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Abstract
This thesis examines transparency and risk reporting issues in Islamic banks. Based
on a postal questionnaire survey of 28 Islamic banks in 14 countries, supplemented by
a follow-up e mails and interviews, the thesis addresses the following specific issues
on: (a) the nature of risks that Islamic banks are exposed; (b) the risk measurement
and management used by Islamic banks; (c) the information required by Islamic bank
supervisors to monitor the risk profile of Islamic banks; (d) the importance of
transparency and market discipline in Islamic banks; and (e) the adequacy of current
risk reporting in Islamic banks.
The results of the study indicate that Islamic banks are exposed to similar risks as
those in conventional banks. Furthermore, the results also reveal that the degree of the
importance of the risks is also similar to those in conventional banks, except the
nature of the risks. However, Islamic banks do not adequately report risk information
in their annual reports, particularly the qualitative risk information, which highlights
that Islamic banks lack behind best practice adopted by leading conventional banks. In
addition, Islamic banks' supervisors required more risk information than that which is
required by financial reporting standards (apart from the issue of frequency) in order
to monitor the risk profile of Islamic banks.
The findings of the thesis have policy making implication on the issue of transparency
with particular reference to risk reporting in Islamic banks, which could benefit
AAOIFI, IFSB and Islamic bank supervisors. These bodies may find it useful to
assess the level of adequacy of risk reporting in Islamic banks and come up with the
new guidelines for risk reporting that would bolster up market discipline as well as
enhance the soundness and stability of the financial systems in which these banks
operate. Furthermore, this study has filled a gap in the literature by empirically
exploring the risk reporting issues from an Islamic banking perspective.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1	 Theoretical Motivation of the Research Study
Financial crises in the mid 1 990s awakened certain national and bank regulators to the
need for enhancing transparency in financial reporting on risks. Previous research
develops the theory and evidence that the financial crises in mid 1990s, particularly in
the East Asian countries, were due, among other things', to inadequate risk disclosure,
particularly foreign exchange risk, in the financial reports of banks (Fons, 1998,
Rahrnan, 1999 and Llewellyn, 2001). If adequate information on risk exposure had
been provided or required periodically, banks might have exercised better risk
management, or allowed international investors and creditors to register their concern,
and thus avoided the sudden withdrawal of capital from the region. In other words, the
banks could have avoided the crises if they had disclosed more information on risks to
the public. This is consistent with the signalling theory as argued by Watts and
Zimmerman (1986).
Islamic banks are no exception. In fact, due to their profit-sharing arrangements,
Islamic banks are expected to be more transparent than conventional banks as the
investment account holders may require more information from the banks to monitor
their investments. The Base! Committee on Banking Supervision2 (BCBS) has Pillar 3
in the New Basel Accord3 (Basel II), published in June 2004 on the issue of market
discipline, which could also apply to Islamic banks. In order to enhance transparency,
banks are encouraged to disclose more information, particularly on risk information.
The heavy reliance on unhedged foreign loans is also a cause of that crisis.
2 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is a committee of banking supervisory authorities which was established by the
central bank Governors of the Group of Ten countries in 1975. It consists of senior representatives of bank supervisory
authorities and central banks from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. It usually meets at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel,
where its permanent Secretariat is located.
The Basel Accord has been introduced by the BCBS in July 1988. This Accord focuses on the total amount of bank capital,
which is vital in reducing the risk of bank insolvency and the potential cost of a bank's failure for depositors. Basel II, which is
proposed in April 2003 and finalised in June 2004, intends to improve safety and soundness in the financial system by placing
more emphasis on banks' own internal control and management, the supervisory review process and market discipline. Section
3.2.4 gives more explanation on this Ba.sel II.
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There is also ongoing discussion on the current International Accounting Standards
(lASs), particularly, lAS 30: Disclosures in the Financial Statements of Banks and
Similar Financial Institutions and lAS 32: Financial Instruments: Disclosure and
Presentation, which are relevant to the banks. The discussions lead to the publication
of the exposure draft of a new International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), ED
7: Financial Instruments: Disclosures, which aims to replace lAS 30 and lAS 32 and
to improve financial reporting by helping users to understand the significance of
financial instruments in the financial statements, by giving more information about
companies' capital and by revealing more clearly the risks attached to holding
financial instruments.
The study of risk has a particular significance for financial reporting, as the banking
risks have a direct effect on monetary assets and liabilities. For instance, the
realisation of currency risks arising from foreign currency denominated loans can
worsen the liquidity and solidity of the banks to such an extent that the bank's
continuity is threatened. Furthermore, risk reporting enables stakeholders to better
assess and understand banking risks and assists shareholders to select the banks that
have an appropriate risk profile.
It is therefore appropriate that banks should disclose their overall risk management
philosophy together with information about the origin of the risks, and the way in
which they are measured, managed and controlled. Conventional banks use several
risk measurement and mitigation techniques (Bessis, 2002). They include credit
ratings, gap analysis, duration analysis, Value at Risk ('VaR), Risk Adjusted Return on
Capital (RAROC) and others. It is interesting to see whether Islamic banks use the
same techniques used by their conventional counterparts, in particular the more
technically advanced risk measurement approaches (for example, VaR, Simulation
techniques, Estimates of Worst Case - Stress Tests, RAROC and Internal Rating
Based System).
Risk management is seen as a key factor in assessing the future performance and
financial position of a bank, as well as in evaluating the quality of its management.
Conventional banks have a variety of risk management techniques which include
credit derivatives and financial derivatives to manage the exposure to market risks for
2
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example swaps, forwards, futures and options. Because of prohibition of nba, many
of these risk management tecimiques based on conventional tools are not used in
Islamic banks4.
1.2	 The Research Objectives and Research Questions
This study aims to achieve the following research objectives:-
To ascertain the perceptions of Islamic bankers on nature of risks, risk
measurement and risk management approaches of Islamic banks in comparison to
those of conventional banks and with reference to the market environment in
which Islamic banks typically operate.
. To ascertain the information that the supervisors of Islamic banks require most to
monitor the risk profile of Islamic banks, but which is not required by existing
financial reporting standards (with reference to lAS 32, ED 7 and FAS 1)), and
also the most important supervisory tool to monitor the risk profile of Islamic
banks.
• To examine the implications of transparency with particular reference to market
discipline for Islamic banks and disclosure of risk and risk management.
• To evaluate the adequacy of risk reporting in existing Islamic banks' aimual
reports.
To explore policy implications from the above for the Islamic banks' regulators
(central banks) and standard setters (IFSB and AAOIFI), with reference to Pillar 2
and Pillar 3 of Basel II.
With regard to the research objectives above, several questions have been raised.
More specifically, this study is concerned with the endeavour to answer the following
questions:
. How does the risk perception of Islamic bankers differ from conventional bankers
with respect to the market in which Islamic banks typically operate? Do Islamic
banks use the more technically advanced risk measurement techniques? Apart
from using similar risk mitigation approaches as in conventional banks, do Islamic
However, some Islamic scholars are of the view that the Shari'a provides exceptions to these conditions to enable deferred sale
where needed (Shafi, 1997), meaning that some derivatives are allowed to be used in Islamic banks.
3
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banks widely use Shari 'a compliant risk mitigation approaches? Also which risk
mitigation approaches used by conventional banks are not used by Islamic banks?
How important for monitoring the risk profile and management of Islamic banks
is the additional risk information which is not required by current financial
reporting standards (with reference to lAS 32, ED 7 and FAS 1) but is provided to
bank supervisors? Which supervisory tool is perceived by bank supervisors to be
the most important to supervise the risk profile and risk management of Islamic
banks?
. What is the perceived role of transparency in Islamic banks from a risk reporting
point of view, with particular reference to Base! II?
. To what extent are existing public disclosures on qualitative risk information in
Islamic banks' annual reports perceived by supervisors of Islamic banks and other
interested parties 5 to be adequate to provide sufficient transparency for Islamic
banks?
. What are the implications of the above for the implementation of Base! II for the
regulation of risk disclosures (Pillar 3) and for banking supervision (Pillar 2)?
1.3	 Overview of the Research Methodology
The theoretical framework of this research study was constructed through the
literature review which is summarised in a series of chapters. The main literature
sources were journals, conference proceedings, books, reports, theses and bank
regulators' papers. The study's research instrument was a survey questionnaire which
was designed to elicit the opinions of the Islamic bankers, the supervisors of Islamic
banks, the representatives of IFSB and AAOIFI, external auditors and external rating
agencies.
1.4	 The Main Conclusions of the Study
The main conclusions drawn from this study are:
In Islamic banks, credit risk is perceived to be the most important risk, and there is
no significant difference with regard to the perceptions of the respondents in
Malaysia, Bahrain and other countries with all the risks. In addition, Salam and
Other interested parties include external auditors, external rating agencies and representatives from IFSB and AAOIFI.
4
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Istisna 'a are perceived to be riskier than Murabaha and Ijarah. However, the most
risky contracts are Musharaka and Mudaraba.
. Islamic banks are perceived not to use the most advanced risk measurement
techniques and the Shari 'a compliant risk mitigation techniques are also not
widely used due to problems raised by Shari 'a interpretations concerning these
techniques.
Supervisors of Islamic banks require additional information in order to monitor
the risk profile of Islamic banks (apart from the issue of frequency). In addition, a
supervisory rating system (CAMELS) is perceived to be the most important
assessment approach to supervise Islamic banks as compared to the statistically
based approaches, with the exception of Babrain, where they considered
CAMELS to be only important and not very important.
Transparency is perceived to be more important in Islamic banks than in
conventional banks due to the existence of profit sharing investment account
holders in the former.
• Market discipline is perceived to facilitate banking supervision in Islamic banks,
similar to conventional banks.
• It is perceived that Basel II could apply to Islamic banks but with some
adaptations, and then the IFSB could play an important role in this context.
• Islamic banks' external credit rating agencies are perceived to help the public to
assess the banks' financial condition. However, not all Islamic banks are rated by
external rating agencies. Islamic banks must find alternative ways to invest
surplus liquidity as a means of securing better risk ratings.
. The level of qualitative risk information is not adequate in the existing Islamic
banks' annual reports. This is consistent with the ongoing discussions on the
current accounting standards that are relevant to the banks.
1.4	 The Significance of the Study
It is believed that this study could contribute some references to an ongoing debate
over the issues regarding the transparency of risk reporting in Islamic banks' annual
reports and the relevant accounting standards. The study could also help the
policyholders, in particular the supervisors of Islamic banks, AAOIFI and IFSB, to
come up with policies to improve transparency of risk reporting in Islamic banks. In
5
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addition, the findings of this study could add to the existing body of literature since
there are not many empirical studies on Islamic banks that have been undertaken to
date. In fact, this study is the first empirical study in the academic literature.
1.5	 The Structure of the Study
The structure of this thesis contains three main parts which are as follows:
Part I: Background and Review of Literature
This part provides a review of background literature associated with this research
study. It includes five chapters. Chapter 2 discusses the importance of adequate risk
disclosure by conventional banks and the roles of segment reporting in that context. It
is argued that adequate risk disclosure could improve market discipline (Pillar 3,
Basel II). Accounting standards on segment reporting (lAS 14, SFAS 131, SSAP 25,
and the UK SORP on Segmental Reporting for Banks) and the role of segment
reporting are also discussed in this chapter.
Chapter 3 identifies the gaps between the current accounting standards and the current
best practice as advocated by regulators (BCBS). The chapter discusses the existing
lASs that are relevant to banks, which include lAS 30 and lAS 32 and also the new
ED 7. It then, provides example of the best current practices for conventional banks
by reviewing three leading banks in Europe. In addition, this chapter explains the
signalling theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) with regard to the disclosure issues.
Chapter 4 provides the link between transparency and market discipline and discusses
some of the causes of the previous banking crisis. In addition, the role of bank
supervisors in facilitating transparency is also discussed in this chapter.
Chapters 5 and 6 look at the case of Islamic banks. First, the differences between
conventional banks and Islamic banks are discussed in Chapter 5. This leads to the
recognition that different accounting standards need to be designed to cover the
specificaties of Islamic bank's transactions and risks. Then, Chapter 6 explains the
issue of transparency within the context of Islamic banks and the implications of
transparency for Islamic banks.
6
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Part II: Research Methodological Approach
This part includes Chapter 7, which discuss the methodological approach employed in
this research study. This covers research objectives, research questions, development
of research propositions, research instrument and the summary of the form of analysis
used to analyse the collected data.
Part III: Findings, Discussion and Conclusions
In this part, research findings, discussion and conclusions are presented. This part
comprises three chapters. Chapter 8 presents the first part of research findings. It
provides a summary to answer research questions 1 and 2. Chapter 9 provides the
second part of the research findings, which are mainly to answer research questions 3
and 4. Chapter 10 discusses the findings and presents the conclusions which were
drawn from this research. It also points out limitations faced by the researcher and the
future research directions.
7
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Chapter 2
Disclosure of Risks in Conventional Banks
2.1	 Introduction
Comprehensive reporting on risk in banks' annual reports is of great importance for
users of the annual reports, particularly for investors, analysts and depositors in
today's volatile business and economic environment. Firstly, risk management is an
integral element in enhancing and protecting shareholder value. Secondly, investors
need to be able to observe and form opinions on the risks potentially affecting the
bank and the way in which these risks are managed. In addition, disclosures about risk
exposures also help investors form a view on the amount, timing and probability of
the banks' future cash flows. Banks, as the institutions who receive deposits from the
public and then invest them must be able to provide useful and meaningful
information about their activities to the users of the information. The activities of the
banks are now becoming more complex and dynamic which lead to greater risks being
faced by the banks. The disclosure of the information on risks in the banks' annual
reports enables the users to make a more accurate assessment of the financial
condition of the banks.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows:
Section 2.2 explains the nature of risks in conventional banks, including risk
measurement and management techniques. Section 2.3 discusses the importance of
transparency in conventional banks. Section 2.4 looks into the empirical evidence on
risk disclosure. Financial reporting standards on segment reporting and their role in
relation to risk disclosure are discussed in Sections 2.5 and 2.6. Section 2.7 presents
the appropriateness of the segment reporting standards for banks. Section 2.8
summarises the empirical evidence on segment reporting. Finally, Section 2.9
provides concluding remarks.
2.2	 Banking Risks
There is no single definition of risks. In this study, banking risks are defined as
adverse impacts on profitability of several distinct sources of uncertainty (Bessis,
2004). Risk is usually estimated by the standard deviation of the distribution of
8
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historic outcomes. Risk measurement requires capturing the source of the uncertainty
and the magnitude of its potential adverse effect on profitability. Profitability refers to
both accounting and mark-to-market measures. In general, any bank faces two types
of risk; business risk and inherent risks (UBS Annual Report, 2002). Business risks
are the risks associated with a chosen business strategy, including business cycles,
industry cycles, and technological change. They are the sole responsibility of the
relevant business, and are not subject to an independent control process. They are,
however, factored into the firm's planning and budgeting process.
Inherent risks are the risks inherent in the banking activities which are subject to
independent risk control and can be divided into primary risks (credit risk, market risk
and liquidity and funding risk) and consequential risks (also known as operational
risks).
It is clear that risks exist in every transaction a bank undertakes and in every service it
provides. Banks are at risk from shortcomings and failures in their own processes and
procedures and from systems failures, all of which can cause loss of customers, loss
of opportunities and perhaps, the need to pay compensation. Banks are at risk from
fraud and theft from their own employees, as well as from customers and criminals.
Banks are also at risk if they misprice their products and services. Banks therefore
need a comprehensive understanding of the cost of delivering their products and
services.
Profitability is at risk if the price they charge for a product or service is less than the
direct and indirect cost of delivery (including interest costs) and, importantly, does not
take account of the cost of any losses crystallising from the risks that arise from
carrying out the transaction. Some of these risks are immediate, for example exchange
rates affecting currency dealing positions change continuously, while others can take
longer to crystallise, for example for as long as the economic cycle in the case of
credit losses. It is therefore a fundamental responsibility of management to ensure that
all the risks associated with each class of business, each product and each type of
transaction are identified.
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In general, banks are exposed to different types of risks, but in quantifying and
disclosing risk, they focus primarily on these four types of risks (Hitchins, 2001),
which is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: The Principal Banking Inherent Risks
Credit Risk
ngRisk
	
Market Risk
Operational Risk
Liquidity Risk
The nature of these risks is discussed below: -
1. Credit risk
The risk of loss that arises when a counterparty or obligor fails to meet the terms
of a financial contract or otherwise fails to fulfil an obligation. All transactions
give rise to counterparty risk. The expectation is that the longer the claim on the
counterparty exists, the greater the risk.
2. Market risk
The uncertainty of cash flows because of changes in the value of financial
instruments caused by movements in market parameters, which include market
prices, interest rates and exchange rates. The more volatile are asset prices, the
greater are the market risks faced by the banks that adopt open trading positions.
Fitch (1997) has noted that interest rate risks and foreign exchange risks arise
primarily as a consequence of a mismatch between the assets and revenues
denominated in one currency, and liabilities and costs denominated in another
currency. The problem occurs mainly in cases of urihedged foreign expansion,
when fluctuations of exchange rates cause assets and liabilities to move in
opposite directions (Hitchins, 2001). This can have a significant impact on the
income and profitability of financial institutions (Heffeman, 1996).
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3. Liquidity risk
The risk that a sudden surge in liability withdrawals may leave a bank in a
position of having to liquidate assets in a very short period of time and at low
prices. More generally, the risk arising from maturity mismatches where liabilities
have a shorter tenor than assets. A sudden rise in the borrower's demands above
the expected level can lead to shortages of cash or liquid marketable assets
(Oldfield and Santamero, 1997). One aspect of asset and liability management in
the banking business is to minimise the liquidity risk.
4. Operational risk
A wide-ranging risk category relating to human error, management or deficiencies
in operating systems. For financial services providers, operational risk can present
a unique challenge insofar as the complexity of contractual arrangements is likely
to result in a significant potential for errors (Hussain, 2000).
It is therefore appropriate that banks should disclose their overall risk management
philosophy together with information about the origin of the risks, and the way in
which they are measured, managed and controlled. Conventional banks use several
risk measurement and mitigation techniques (Bessis, 2002). They include credit
ratings, gap analysis, duration analysis, maturity matching, Earnings at risk, VaR,
simulation techniques, stress tests, RAROC and internal based rating system. Risk
management is seen as a key factor in assessing the future performance and financial
position of a bank, as well as in evaluating the quality of its management. The BCBS
(1999) for example, reports that weak credit risk management practices and poor
credit quality continue to be a dominant cause of bank failures and banking crises
world-wide. The effective management of credit risk is a critical component of a
comprehensive approach to risk management and essential to the long-term success of
any banking organisation. Apart from credit risk issues, conventional banks have a
variety of risk management techniques which include credit derivatives and financial
derivatives to manage the exposure to market risks, for example, swaps, forwards,
futures and options.
In an information environment that lacks transparency, a bank that discloses more
information about its risks than others may fear that outsiders will erroneously
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perceive its riskiness to be greater than that of other banks. However, the regulations
on enhancing disclosures and signalling theory (details in Section 3.7) could be seen
as an indication of strength to the banks as these can provide more meaningful
information to the users to assess the financial performance of the banks.
In September 2000, the BCBS, in a paper 'Best Practices for Credit Risk Disclosure'
identifies the types of credit risks information market participants and supervisors
need in order to make a meaningful assessment of a bank, and encourages banks in all
countries to provide such information to the public. The paper provides disclosure
recommendations in five broad areas: accounting policies and practices, credit risk
management, credit exposures, credit quality and earnings. They recommend that
banks should increase their level of public disclosure to comply with this guidance in
line with the nature, size and complexity of their activities. The paper builds on
concepts developed in the BCBS's report in 1998 on 'Enhancing Bank
Transparency6 ', by providing more detailed guidance in the area of credit risk.
This is consistent with their publication in 2001 with the title, 'Public Disclosures by
Banks: Results of the 1999 Disclosure Survey' where they conducted a survey to
encourage banks to publicly disclose both quantitative and qualitative information that
will allow bank counterparties and other financial market participants to make
informed decisions regarding banks' risk management practices and financial
strength. The survey results show varying disclosure levels in the areas surveyed. In a
broad sense, banks commonly disclosed capital related items, credit risk allowances,
diversification of credit risk and accounting policies. However, the survey results
show that there is a lack of disclosure in areas related to credit risk modelling and the
use of internal ratings. These disclosure areas are likely to be of increased importance
in the future, as disclosure of key information regarding the use of internal ratings will
be necessary for banks to qualif' for the ratings based approach in Pillar 1 of Basel II
(minimum capital requirement).
6 Details of this paper wifl be discussed in Section 2.3.
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2.3	 Importance of Transparency
Transparency in this context is defined as public disclosure of reliable and timely
information that enables users of that information to make an accurate assessment of a
bank's financial condition and performance, business activities, risk profile and risk
management practices (BCBS, 1998). This definition recognises that disclosure alone
does not necessarily result in transparency. To achieve transparency, a bank must
provide timely, accurate, relevant and sufficient disclosures of qualitative and
quantitative information that enables users to make proper assessment of the
institution's activities and risks inherent in those activities. Greater transparency and
disclosure keep corporate stakeholders better informed about the way a bank is being
managed and governed. In addition, studies suggest that better disclosure has a
positive impact on the efficient functioning of capital markets. In particular, Healy
and Palepu (2001) review research on financial reporting and voluntary disclosure of
information by management, and conclude that the increased pace of entrepreneurship
and globalisation has increased the value of reliable information in capital markets.
According to Healy and Palepu (2001), in the presence of imperfect accounting
regulations, managers can be stimulated to make voluntary disclosure for several
reasons. First of all they can be driven by the expectation of reducing the cost of
capital by reducing the information asymmetry and the uncertainty perceived by
investors (Lang and Lundholm, 1993, 1996). Secondly, managers can voluntarily
disclose in the case of poor share or earnings performance, when they are held
accountable, in order to reduce the likelihood of under-evaluation of their
performance and to explain away poor performance (Breiman, 1999). In this case,
managers may disclose also in order to protect themselves from legal actions for
inadequate or untimely disclosure (Skinner, 1994). Thirdly, talented managers may
have an incentive to make voluntary earnings forecasts in order to enable the market
to appreciate their capabilities (Trueman, 1986).
In addition, the literature suggest that it is in the firm's interest to provide more
voluntary disclosures, thereby reducing the information asymmetry component of the
firm's cost of capital and increasing the firm's stock liquidity (Diamond and
Verrecchia, 1991; Verrecchia, 2001).
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Transparency reduces moral hazard and adverse selection and enhances efficiency and
integrity of the markets and strengthens market discipline (details in Section 4.2). The
issue of transparency for banks has been emphasised in recent years, particularly by
the BCBS. In their article 'Enhancing Bank Transparency' which was published in
September 1998, the definition of transparency is given as shown at the begiiming of
this section. In this article, the BCBS makes six recommendations about the
information that should be included in public disclosures by banks in order to achieve
a satisfactory level of bank transparency and to ensure effective market discipline as a
complement to effective banking supervision. They include financial performance,
financial position (including capital, solvency and liquidity), risk management
strategies and practices, risk exposures (including credit risk, market risk, liquidity
risk, and operational, legal and other risks), accounting policies and basic business,
management and corporate governance information.
Transparency of banks and risks are considered to be a key element of an effectively
supervised, safe and sound banking system. Meaningful and accurate information
reported in a timely maimer provides an important foundation for the decisions of
market participants. Hence disclosure of information is effective only if it provides
information about the banking risks and risk management processes.
Recommendations by BCBS (1998) on the disclosure of information on risk are
divided into:
• Credit risk. Disclosure of information on credit risk should enable users to
understand the size of a bank's credit exposures both on an aggregate basis and in
significant areas. An understanding of those business lines that create credit risk
and the nature and composition of the exposures can be acquired through
qualitative disclosures. Among the quantitative disclosures, it is recommended
that banks disclose the amount of the problem loans, an ageing schedule, and any
concentrations of credit exposure.
• Market risk. The BCBS suggests that banks should disclose both qualitative and
quantitative information on market risk, the risk that arises from changes in
interest rates, foreign exchange rates and the market prices of equities and
commodities. It is noted that for larger banks, measurement methods such as
14
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Value at Risk7 (VaR) provides summarised data on market risk exposures. Where
such methods are used, it is recommended that there should be disclosure of the
assumptions used in the calculations.
Liquidity risk. As well as providing quantitative disclosures about its available
liquid assets, it is recommended that a bank provides qualitative information about
its funding options and its contingency plans.
Operational risk. In addition to providing information about the main types of
operational risk faced by a bank, it is recommended that it discloses any specific
problems that are considered significant.
Disclosure and transparency are not a panacea but they can improve market discipline.
This is explained in Pillar 38 of Basel II.
The role of the standard-setters in preparing disclosure standards will be important in
order to improve financial reporting. Banks are encouraged to provide greater
disclosure of risk, so that implications of the use of their complex financial
instruments can be understood by financial statement users.
In most cases, investors have considerable difficulty in obtaining a complete and
integrated view of a bank's risk profile. This leads to what has been defined as the risk
information gap, one of the components of the information gap affecting corporate
reporting (Eccles et a!., 2001). This information gap has to be filled in order to avoid
the permanent loss of importance of financial statements as one of the traditional
instruments for communicating bank performance to investors. One way banks can
fill this gap is by voluntary disclosure as discussed earlier in this section.
2.4 Empirical Evidence on Risk Disclosure
There are no specific studies reported in the literature on the disclosure of risks by
banks. However, several studies have been undertaken by academicians and bank
regulators on loan loss provisions disclosure and the effect to banks' returns. Loan
Value at Risk (VaR) estimates the potential pre-tax loss resulting from any chosen adverse movement in interest or market rates
over a defined holding period. It can be used for risks implicit in price movements for equities and commodities, exchange rate or
interest rate exposures providing there is a sufficient base of historical data on past rate changes from which to calculate the
probabilities of future rate changes. Future rate changes are assumed to follow past changes i.e. normally distributed.
Market discipline imposes strong incentives on banks to conduct their business in a safe, sound and efficient manner, including
an incentive to maintain a strong capital base as a cushion against potential future losses arising from risk exposures.
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loss provisions reflect the current period increase in the level of expected loan losses,
and are disclosed as accrued expenses in the income statement. There are two more
disclosures of changing default risk by banks: non-performing loans and loan
chargeoffs. Non-performing loans include all loans in the portfolio more than 90 days
overdue on interest or principal payments, and are disclosed as supplemental financial
statement information. Loan chargeoffs measure all loans deemed uncollectible
during the period. Chargeoffs are assets write-offs that are reported separately in
financial statement footnotes, and can also be derived from balance sheet and income
statement data. Together, these three disclosures represent an integrated, contextual
set of potentially value-relevant information spanning the income statement, balance
sheet and footnotes.
Interestingly, recent empirical studies have obtained evidence consistent with a
positive relation between stock returns and loan loss provisions (Beaver et. al., 1989;
Griffin and Wallach, 1991; and Wahlen, 1994). This evidence is interesting because it
contradicts the notion that loan loss provisions are interpreted as expenses that reflect
expected loan losses. On the other hand, Griffin (1998) examines the loan loss
disclosures made by seventeen New England banks during 1989 and 1990. The study
hypothesises and provides evidence of a differential negative market reaction to bank
loan loss announcements based on the timeliness of the announcement relative to the
end of a fiscal quarter. In addition, the analysis reveals that bank stock prices
responded as a function of the timing and the amount of unexpected change in the
loan loss provision. His finding contradicts the earlier studies. However, this also
depends on whether the disclosures provide "good" news or "bad" news in relation to
market expectations.
McLeay and Diaz (1996) look at the inter bank transfer of information in the
securities market at the time of the bad debt provision announcements, using a system
of simultaneous equations. They compare the behaviour of commercial banks in the
US (12 banks) and the UK (4 banks), which are the principal lenders to Latin
America. They found that the reactions over successive announcements by banks
(provision for bad debts by UK banks and the addition to loan loss reserves by US
banks) followed a similar pattern of information transfer in two countries. The paper
assesses the capital market reaction to the bad debt provision announcements resulting
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from the Latin America debt crisis. It is shown that there were significant excess
returns to the shares of announcing banks and to those of banks which had, at the time
of any given announcement, not yet disclosed their own policy. On the other hand,
once an announcement had been made, subsequent excess returns were not
significantly different from zero or were negative.
However, the preceding results do not look into the issue of adequate risk disclosure
by banks, but rather on the disclosure of loan loss provisions and the reaction from the
market and whether the report on loan loss information should convey more
information about loan impairment than similar banks that report on a less timely
basis. Loan loss provisions are related to credit risk disclosures in that they are
provisions for those risks known as credit risks. There may, however, be credit risks
other than potential loan losses, for example counterparty risks or guarantor risks.
The existing studies look into the loan loss disclosures, which exist on the income
statement, balance sheet and footnotes to the financial statements. These may be
useful to the users, but users obtain a better understanding if banks provide a
commentary on the financial statements which describes the way it manages and
controls the risks associated with the operations of the bank. As mentioned earlier,
banks are exposed to credit risks, market risks, liquidity risks and operational risks.
Therefore, disclosures in the financial statements of a bank need to be sufficiently
comprehensive to meet the needs of users. The existence of segment reporting
standards is hoped to assist financial statements' users in understanding risk exposure.
2.5	 Segment Reporting Standards
There are several accounting standards related to segment reporting, particularly lAS
14, SSAP 25 (UK) and SFAS 131 (US).
2.5.1 International Accounting Standard (lAS) 14 (Revised), 'Segment
Reporting'
The current International Accounting Standard Committee Board (IASCB) rules are
found in lAS 14, which came into force in 1983. The standard was revised in August
1997 and the new rules in lAS 14 (Revised), 'Segment Reporting' are applicable for
accounting periods beginning on or after 1 July 1998. This standard is applicable to
the financial statements of all enterprises that have issued, or are in the process of
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issuing, publicly traded securities (equity or debt). lAS 14 (Revised) provides that one
basis of segmentation is primary and the other is secondary, with considerably less
information to be disclosed for secondary segments. The primary segment can be
either industry or geographical segments and the secondary segment is the segment on
the alternative basis. If the company's risks and returns are strongly affected by
differences in both geographical areas and industries, then both types of areas are
under primary segments.
The objective of lAS 14 (Revised), 'Segment Reporting' is to assist the user of
financial statements in making judgements about the risks and returns facing an
enterprise by the disclosure of finer information than that provided in the primary
financial statements. This standard adopts a consolidated statement approach due to
the fact that it defines business segments by products or services grouped together on
an industry basis according to a national or international industry or product
classification system.
2.5.2 SSAP 25, 'Segmental Reporting'
Although the original International Accounting Standard, lAS 14, 'Reporting
Financial Information by Segment' was published in August 1981, it was not until
1986 that work commenced in the UK on developing an accounting standard on the
subject. SSAP 25, 'Segmental Reporting' was issued in July 1990. SSAP 25 was
effective for accounting periods beginning on or after July 1, 1990. This standard
requires segmental reporting of information on turnover, results and net assets in
respect of each class of business or geographical segment, if significant to the entity
as a whole. A segment is regarded as significant if the turnover, results or net assets
that it produces are greater than 10 per cent of the total for the company. SSAP 25
applies to all entities subject to the Companies Act 1985, which include banking and
insurance companies and groups.
The emphasis of the standard is that for segmental reporting to be of real value to
users of financial statements, the segmental information reported needs both to reflect
the company's risk and return profile and to inform users of the nature of that profile.
This indicates that this standard adopts a risk and return approach. The standard views
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reportable segments in terms of either class of business segments or geographical
segments.
2.5.3 SFAS 131, 'Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise and Related
Information'
SFAS 131 was issued by Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in United
States in June 1997. Its primary benefit is the ability to see an enterprise through
management's eyes, thereby making it easier for the users to predict management
actions or reaction that can have a significant effect on the enterprise's prospects of
future cash flows. This statement supersedes SFAS 14, 'Financial Reporting for
Segments of a Business Enterprise' 9
 which had led to several problems such as that
segment disclosures did not correspond to the way management runs the business.
SFAS 131 is effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1997. It applies
to all business enterprises which are traded in a public market and are required to file
financial statements with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). This
statement adopts a 'management approach' (FASB 1997, para.4), in requiring that the
reportable business segments be based on the way that management organises
segments for making operating decisions and assessing performance.
SFAS 131 requires disclosure of information by operating segment and by
geographical segment. Reportable segments are operating segments where total
operating segments' revenues, reported profit or loss and assets make up 10 per cent
or more of the combined respective items.
For geographical segments, there are two items of information to be disclosed by
geographic area: revenues from external customers or each group of similar products
or services regardless of amount unless it is impracticable and long-lived assets.
Revenue information is a critical disclosure for financial analysis.
SFAS 14 issued in 1976, requires companies to disclose revenues, a profitability measure, and identifiable assets for lines of
business (LOB) and geographic areas with no specific link to the internal Organization of the company. The disclosure was
limited to geographic regions and major customers.
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SFAS 131 does not have a category of 'secondary' segments for which a lower level
of disclosure is required, like lAS 14, but it has a category of 'enterprise-wide'
information, in addition to disclosures by operating segment. This disclosure is about
products and services, geographic areas, and major customers, which must be
disclosed separately if this has not been done as part of segment reporting.
SFAS 131 requires disclosure of revenues from external customers to be made by
individual country (paragraph 38), which FASB believes will provide more useful
information than disclosures provided at an aggregated level. A study by Nichols et al.
(2000) provides partial evidence that country level disclosures can be useful.
Figure 2.2 summarises all the standards related to segment reporting.
Figure 2.2: Accounting Standards on Segment Reporting
Accounting Standards on Segment Reporting
SFAS 131
	
SSAP25
	 lAS 14
-US	 -UK	 - IASB
- Management approach	 - Risk-return approach	 - Consolidated
statement approach
2.6	 The Role of Segment Reporting
The objective of segment reporting is to assist the user of financial statements in
making judgements about the opportunities and risks facing an enterprise by the
disclosure of finer information that provided in the primary financial statements (lAS
14). The finer information provides an analysis of the enterprise's financial
performance in the various market areas in which it operates. Market areas will
include product markets (business segments) and geographic markets (geographic
segments). Disclosure of appropriate segment information enables the user of
financial statements to observe the enterprise's performance by market area, for
example return on assets (ROA) and return on sales.
For segment reporting to be truly useful, it must be relevant and comparable over
time. However, the latter is very difficult to achieve in practice. Emmanuel and
Garrod (2001) conduct a study to examine whether relevance and comparability can
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be achieved simultaneously in segmental disclosures for UK companies. The results
of their tests reveal that for a significant portion of the sample the levels of both
relevance and comparability are simultaneously low due to the segment identification
choices made. These choices appear to match the possible outcomes of following the
management approach to identification. By implication, the adoption of the
management approach may lead to reduced comparability and relevance in some
cases.
How can segment reporting help in the area of risk evaluation? Most industry segment
information is aggregated on a worldwide basis, and the risk that a specific industry
faces might differ from country to country. Countries within a geographic area also
face different kinds of risk. It would appear that the reporting solution to the problems
of risk is the same as it is for forecasting returns. The greater the degree of
disaggregation, the better an analyst would be able to forecast the impact of events on
the overall operations of the sector. Ideally, that disaggregation could reach down to
the country level.
The study by Ajinkya (1980) shows that the uniformity and greater fineness of
disclosure for multi product firms (as mandated by SEC), appear to have increased the
consensus in the risk-return assessments of the securities of multi product firm at the
aggregate level. This confirms that segment reporting can help in the area of risk
evaluation.
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in the provision of additional
information, including disaggregated or segment information. Segment reporting
involves breaking down the enterprise into its constituent parts or segments and
reporting financial information on a disaggregated basis for each of the segments. A
business can segment its operations in a number of ways, with the two most common
being segmentation by industry or type of business and by geographical area (in
accordance with the accounting standards mentioned earlier). If adequate segment
information is disclosed, users should be ab'e to combine business specific
information with external information to help them to assess the future prospects of
the business.
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Previous studies have shown the US standard (SFAS 131) has led to the US
companies under study to improve their financial reporting in terms of number of
segments reported and information shown in the segments, in particular studies by
Herrmann and Thomas (2000) and Street et al. (2000). Both studies have compared
the segment reporting disclosures under SFAS 131 with those reported the previous
year under SFAS 14. They used the annual reports of US companies obtained from
1998 Fortune 500 Listing (Hermann and Thomas, 2000) and a list of the 480 US-
domiciled Business Week Global 1000 companies (Street et. al, 2000). However, both
of the studies were conducted on non-banking firms.
Advocates of segment reporting argue that the separate segments of an enterprise are
usually subject to different economic conditions, different degrees of risk and exhibit
different growth rates. A single, all-inclusive report tends to average out those
differences, thereby obscuring them. Accordingly, they argue that segment reporting
would enable users of financial reports to make better decisions.
It is clear that segment reporting can assist in the area of risk disclosure. When the
banks report their activities based on segment (by business line or geographical
segments), the users can assess the risk exposure of these banks in each of the
segments. Evaluation of business activities involves analysis of risk and profitability
associated with such activities. The rate of risk and profitability is influenced by the
degree of uncertainty that is inherent with a firm's operations. Since uncertainty tends
to change from country to country, disclosures based on geographic areas of
operations are expected to provide useful information for the assessment of the bank's
performance as a whole.
2.7	 Appropriateness of the Segment Reporting Standards for Banks
As financial conglomerates, which include high-street banking, investment banking
and securities dealing, banks operate in a variety of classes of business and in a
number of different geographical locations. Therefore, the availability of segmental
information (also called 'disaggregated information') setting out meaningful analyses
of turnover and profits is useful for good management as well as for investors and
creditors. Such information is essential if management is to be able to detect trends in
revenues and other aspects of performance within its specific businesses and
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geographical regions. At the same time, this could enable the different risks faced by
the banks to be analysed by line of business and geographical area. However, there
are problems with existing accounting standards on segment reporting. For example,
there is lack of comparability in definitions of line of business.
As mentioned earlier, banks have a variety of operations and the availability of the
segmental reporting can assist the users in understanding the different activities of the
banks. However, in all of the above standards, they are applicable to banks but not
really mandatory. For example, SSAP 25 applies to all banks, unless they avoid
disclosure by taking advantage of the 'prejudicial override' exemption'°. The bank
supervisors, during the process of improving transparency, can make segment
reporting mandatory so that this can give better picture of the risks and returns faced
by the banks. Business and geographical segments are likely to have different risk
characteristics which aggregate information does not reveal. Therefore, it is important
for banks to be broken down into segments so that the decomposition of risks can be
shown separately.
In discussing the issue of transparency that has been explained in the previous
chapter, segment reporting can be seen as a tool to enhance transparency.
The existing standards on segment reporting of IASB, UK and US do explain in a
great deal regarding the ways enterprises (which include banks) should report their
segments either by a management approach (US), a risk and return approach (UK) or
a consolidated approach (IASB). For example, lAS 14 (Revised) requires extensive
disclosure for primary segments which include segment revenue, segment results,
segment assets and liabilities the cost of property, plant, equipment and intangible
assets acquired during the period.
For secondary segments, it requires disclosure of segment revenue, segment assets
and the cost of property, plant, equipment and intangible assets acquired during the
period. This indicates the appropriateness of the segment reporting in relation to the
'° This exemption mentions that disaggregated information need not to be disclosed where the directors have determined that
such disclosure would be seriously prejudicial to the company's interest. For example, if a company or a group supplies
customers in two countries and these two countries are politically opposed to each other. Then, to publish a geographical split of
turnover could be considered to be prejudicial to the interests of the company or the group.
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banks. For example, it is argued by Nichols et al. (2000) that enterprise-wide
disclosures as required by SFAS 131 will provide information that is more useful in
assessing the impact of concentrations of risk. Banks which operate internationally
can make this type of disclosure so that different rates of growth and differences in
economic conditions in different countries can be shown. However, additional
requirements, for example the credit risk and market risk by country, should also be
included, particularly due to the uniqueness of the banks' activities.
If banks provide segmental information in their financial reports, the users of
accounting information can properly understand the concentration of the reporting
organisation's activities in specific sectors of the economy. From such segmental
information, the users of financial statements can judge whether or not a bank is
exposed to a high degree of financial risk due to concentration in a particular sector.
2.8	 Empirical Evidence on Segment Reporting
Previous studies on segmental disclosure do not really highlight the application of
segment reporting by banks, but rather the information content of segmental
disclosure particularly geographic area disclosures (Nichols et al., 2000; Doupnik and
Seese, 2001) in non-banks.
Nichols et al. (2000) examine the geographic segment disclosures of 158 US Global
1000 companies for both 1997 and 1998 to ascertain the impact and effectiveness of
SFAS 131. However, again, they exclude financing firms from their sample. The main
reason is for consistency. In summary, they found that SFAS 131 has resulted in the
disclosure of more country specific geographic segment data and a closer alignment
of reportable segment data with other parts of the annual report.
The recent study by Doupnik and Seese (2001) also looks at geographic area
disclosures under SFAS 131, but their study goes beyond Nichols et al. (2000) by
evaluating the issue of materiality and fineness. They used a sample of 254 largest
US-based companies taken from Fortune and they found that there is considerable
diversity among companies in the way that materiality is defined. For a large
percentage of companies, the information provided under SFAS 131 appears to be
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finer than the information provided under SFAS 14. This confirms the superiority of
SFAS 131 over SFAS 14, which the FASB wanted to achieve.
Another important study on segment reporting and standard was made by Ahadiat and
Stewart in 1992. They show that there is considerably diversity of practices and
disclosure requirements for geographic segment reporting among the international
standard-setting organisations. The international standard-setting organisations used
are the United Nations (UN), Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), European Economic Community (EEC) and International
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). This diversity is noticeable not only in the
segment identification procedures, but also in the list of information to be reported.
Each of the organisations described in their study has developed its own version of
geographic segment reporting standards, seemingly with little regard for
harmonisation. Harmonisation of accounting standards between all reporting
components of enterprises not only improves comparability but it also can provide
better communication, lower costs, and contribute to more efficient management.
The above argument is also true for banks. Banks, especially when they operate
internationally, must be able to use the same financial reporting methods following
the same standards so that their performance can be compared and measured
efficiently. It is important for the market to be aware of the banks' exposure to risk
and the basis on which these exposures are managed and calculated.
2.9	 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has discussed the inherent risks in conventional banks reporting and the
importance of enhancing transparency with regard to risks, an issue which has been
raised by the regulators, particularly the BCBS. Empirical evidence only focuses on
one aspect of risks, which is the disclosure of loan loss provisions and the effect on
bank stock returns. It is important to include the disclosure of all the other risks faced
by the banks in the present study to provide a basis for an accounting standard (for
Islamic banks) applying lASs or UK Standards, which can assist the users in
understanding the risks faced by these banks.
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The role of segment reporting in the disclosure of risks by the banks has been very
important in giving a better picture of the banks' performance. Disaggregation of the
information will allow the users to make better use of the annual reports for decision-
making. The users of financial information can achieve a better understanding of a
bank's overall financial performance if the bank discloses the contribution of different
activities and regions to overall financial performance. In particular, this information
helps the users assess the extent of diversification in the bank's business and the
contribution of specific business segments and regions that may be considered to be of
a higher risk. It also facilitates awareness of the impact of significant changes, for
example due to regional disturbances, on the bank as a whole. It is hoped that by
having increased disclosure of risks, the likelihood of banking crises can be reduced
in the future.
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Chapter 3
Best Practices for Conventional Banks on Risk Disclosure
3.1	 Introduction
It is necessary for banks to operate in a safe and sound manner and to hold sufficient
capital and reserves to support the risks that arise in their business. The main reason
for this is that banks are responsible for maintaining the trust of the public. In general,
financial globalisation and deregulation have increased the demand for better
disclosure of risks in banking. Therefore, the reporting requirements will be greater
for banks operating in the international capital markets. They have to follow the
existing accounting standards and at the same time to be up-to-date with the
recommendations of international and national regulators, such as the Bank for
International Settlements, the UK Financial Services Authority and the US Securities
and Exchange Commission.
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS)" is an international organisation which
fosters cooperation among central banks and other agencies in pursuit of monetary
and financial stability. It will give recommendations to central banks in order to
enhance the transparency of the banking system. In United Kingdom (UK), there is
the Financial Services Authority (FSA), an independent non-governmental body,
which is the main regulator for investments firms, banks, building societies and
insurance companies in UK. FSA's main objectives are to maintain confidence in the
UK financial system and promote public understanding of the financial system. The
US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has as its objectives to protect
investors and to maintain the integrity of the securities markets. SEC is also
concerned primarily with promoting disclosure of important information enforcing the
securities laws and protecting investors who interact with these various organisations
and individuals.
Banks' activities are becoming more complex, which means that current accounting,
reporting and disclosure standards do not really provide a sufficiently full picture of
the banks' risk profile. Banks are exposed to a complex diversity of risks, which can
The BCBS's secretariat is provided by the BIS in Basel, Switzerland.
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threaten a bank's future. One bank's failure can have a significant impact on other
banks' viability (so-called 'systemic risk'). The Asian financial crisis in 1996 has
highlighted the importance of risk management in preventing banks' failure (details in
Section 4.3). It turned out that most financial institutions had a large amount of non-
performing loans which were the result of poor credit evaluation and risk management
and excessive lending to some parts of the real estate sector.
The recommendations from the banking regulators especially by the BCBS were
being targeted at setting global standards and guidelines that are in many cases
derived from practices in developed countries. These standards were gathered in the
'Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision" 2 and have recently been
extended in some areas, such as bank transparency.
There seem to be some significant gaps between the accounting standards and current
best practice as advocated by the regulators, in particular the BCBS's
recommendations on disclosure of risks.
Section 3.2 identifies the gaps between the existing international accounting
standards, the recommendations by UK FSA and BCBS, and examines the existing
accounting standards that are relevant to banks. Furthermore, this section also
discusses the improvements to the existing international accounting standards and the
new exposure draft issued by IASB, ED 7. Section 3.3 reviews the current practice by
three leading banks in Europe. Section 3.4 presents the best disclosure practice.
Section 3.5 explains the signalling theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) with regard
to the disclosure issues. Finally, Section 3.6 provides concluding remarks.
3.2	 Disclosure Recommendations: International Accounting Standards and
Banks' Regulators
There is increasing interest in the international harmonisation of accounting standards
and particularly in attempts to expand the international accounting standards
framework to form a base for this. There is also mounting pressure from banking
regulators for increased and harmonised disclosures by major banks as part of their
2 See BCBS (1997).
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move to improve regulatory conduct through market discipline and peer pressure. A
major concern of banking regulators is the stability of the banking industry.
3.2.1 International Accounting Standards
Since 1977, the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), now the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), has collaborated with the BCBS
on the matter of the international harmonisation of the financial reporting of banks. At
the European level, other harmonisation work took place during thel98Os in order to
produce the European Economic Community (EEC) Bank Accounts Directive, which
was approved in December 1986. Two of the international accounting standards
particularly relevant to banks on disclosure are lAS 30 and lAS 32.
lAS 30 'Disclosure in the Financial Statements of Banks and Similar Financial
Institutions' was issued in June 1990. The standard was reformatted in 1994, and a
few amendments were made in 1998 to reflect implications of lAS 39, "Financial
Instruments' 3 : Recognition and Measurement." lAS 30 is the only standard issued by
the IASC specifically for banks, and states that "banks commonly act as trustees and
in other fiduciary capacities that result in the holding or placing of assets on behalf of
individuals, trusts, retirement benefit plans, and other institutions. Provided the trustee
or similar relationship is legally supported, these assets are not the assets of the bank,
and therefore, are not included in its balance sheet" (IASC 1990, paragraph 55).
In general, lAS 30 requires the banks to disclose a detailed profit and loss account and
a balance sheet that groups assets and liabilities by nature and lists them in an order
that reflects their relative liquidity. The standard also requires the disclosure of
contingencies, commitments and other off-balance sheet items. In addition to that, the
standard requires disclosures of significant risk concentrations and more detailed
disclosure of loan loss provisions and non-accrual lending. This is also covered in lAS
14 'Segment Reporting' which has been explained in the section 2.5.1.
In June 1995, the IASC issued lAS 32 'Financial Instruments: Disclosure and
Presentation', another standard of significance to banks. lAS 32 deals with the
° A financial instrument is any contract that gives rise to both a financial asset of one entity and a financial liability or equity
instrument of another entity (lAS 32).
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presentation and disclosure of financial instruments in enterprises which include
banks. Transactions in financial instruments may result in an enterprise's assuming or
transferring to another party one or more of the financial risks, in particular to banks,
banking risks described earlier. The required disclosures provide information that
assists users of financial statements in assessing the extent of risk related to both
recognised and unrecognised financial instruments. Enterprises, including banks,
should describe their financial risk management objectives and policies, including the
policy for hedging each major type of forecasted transaction for which hedge
accounting is used.
lAS 32 is divided into sections on Presentation and Disclosure. To inform the users of
the extent to which exposure to credit risk at a particular point in time has been
reduced, the enterprise discloses the existence and effect of the right of set-off when
the financial asset is expected to be collected in accordance with its terms. lAS 32,
paragraph 94, encourages additional disclosures when they are likely to enhance
financial statement users' understanding of financial instruments. Under Disclosure,
lAS 32 requires the inclusion of information about the extent and nature of the
financial instruments, the accounting policies adopted, exposure to interest rate risk,
maximum credit risk and significant credit risk concentrations, fair values of each
class of financial asset and liability, assets carried at value in excess of fair value and
details of hedges and of anticipated future transactions. Much of this disclosure is now
required in the UK by FRS 13 'Derivatives and Other Financial Instruments:
Disclosures'.
FRS 13 focuses primarily on the risks that arise in connection with financial
instruments and how they have been managed. The disclosures required by FRS 13
fall into two categories: narrative disclosures, which may be either included in the
notes to the accounts or relegated, with an appropriate cross reference, to the
Operating and Financial Review (or equivalent statement); and numerical disclosures
to be included in the notes to the accounts. FRS 13 makes the narrative disclosures
mandatory. The narrative disclosures will discuss the banks' objectives, policies and
strategies in using financial instruments. It is emphasised that the primary focus of the
narrative disclosures is the risks that arise in connection with financial instruments
and how they have been managed. These risks include credit risk, liquidity risk, cash
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flow risk, interest rate risk, currency risk and other types of market risk. The
disclosure is intended to include a discussion of the nature of the main types of
financial instruments and similar contracts and the purpose, for which they are held or
issued, with separate disclosure of instruments used for financing, risk management
and hedging, and trading or speculation.
The requirements for banks and similar institutions are contained within Part B of
FRS 13. FRS 13 defines a bank or similar institution as 'an entity that:
(a) is authorised under the Banking Act 1987 (in the UK) or the Central Bank
Acts 1942-1989 (in the Republic of Ireland); or
(b) whose business is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the
public and to grant credits for its own account.
In 2004, JASB has proposed ED 7: Financial Instruments: Disclosures which aims to
replace lAS 30 and lAS 32 (details in 3.2.6) in order to improve the disclosures in
financial reporting as commented below.
3.2.2 Comments on the Existing International Accounting Standards
In April 2000, BCBS has published the article "Report to G7 Finance Ministers and
Central Bank Governors on International Accounting Standards". This report reviews
of 15 International Accounting Standards (lASs) that have significant effects on
banks. They are shown in Table 3.1 below.
No significant concerns were found in seven of the IASC standards (lAS 1, 8, 10, 18,
21, 22 and 28). The main comments related to banks arise in connections with lAS 30
and lAS 39. In this report, BCBS expressed concerns that lAS 30 was an old standard
that had not been updated since 1991. As a consequence, it did not reflect the latest
developments in banking and failed to encompass the current best practice (or even
good) practice in terms of disclosure, particularly in relation to risk exposures and risk
management policies. This issue is clearly related to this discussion, as the risk
disclosure is important by banks to enhance transparency. The existing standard does
not adequately address this issue. On the other hand, lAS 39 has led to a number of
significant initial concerns, particularly on the issue of fair values. For lAS 32, the
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issue arises on the implementation problem on how to differentiate between debt and
equity where legal structures would not permit.
Table 3.1: International Accounting Standards Used (BCBS, 2000)
lAS	 Title	 Effective date
lAS 1	 Presentation of Financial Statements
	 1.7.98
lAS 8
	 Profit or Loss for the Period, Fundamental Errors and 1.1.79
_____________ Changes_in_Accounting_Policies	 ________________
lAS 10	 Events after the Balance Sheet Date
	 1.1.00
lAS 12
	 Taxes	 1.1.98
lAS 17	 Leases	 1.1.84
lAS 18	 Revenue	 1.1.84
lAS 21
	 The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates
	 1.1.85
lAS 22	 Business Combinations 	 1.1.85
lAS 27
	 Consolidated Financial Statements and Accounting 1.1.90
_____________ for Investments in Subsidiaries
lAS 28	 Accounting for Investments in Associates
	 1.1.90
lAS 30	 Disclosures in the Financial Statements of Banks and 1.1.91
_______________ Similar_Financial_Institutions
	 __________________
lAS 31
	 Financial Reporting of Interests in Joint Ventures
	 1.1.92
lAS 32	 Financial Instruments: Disclosures and Presentation
	 1.1.96
lAS 37
	 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent 1.7.99
Assets
lAS 39	 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement 1.1.01
3.2.3 Financial Services Authority's Recommendations
In June 1998, the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) issued a paper on 'Risk
based Approach to Supervision of Banks". This applies to 'banks incorporated both In
UK and in non-EEA (non-European Economic Area) countries. This does not apply to
branches in the UK of banks incorporated elsewhere in the EEA, since supervisory
responsibility for these banks lies primarily with their home country supervisor. The
paper merges the RATE and SCALE frameworks 14
 into a single risk-based approach,
as the two approaches were fundamentally the same. The merged risk based approach
to supervision is known as the RATE framework.
' RATE is Risk Assessment, Tools of Supervision and Evaluation whereas SCALE is Schedule 3 Compliance Assessment,
Liaison and Evaluation. This framework was proposed by the Bank of England authorised under the Banking Act 1987 ('the
Act').
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The significance of the paper is its aim to increase understanding of how FSA will
conduct its supervision of banks. In particular, the FSA's supervisors should gain a
better understanding of the quality of management, the characteristics of the business
and the risks a bank faces.
From the paper, the importance of the banking regulators' role in enhancing
transparency can be seen. The banking supervisors are to assess and report the
banking risks using several stages. The stages include identification of key units, on-
site visit to the banks, risk assessment, supervisory programme and formal feedback
to banks. Good and efficient supervisions can also lead to better performance of the
banks.
3.2.4 Basel II - Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)
In January 2001, the BCBS published a revised and updated draft of its earlier
proposals issued in June 1999, to reform the 1988 Basel Capital Accor& 5 . The reform
aims to introduce a less broad-brush approach to credit risk (for example all corporate
customers currently being risk weighted at 100 per cent) as well as developing the
Accord into a more rounded framework for use by national banking supervisors. The
final version of this Basel II was published in June 2004. The most significant part of
Basel II is that they move away from sole reliance on capital adequacy ratios and
adopt a 'three-pillared' approach for ensuring bank solvency.
The first pillar (Pillar 1) would continue to be minimum capital ratios, which for
credit risk would be calculated through new "risk bucketing" approaches. The second
pillar (Pillar 2) would add supervisory review of banks' internal risk and capital
management practices, and significantly, would require that major banks adopt
comprehensive, internal economic capital models. The third pillar (Pillar 3) would be
better market discipline through improved risk disclosure standards and practices. The
purpose of Pillar 3 is to complement Pillar 1 and Pillar 2. Figure 2.1 summarises the
structure of this New Accord.
' The 1988 Accord established minimum levels of capital (8 % of risk-adjusted assets) that helped to strengthen the soundness
and stability of the international banking systems and enhanced competitive equality among internationally active banks.
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Pillar 1 sets out minimum capital requirements, which maintain both the current
definition of capital and the minimum requirement of 8 per cent of capital to risk-
weighted asset. The credit risk measurement methods are more elaborate than those in
the current Accord. The risk weights are determined by the rating of the borrower, as
defined for example by a rating agency. The new Accord proposes for the first time a
measure for operational risk, while the market risk measures remain unchanged from
the Market Risk Amendment to the original Accord, published in 1996.
Figure 3.1: Three Basic Pillars of Basel H
Three Basic Pillars
Minimum Capital Requirements Supervisory Review Process Market Discipline
Pillar 2 requires supervisors to ensure that each bank has sound internal processes in
place to assess the adequacy of its capital based on a thorough evaluation of its risks.
The supervisors must ensure that other risks such as concentration risks and market
risks in the banking books being managed.
The rationale of Pillar 3 is to warrant the introduction of disclosure requirements for
banks, with clear remedial actions in the case on non-disclosure. In the context of
market discipline, Pillar 3 is useful as it conveys clearly that the purpose of the
disclosure is to allow market participants to assess key pieces of information on the
scope of application, capital, risk exposures, risk assessment processes, and hence the
capital adequacy of the institution (see Appendix 7 for detailed Pillar 3). If the
disclosures are not mandatory under accounting or other requirements, management
may choose to provide the Pillar 3 information through other means such as a publicly
accessible internet website or in public regulatory reports filed with bank supervisors.
However, it is important to determine the right level of detail for disclosure, in light of
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the proprietary 16
 and confidential nature 17 of information held by banks. There must
be an appropriate balance between the need for meaningful disclosure and the
protection of proprietary and confidential information. Pillar 3 disclosures will not be
required to be audited by an external auditor, unless otherwise required by accounting
standards setters, securities regulators or other authorities.
The aspiration level of Pillar 3 is related to disclosure about the amount, components,
and features of capital to provide market participants with important information
about a bank's ability to absorb financial losses. Information on the terms and
conditions of capital instruments provides additional background on the loss-
absorbing capacity of capital instruments and provides a context for the analysis of the
capital adequacy of the institution. The qualitative and quantitative information can
assist market participants in gaining a better understanding of the risks and rewards
inherent in the bank's activities. The risks to which banks are exposed and the
techniques that banks use to identify, measure, monitor and control these risks are
important factors to be considered by market participants in their assessment of an
institution.
In general, the risks to be disclosed include credit risk (the most significant risk for
many banking institutions and therefore forming an important part of the disclosure
regime), market risk (which includes commodity, interest rate, equity position and
foreign exchange risks in the trading, book), intetest tate tik its. ttxe izcck18
and operational risk.
3.2.5 Gap between International Accounting Standards and Regulators'
Recommendations
There is a substantial gap between the disclosure requirements of the international
accounting standards (lAS 30 and lAS 32) and the requirements by bank regulators in
particular the BCBS and the UK FSA. The requirements of the international
16 Proprietary information is the information (for example on products or systems) that if shared with competitors would render a
bank's investment in these products or systems less valuable and hence would undermine its competitive position (Verrecchia,
2001).
° Information about customers is often confidential, in that it is provided under the terms of a legal agreement or counterparty
relationship.
8 The trading book groups all market transactions tradable in the market whereas the banking book groups and records all
commercial banking activities (Bessis, 2004). Interest rate risk appears in both trading book and banking book because in trading
book it reflects the fair value risk and in banking book, it shows the cash flow risk.
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accounting standards seem to fall substantially short when compared to the bank
regulators' recommendations. In particular, it is argued by BCBS' 9 that the existing
standards do not really require disclosure of sufficient information by banks about
their risk concentrations and risk exposures. Table 3.2 gives a summary of the gaps,
which exist between the international accounting standards and the regulators'
recommendations, in particular the BCBS.
Therefore, in order to bridge this gap, the accounting standard-setters need to revise
their accounting standards. In response to that, the IASB has made some
improvements in the existing accounting standards which is discussed in Sections
3.2.6 and 3.2.7. The standard-setters should make reform of accounting standards arid
increased disclosure of risks a high priority. At a minimum, they should insist on
acceptable standards for loss provisioning to eliminate the 'fudge factors' 2° that often
make reporting of credit losses a managed number. What the banks should do is to
follow 'best practice' in order to be more transparent and to provide adequate
disclosure. This has led to the improvements in the existing lASs as discussed in the
next section.
3.2.6 Improvements to International Accounting Standards
Based on the above discussion, IASB believes that there is a need to improve the
existing lASs. Fifteen lASs were revised as a result of the IASB's Improvement
projects. The objectives of the project were to reduce or eliminate altevative,
redundancies and conflicts within the Standards, to dea' with some convergence
issues and to make other improvements.
The revised lASs are:
• lAS 1: Presentation of Financial Statements
• lAS 2: Inventories
• lAS 8: Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors
• lAS 10: Events after the Balance Sheet Date
• lAS 16: Property, Plant and Equipment
' See BCBS (2000). 'Report to G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors on International Accounting Standards'.
20 Fudge factors refer to the exposure to credit risk. Loan loss provisions have to be set up when a loss is both probable and
measurable. Two kinds of provisions are mandated: the specific and the general loan loss provision.
36
Noraini Mohd. Ariffin	 Chapter 3: Best Practices for Conventional Banks on Risk Disclosure
Table 3.2: Gaps between International Accounting Standards and Regulators'
Recommendations
International Accounting Standards	 Regulators'
____________ ________________________________ Recommendations - BCBS
lAS 30 - Disclosures in the Financial Need to be updated by including
Statements of Banks and Similar Financial additional disclosures, particularly
Institutions	 in relation to risk exposures and
risk management policies.
lAS 30 requires the banks to disclose detailed
profit and loss account and a balance sheet that
groups assets and liabilities by nature and lists
them in an order that reflects their relative
Explanation	 liqiidi'. The standard also requires the
and	 disclosure of contingencies, commitments and
comments	 other off-balance sheet items.
lAS 32 - Financial Instruments: Disclosures Pillar 3 of Basel II requires banks
and Presentation	 to disclose more information
regarding the amount, components,
lAS 32 requires the inclusion of information and features of capital in the banks
about the extent and nature of the financial and also information on the terms
instruments, the accounting policies adopted, and
	
conditions	 of	 capital
exposure to interest rate risk, maximum credit instruments, which provides
risk and significant credit risk concentrations, additional background on the loss-
fair values of each class of financial asset and absorbing capacity of capital
liability, assets carried at value in excess of fair instruments and provides a context
value and details of hedges and of anticipated for the analysis of the capital
future transactions.	 adequacy of the institution
Source: Report to (17 Finance Ministers and Central Bank (Jovernors on International Accounting
Standards, BCBS (2000)
. lAS 17: Leases
• lAS 21: The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates
• lAS 24: Related Party Disclosures
• lAS 27: Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements
• lAS 28: Investments in Associates
• lAS 31: Interests in Joint Ventures
• lAS 32: Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation
• lAS 33: Earnings per Share
• lAS 39: Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement
• lAS 40: Investment Property
A further amendment was made to lAS 39 in March 2004. This related to Fair Value
Hedge Accounting for a Portfolio Hedge of Interest Rate Risk. Application of these
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revised lASs is required for annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 2005.
Earlier application is encouraged. In addition, the IASB withdrew lAS 15:
Information Reflecting the Effects of Changing Prices with effect for annual periods
beginning on or after 1 January 2005.
3.2.7 Exposure Draft - ED 7: Financial Instruments: Disclosures
Based on the above criticisms particularly by BCBS on lAS 30 and lAS 32, IASB has
issued an Exposure Draft of an IFRS, ED 7: Financial Instruments: Disclosures in
order to improve disclosures about financial instruments in financial statements. ED 7
is not a bank-specific standard but applies to all types of entities that use financial
instruments. However, the extent of disclosure required depends on the extent of the
entity's use of financial instruments and of its exposure to risk. ED 7 requires entities
to provide disclosures in their financial statements that will enable users to evaluate
the significance of financial instruments for the entity's financial position and
performance; the nature and extent of risks arising from financial instruments to
which the entity was exposed during the period and at the reporting date; and the
entity's capital.
BCBS has been developing and publishing comprehensive guidance and policy papers
on risk reporting by banks in recent years. In Basel II, Pillar 3 - Market Discipline
represents an important outcome of the BCBS's effort to enhance capital adequacy
transparency in financial markets. Pillar 3 as discussed earlier in Section 3.2.4
presents a set of disclosure requirements that will allow market participants to assess
key pieces of information on the capital, risk exposures, risk assessment processes,
and hence the capital adequacy of the banks.
The importance of standards of transparency in the private sector also has been
recognised by the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors who, in a 1998
Declaration requested the BCBS and other international regulatory organisations to
review the international accounting standards including lAS 30 and lAS 32. The
BCBS expressed concern that lAS 30 was an old standard that had not been updated
since 1991. As a consequence, it did not reflect the latest developments in banking
and failed to encompass the current best (or even good) practice in terms of
disclosure, particularly in relation to risk exposures and risk management policies.
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ED 7 could be seen as the outcome of all these criticisms to revise and replace lAS 30
with a standard that focuses on risk disclosures and applies to all types of entities that
use financial instruments. As mentioned earlier, ED 7 has included more qualitative
and quantitative information on risk exposures and risk management policies. Risk
management techniques have advanced to a point where it is practical for all entities,
including banks, to produce this information at a reasonable cost. The disclosure of
the risk management techniques improves transparency and of an entity's financial
position.
Consistent with these recommendations, IASB believes that ED 7 could provide
information to the users of financial statements about an entity's exposure to risks and
how these risks are managed, which are beyond the requirements in lAS 30 and lAS
32. For example, regarding risk management disclosures, ED 7 is more prescriptive
than lAS 32 as it makes sensitivity analyses wider in scope than just interest rate risk
and it makes sensitivity analyses a requirement. In contrast, Base! II only requires the
disclosure of VaR analysis.
The information required by ED 7 can influence a user's assessment of the financial
position and financial performance of an entity or the amount, timing and uncertainty
of its future cash flows. Greater transparency regarding those risks allows users to
make more informed judgements about risk and return.
ED 7 incorporates disclosures at present contained in lAS 32 so that all disclosures
about financial instruments are !ocated on one Standard. Furthermore, IASB proposes
to remove unnecessarily onerous or duplicative disclosures. This includes
simplifications to the disclosures about concentrations of risk, credit risk, liquidity
risk and market risk in lAS 32 and the deletion of disclosures about contingencies and
commitments and general banking risks in lAS 30.
ED 7 adds to the requirements previously in lAS 32 by requiring enhanced balance
sheet and income statement disclosures and disclosures about an allowance account
when one is used to reduce the carrying amount of impaired financial assets.
39
Noraini Mohd. Ariffin 	 Chapter 3: Best Practices for Conventional Banks on Risk Disclosure
ED 7 also requires both qualitative and quantitative disclosures about exposure to
risks arising from financial instruments. The qualitative disclosures describe
management's objectives, policies and processes for managing those risks and the
methods used to measure risks (paragraph 34). In accordance with paragraph 34,
entities, including banks disclose if there has been any change in the qualitative
information from the previous period and explain the reasons for change. Such
changes may result from changes in exposure to risk or from changes in the way those
exposures are managed.
The quantitative disclosures provide information about:-
a. the extent to which the entity is exposed to risk, based on information
provided internally to the entity's key management persoimel, for example the
entity's board of directors and chief executive officers (paragraph 35 —38);
b. minimum disclosures for
i. credit risk (paragraph 39 —41);
This includes the information about its exposure to credit risk by class of
financial instrument, collateral and other credit enhancements obtained, credit
quality of financial assets with credit risk that are neither past due nor
impaired.
ii. liquidity risk (paragraph 42);
Paragraph 42(b) requires the entity to describe how it manages liquidity risk
inherent in the maturity analysis of financial liabilities required in paragrap)?
42(a).
iii. market risk (paragraphs 43 - 45
There are various types of market risk, including currency risk, equity price
risk, commodity price risk, interest rate risk, prepayment risk and residual
value risk. Paragraph 43(a) requires a sensitivity analysis to be disclosed for
each type of market risk to which the entity is exposed.
These quantitative disclosures provide a useful sight into how the entity views and
manages risk and is consistent wit the approach used in lAS 14. Together, the
qualitative and quantitative disclosures are intended to provide an overview of the
entity's use of financial instruments and the exposures to risks they create.
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The disclosures in ED 7 are consistent with the recommendations in the BCBS's
(1998) paper on Enhancing Bank Transparency (as discussed in Section 2.3) and with
the disclosure approach taken in Pillar 3 of Basel II, so that the banks can prepare, and
users receive, a single coordinated set of disclosures about financial risk. However, as
far as risks are concerned, ED 7 calls for additional disclosures which are not required
in Pillar 3. For example, past due loans (paragraph 40) and fair value of collateral
(paragraph 41). This would enable users to make better assessments of the financial
position and performance of the entities, particularly banks.
The disclosure of risks arising from financial instruments proposed by ED 7 would be
part of the financial statements prepared in accordance with IFRSs. UBS, one of the
leading banks in Europe (see section 3.3) has currently prepared a substantial
management discussion and analysis (MDA), which is similar to the items proposed
by this ED 7 and included as part of their financial report, but it is outside the audited
financial statements. Even the disclosures required by Pillar 3 of Basel II are not
subjected to auditing by external auditors. Although the IASB framework does not
currently define where this information should be disclosed, best practice hitherto has
been to disclose this outside audited financial statements. If this ED 7 is approved, a
significant quantity of information will be moved to the audited report, which can lead
to additional time and resources required to produce the significantly increased level
of information.
This ED 7 would supersede lAS 30, and the title for the amended lAS 32 would be
Financial Instruments: Presentation. ED 7 could be seen as a risk-focused standard,
consistent with Pillar 3 requirements.
In summary, ED 7 not only deals with disclosures regarding an entity's exposure to
risks arising from financial instruments but also emphasises disclosures relating to
how those risks are managed. The enhanced disclosures of risks arising from financial
instruments will allow markets to improve their evaluations of risk profiles of banks
and other financial institutions. In addition, such disclosures will enable banks to
more comprehensively assess the risks of their debtors. However, it is also important
to strike a balance in the information required in the financial statements and
information provided by management that may accompany these statements but be
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presented outside of the body of the audited financial statements, which require
significant work and time.
3.3	 Review of the Banks' Annual Report
This section provides evidence on the current disclosure of risks by three leading
banks in Europe. These banks were chosen because they represent the leading banks
in Europe which have a wide range of different activities. American banks were not
included in the review. The reason because in United States (US), the investment and
commercial banks were separated until very recently (the Glass-Steagall Act 21 ), which
means that there are no universal banks as in Europe.
A review of the banks' annual reports for the year 2000 is undertaken to examine the
adequacy of the disclosure of risks practised by these banks. Three banks' annual
reports were chosen: UBS (Union Bank of Switzerland) Group, Barclays PLC and
Deutsche Bank, since they are among the largest banks in Europe. It is expected that
the disclosure by these larger banks would be better as compared to that by the
smaller banks. Table 3.3 gives a summary of the review. For example, UBS publishes
annually a 120 pIus page Handbook, which over half is devoted to capital and risk
management
It emerges clearly from this brief review that all these three leading banks in Europe
have provided more information than was required by lAS 30 and lAS 32. They
disclose in details their risk management practices and also the exposure to risks
which include country exposure and product exposure, which is required by lAS 14.
They also have gone into discussing other types of risks, which are not covered by
lAS 32, for example compliance, legal and tax risk. This is consistent with the
comments made by the BCBS earlier on these standards which need to be updated.
Looking at other important aspects of disclosure by these banks, the issue of segment
reporting is very interesting. It is clear that the banks disclosed segment reporting
information. For example, UBS disclosed the segment reporting by business groups
which includes UBS Switzerland, UBS Warburg, UBS Asset Management and
2! The Glass-Steagall Act was one of the pillars of banking law since its passage in 1933 by erecting a wall between commercial
banking and investment banking and was repealed in 2001.
42
Noraini Mohd. Ariffin	 Chapter 3: Best Practices for Conventional Banks on Risk Disclosure
Table 3.3: A Summary of the Annual Reports' Review
UBS Group	 Barclays PLC	 Deutsche Bank
Country	 Switzerland	 United Kingdom	 Germany
Accounting standard	 lAS	 GAAP	 lAS
Services provided 	 Advisory, underwriting, Banking, 	 investment Banking,	 asset
financing,	 market banking	 and	 asset management, real estate,
making,	 asset management	 technology and services
management, brokerage
________________________ and retail banking	 _______________________ _______________________
Type of risks disclosed	 Credit risk	 Credit risk	 Credit risk
Market risk	 Market risk	 -	 Default risk
-	 Interest rate risk 	 Liquidity risk	 -	 Country risk
-	 Currency risk	 Operational risk	 -	 Settlement risk
Liquidity risk	 Compliance risk	 Market risk
Legal risk	 Liquidity
________________________ ________________________ Tax risk 	 Operational
Risk	 management VaR	 VaR	 VaR
techniques	 Stress tests	 Stress tests	 Stress tests
Derivatives used	 Swaps	 Swaps	 Swaps
Forwards	 Forwards	 Forwards
Futures	 Futures	 Futures
______________________ Options	 Options	 Options
Segment reporting
- Business	 UBS Switzerland	 Retail	 Financial Retail	 and	 Private
UBS Warburg	 Services	 Banking
UBS Asset Management Barclaycard	 Corporates and Real
Corporate Center	 Corporate Banking	 Estate
Barclays Capital	 Global Corporates and
Barclays	 Global Institutions
Investors	 Asset Management
Businesses in Transition Global Technology and
Other operations	 Services
Corporate Center
__________________________ __________________________ _________________________ Others
- Geographical	 Switzerland	 UK	 Germany
Rest of Europe	 Foreign UK-based	 Europe	 (excluding
O\cex	 ThTrj)
Asia! Pacific	 United States	 Asia/Pacific! Africa
Africa/Middle East
	
	 Rest of the World	 North America
South America
BIS Capital Ratio
Tier 1 (%)22	 11.7	 7.2	 7.4
-	 TotalBIS(%)	 15.7	 11	 12.6
Corporate Centre. Segment reporting by geographic location is shown based on the
analysis of total assets by customer domicile. Operating income and capital
investment are based on the location of the office in which the transaction and assets
are recorded. By having this information disclosed in the annual reports, UBS can
22 Tier I capital consists of permanent shareholders' equity, trust preferred securities and retained earnings less goodwill and
investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries. Tier 2 capital includes the bank's subordinated long-term debt.
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provide more information to the users about the concentrations of its activities, which
is hoped to assist them in understanding the risk exposure.
This is consistent with the annual survey conducted by Trema Management
Consulting (a management consulting firm specialized in strategic finance and risk
management) on financial risk management information in the year 2000 annual
reports of major European Banks, where they find that UBS presented the most
comprehensive disclosure on risks.
The capital adequacy rules require a minimum amount of capital to cover credit and
market risk exposures. Among other measures, the banks monitor the adequacy of
their capital using ratios established by the BCBS. The BCBS ratio is required to be at
least 8 per cent. All these three leading banks in Europe are well above the minimum
ratio of 8 per cent required by BCBS for the year 2000.
These ratios measure capital adequacy by comparing a bank's eligible capital with its
risk weighted positions which include balance sheet assets, net positions in securities
not held in the trading book, off-balance sheet transactions converted into their credit
equivalents and market risk positions at a weighted amount to reflect their relative
risk.
Appendix 1 provides more information on disclosure of risks and segment reporting
by all these three banks.
3.4	 Best Disclosure Practice
Public disclosure of accurate, timely and reliable information will help market
participants make a more accurate assessment of an institution's financial
performance and state of health, leading to better market discipline and increased
investor confidence. This is consistent with Pillar 3 of Base! II.
Current examples of the best disclosure practice exemplified by three leading banks in
Europe can be seen in Appendix 1 (as also summarised in Section 3.5 above). All
these banks have made a comprehensive disclosure on risks and risk management
techniques used by them. According to Pillar 3 of Base! II, banks should be required
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to disclose to the public information regarding their activities and financial position
that is comprehensive and not misleading. In addition, financial reports of banks
should give greater qualitative (risk management and risk control practices) and
quantitative (maturity structure for interest sensitive assets and liabilities) information
on banks' activities in financial instruments, including derivatives, and on the
objectives and methods of risk measurement and management systems. This will
improve the transparency of financial information published by banks and other
financial institutions. The financial statements allow users to discern the general risk
profile and risk tolerance of the bank, highlighting the areas in which the bank is
taking on exposures, particularly credit risk.
Banks are normally required to disclose information on credit risks, including risk
concentrations by various broad categories, coimected lending, and loans made under
directed lending programme (lAS 30 and lAS 32). The user is able to obtain
quantitative information on the relationships between loans and total assets, non-
performing loans, and loan loss reserves. Definitions for loan categorisation, and
criteria for classifying loans as non-performing, should also be disclosed to give a
better picture of the banks' performance.
This information should be timely and sufficient for market participants to assess the
risk inherent in any individual banking organisation. It should help market
participants and other financial institutions to adequately assess and compare financial
performance, and so tackle potential barriers to an integrated market in financial
services arising from insufficient financial information.
More disclosure requires greater internal discipline and greater attention to internal
accounting and management systems. More detailed disclosure also has the potential
to reduce the risk of aggressive behaviour as banks have to disclose all the risk
information to their users.
The more reliable and extensive the information that is disclosed by banks to the
market, the more effective is market discipline. Banks that disclose more information
will be subject to more market discipline and have a greater incentive to limit their
risk of default. Baumann and Nier (2003) provide evidence on this. Based on a large
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cross-country panel dataset, which consist observations on individual listed banks
from 32 different countries for the 1993 to 2000 period, they empirically investigate
the variables that are likely to affect the strength of market discipline. These include
the strength of the safety net (insurance), the banks' funding structure (funding) and
the transparency of the banks' risks (disclosure). Their findings indicate banks that
disclose more information, measured by whether a bank has a US listing, whether it is
rated or by the disclosure index - tend to have a higher capital buffer and thus more
protection against unexpected losses than banks that disclose less. This is also
consistent with Pillar 3 of Basel II.
Best practices for disclosure in some countries typically go beyond disclosing
traditional financial statements to include providing other quantitative and qualitative
information such as the structure of the banks' ownership, risk concentration, and
details of policies and practices of risk management systems.
The importance of the best practices for disclosure is also supported by the study of
Gerald and Gregory in 1995. They review the 1995 annual reports of the top ten US
banks that deal in derivatives. Although disclosure requirements did not change
during the intervening period, banks nonetheless improved their reporting of
derivatives activities in 1995 compared to 1994. In particular, they expanded their
discussions of derivatives activities and provided more quantitative information.
The Ernst & Young survey in 2000 included 77 banks in 16 European countries which
highlights general information regarding risk management as well as the financial
strategy and specific risks issues relating to credit and trading instruments (including
derivatives) as laid out in the annual reports. Leading banks from countries such as
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom provide the best information about
their risks. However, one of the most obvious areas for improvement is the disclosure
of the bank's strategy towards risk, for example which level of market, credit and
operational risk is acceptable for the bank and the method in use to measure and
manage risk.
The results of the PA Global Survey 2001 and 2004 demonstrate clearly that most
banks have significantly improved their shareholder returns by using their basic risk
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management tools (for example credit risk grading, VaR and operational risk analysis)
to make better business decisions. The survey was distributed to banks situated around
the world. Responses were received from over 50 banks, ranging in size from regional
banks with assets of US$2 billion to world leaders with assets of over US$500 billion.
The above studies have shown that conventional banks have been disclosing risk
information in their annual reports and using the basic risk management tools for
more effective risk management.
3.5	 Signalling Theory
The above discussion is relevant from a signalling theory perspective. Signalling
theory considers problems of information asymmetry in the market. The theory shows
how this asymmetry can be reduced by the party with more information signalling to
others (Morris, 1987). It was originally developed to address problems of information
asymmetry in labour markets and how information asymmetry can be reduced by the
party with more information signalling to others (Spence, 1973). However, signalling
is a common phenomenon applicable in any market with information asymmetry
(Morris, 1987).
Signalling theory suggests that when banks' performance is good, banks will wish to
signal their high quality information to the market. It is hoped that this information
could assist the financial statement users in their decision making ('Watts and
Zimmerman; 1986).
The signalling theory has been tested for banks by examining the stock market's
valuation of loan loss provisions. Loan loss provisions are a relatively large accrual
for commercial banks, and therefore have a significant impact on banks' earnings and
regulatory capital. The motive for loan loss provisions that has been put forward in the
literature is to signal financial strength. Beaver et al. (1989) suggest that loan loss
provisions can indicate that 'management perceives the earnings power of the bank to
be sufficiently strong that it can withstand a "hit to earnings" in the form of additional
loan loss provisions23 '. Wahien (1994), Beaver and Engel (1996) and Liu et al. (1997)
23 Note that the signalling effects in the loan loss provisions studies are opposite to the signalling effects hypothesised in the
studies on discretionary accruals more generally such as Subramanyam (1996) and Ahmed (1996).
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investigate this theory. Consistent with this signalling theory, Wahien (1994)
documents a positive relation between discretionary or unexpected loan loss
provisions and bank stock returns. Beaver and Engel (1996) document a positive
coefficient on the discretionary component of loan loss provisions in a regression of
market value of equity on earnings (before provisions), loan loss provisions,
discretionary component of loan loss provisions, and non-performing loans. Liu et al.
(1997) find a positive relation between stock returns and unexpected loan-loss
provisions for banks with low capital ratios, but a negative relation for banks with
high ratios, which contradicts a signalling theory. Griffin (1998) provides evidence of
a differential negative market reaction to bank loan loss announcements based on the
timeliness of the announcement relative to the end of a fiscal quarter. His results are
consistent with a stock market that obtains loan impairment information from timely
sources of that information, for example, loss provisions reported in bank financial
statements.
Gibson (2000) confirms these findings by developing a model in which banks use
write-offs to signal private information about the credit quality of their loan portfolios
in the Japanese banking sector. More recently, Kanagaretnam et al. (2003) find that
managers of undervalued banks use loan loss provisions to signal their banks' future
earnings prospects. In contrast the aforementioned empirical findings, Ahmed et al.
(1999) find no support for the signalling theory. They do not find evidence of a
positive relation between loan loss provisions and one-year ahead future change in
earnings as in Wahlen (1994). Based on their argument, their findings suggest that
Wahien's (1994) and Beaver and Engel's (1996) results are likely to be specific to the
time period examined in their study.
The empirical evidence indicates that the propensity to signal differs across banks
based upon the degree of information asymmetry. Signalling is a reaction to
informational asymmetry in markets. In this case, banks have information that the
market does not. Asymmetries can be reduced if the party with more information
signals to others. In this case, leading banks (for example UBS), will wish to
distinguish themselves from non-leading banks through voluntary disclosures. The
signalling theory suggests that when banks' performance is good, banks will wish to
signal their high quality information to the market. It is hoped that this information
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could assist the financial statement users in their decision making on the assumption
that market discipline exists (details in Section 4.2).
3.6	 Concluding Remarks
It is clear from the above discussion that banks are encouraged (BCBS) to disclose
sufficient information on their activities, particularly given the risks inherent in
banking activities. This will allow the market to assess the banks' performance and
the state of health of the banks. Consequently, this can improve the investors' and
depositors' confidence. The existence of the international accounting standards can be
seen as a tool to harmonise the financial reporting so that the banks' reports are
comparable even though, in some situations, this is not achieved. Accounting
standards provide the foundation for credible and comparative public financial
statements and supervisory reports.
The evidence from the regulators (BIS and FSA) proves that there is much more to be
disclosed by the banks in order to be transparent. The existence of ED 7 could be seen
as a good initiative from IASB to improve the risk disclosures in the entities including
banks.
A review of the current 'best' practices by some of the leading banks in Europe has
been made and it is clear that their reporting practices have gone beyond the
requirements of the current international and national accounting standards, which are
consistent with signalling theory.
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Chapter 4
Transparency and Market Discipline in Conventional Banks
4.1	 Introduction
Transparency means that market participants have the information they need to
allocate their resources within the market as explained in Section 2.3. The use of
market discipline as a complement to bank supervision and regulation has gained
greater acceptance in the US and abroad. It is also widely recognized that effective
market discipline depends on market participants' having information about the risks
and financial condition of banking organizations.
As explained in the previous chapter, signalling is a reaction to informational
asymmetry, where the management has information that the market does not. This
signalling theory is also relevant for market discipline. If market discipline is weak,
theoretically, the signalling theory would be less applicable and a more prescriptive
set of risk disclosure standards together with a more intrusive style of supervision
would be necessary in applying Basel II.
The structure of this chapter is outlined as follows:
Section 4.2 discusses the link between transparency and market discipline by looking
at the studies in conventional banks. Some of the causes of the previous banking crisis
are presented in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 looks into the role of bank supervisors in
order to facilitate transparency. Finally, Section 4.5 provides concluding remarks.
4.2	 Market Discipline
In the context of banking, market discipline includes notably a market based incentive
scheme in which investors in bank liabilities such as subordinated debt or uninsured
deposits "punish" banks for greater risk-taking by demanding higher yields on those
liabilities (Berger, 1991). Banks collect deposits and invest these funds in risky assets
(loans). To safeguard against insolvency, banks hold a capital buffer against adverse
outcomes in their investments in risky assets (loan default). But the bank's private
solvency target may not take into account the interests of depositors, or of society as a
whole. As a result, banks may engage in excessive risk-taking. Market discipline is a
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mechanism that can potentially curb the incentive to take excessive risk, by making
risk-taking more costly for banks.
There are a number of potential social benefits from enhancing market discipline in a
country's banking sector. First, by punishing excessive bank risk-taking, increased
market discipline may reduce the moral hazard problems, which government
guarantees create for banks by providing incentives to undertake excessive risks.
Second, market discipline may improve the efficiency of banks by pressuring some of
the relatively inefficient banks to become more efficient or to exit the industry
(Berger, 1991). Finally, the social cost of supervising banks may be lowered if
regulators cede greater control to market forces that can tell "good" from "bad" banks.
In particular, the market is an anonymous and constant overseer, which is hard to
lobby for forbearance, and may react more quickly than regulators to increases in
bank risk-taking.
In order for market discipline on banks to be fully effective in ensuring financial
stability, Crockett (2001) suggests four pre-requisites. First, market participants need
to have sufficient information to reach informed judgements. Second, they need to
have the ability to process it correctly otherwise inaccurate signals are transmitted to
banks. Third, they need to have the right incentives and finally, they need to have the
right mechanism to exercise discipline. The first pre-requisite is in line with the
requirements in Pillar 3 of Base! II (see Section 3.2.4 for details).
4.2.1 Literature on Market Discipline
Most studies that have examined the usefulness of market discipline and signalling
have focused on subordinated debt in the US commercial banking industry over the
last two decades. Flannery (1998) provides an excellent survey of this literature. As
argued by Flannery (1998), market assessments of bank conditions compare
favourably with supervisory assessments arid could improve with access to
supervisory information. However, although supervisors could benefit from such
improved public monitoring of banks, the costs to the current form of supervisory
monitoring must also be considered.
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The empirical evidence shows that subordinated debt spreads generally increase as a
bank's risk increases. Several of the papers that examine market discipline in US
analyse whether banks pay a risk premium on their uninsured bank liabilities. Hannan
and Hanweck (1988) and Ellis and Flannery (1992), among others, analyse how yields
on uninsured deposits respond to bank risk-taking as captured by the balance sheet
and by market measures of risk. Overall, these papers support the hypothesis that
yields on uninsured deposits contain risk premia. This evidence means that uninsured
depositors charge higher interest rates to riskier banks. Furthermore, Cook and
Spellman (1994) provide evidence of risk pricing even among insured depositors.
Whereas the literature on market discipline is quite vast for the US, significantly
fewer papers have been written for the developing countries. The main contributors to
this market discipline literature are Schumacher (1996), D'Amato, Grubisic and
Powell (1997), Sironi (2000), Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001), and Birder and
Maechler (2002).
Valdes and Lomakin (1988) examine whether, during 1987, depositors in the Chilean
financial system continued to act as if all claims were insured by the government,
despite the fact that a law was passed in 1986 providing insurance only to small
depositors. Throughout 1981-1986, the government guaranteed the deposits of
practically all banks that failed during that period. Using panel data on implicit
interest rates paid on deposits during 1987-1988, they fail to reject the null that
depositors did not require riskier banks to pay higher interest rates. They conclude
that depositors behaved as if they continued to enjoy the pre-1986 full deposit
insurance guarantee, even though the 1986 law limited deposit insurance coverage.
Schumacher (1996) studies the 1994-95 Argentine banking crises. Using a bank-level
data set, she first estimates probabilities of bank failure. Then, she examines whether
these probabilities have an impact on deposit behaviour over the course of the 1995
Argentine banking crisis. Her findings show that the probability of failure is explained
by the ratio of non-performing loans, the return on assets, and a number of variables
measuring liquidity. She also finds that the probability of bank failure negatively
affects the behaviour of deposits (i.e. depositors withdraw their deposits), in particular
the peak of the crisis in March 1995.
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D'Amato, Grubisic and Powell (1997) estimate a two-way random effects model
using daily deposit data for a sample of 120 Argentine banks, over a four month
period surrounding the 1995 banking crisis. The main objective of their paper is to test
the presence of contagion in depositors' behaviour. Their findings provide the
evidence of contagion in depositor behaviour in Argentine during the 1995 banking
crisis.
Sironi (2001) tests for market discipline in the European banking industry and finds
that holders of subordinated debt rationally discriminate between the risk profiles of
private sector banks. He used credit ratings and published accounting data as a
measure of bank riskiness.
Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001) evaluate the interaction between market
discipline and deposit insurance and the impact of banking crises on market discipline
in Argentina, Chile and Mexico. Their findings show that depositors, both small and
large, discipline banks by withdrawing deposits and by requiring higher interest rates
even though deposit insurance schemes exist in these countries. The result suggests
that even explicit depositor protection schemes may not always be fully credible.
The study by Birchler and Maechler (2002) finds a considerable amount of market
discipline in Swiss banks. Depositors respond to bank-specific fundamentals,
institutional differences across bank groups, and institutional changes in the Swiss
depositor protection system.
However, as been emphasised by Berger (1991) and Bliss and Flannery (2002), the
above studies do not reveal the degree to which market discipline is effective, i.e. how
far such price signals actually influence bank behaviour. Blum (2002) and Cordella
and Yeyati (1998) show analytically that in the absence of bankruptcy costs and
corporate governance problems between bank shareholders and managers, if bank
deposits are uninsured and the bank's risk choice is observable by depositors, the
bank's risk choice will be efficient. The reason is that banks internalise the impact of
their risk choice on depositors since these in turn will demand higher compensation if
the bank incurs higher risk. In such a world, there is perfect market discipline and no
moral hazard.
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Conversely, if deposits are insured or the bank's risk choice is not observable by
depositors, then the bank will choose a higher return in response to a higher risk
profile at the expense of depositors. The reason is that depositors will not demand a
higher return in response to higher risk choices by the bank. In such a world, there is
no market discipline and the bank's choice of its risk of default is subject to moral
hazard. In the Cordella and Yeyati model disclosure enables banks to commit to low
risk. There are two cases: (1) Under full disclosure the bank's risk choice is
observable. Depositors demand a high interest rate if the bank chooses high risk. In
equilibrium the bank chooses low risk and the interest rate is low. (2) Under no
disclosure, depositors do not observe the bank's risk choice. Lower risk is not
rewarded with a lower interest rate. In equilibrium, the bank chooses maximum risk
and depositors, anticipating this choice, choose an interest rate commensurate with
this anticipation.
Baumann and Nier (2003) investigate empirically the effectiveness of market
discipline in limiting excessive risk-taking by banks, using a large cross-country panel
data set (Bank Scope database) for 729 individual banks from 32 different countries
over the years 1993 to 2000. Their results suggest that moral hazard exists and that
market discipline plays a role in mitigating banks' risk of insolvency.
This theoretical framework suggests that the effectiveness of market discipline in
containing excessive risk-taking hinges oti three itecxs F,r,t, tci
government safety net, second, the degree to which the bank is financed by uninsured
liabilities and third, the extent of observability of bank risk choices. Market discipline
is likely to be effective, the lesser the degree of explicit or implicit government
guarantees relating to bank liabilities, the greater the amount of uninsured liabilities in
the bank's balance sheet and the greater the degree of bank disclosure. Deposit
insurance is likely to weaken market discipline. Demirguc-Kunt and Sobaci (2001)
provide a dataset on the existence and extent of deposit insurance schemes across
countries. They find that explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the likelihood of
banking crises in a sample of 61 countries over the years 1980-97.
Signals from the market through information in the external credit ratings are also a
valuable source of information about the condition of a bank. There is reason to
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believe that investors have more information about a bank if the bank is rated by a
major rating agency. Rating agencies act as intermediaries in the disclosure process.
They gain access to information that is not publicly available to investors and feed
this information into the rating. Kliger and Sang (2000) suggest that this is the very
reason why firms usually pay for the rating. It allows firms to incorporate inside
information into the assigned ratings without disclosing specific details to the public
at large. A number of studies provide evidence that ratings do indeed contain
information over and above information that is publicly known. Kliger and Sang
(2000) show that Moody's change to a finer grading system in April 1982 moved
bond market prices for individual rated securities in a way consistent with the
information (good or bad) associated with the finer rating. From this, investors have
more information on an individual bank if it is rated. Market discipline is likely to be
stronger for rated banks.
As mentioned earlier, deposit insurance does affect banking crises. The next section
provides the linkage between market discipline and banking crises.
4.3 Banking Crises
For most banks, market risk accounts for only a small proportion of their overall risk
profile. Despite changes in financial markets, the credit risk charge remains the most
significant factor in determining the regulatory capital requirement for the majority of
banks. Credit risk is the major risk faced by many banks, since loans are their major
asset category. Experience from around the world (Rahman, 1999) indicates that poor
credit quality coupled with weak credit risk management practices continues to be a
dominant factor in bank failures and banking crises (Asia, Russia and Brazil). During
such crises, it would appear that the risk during such periods was of a much greater
magnitude than existing risk management techniques were able to capture. Therefore,
it is clear that information on banks' credit risk management processes is crucial in
market participants' and supervisors' assessments of their condition, performance and
ability to survive in the long run.
Fons (1998) examines the role that poor transparency played in the East Asian
financial crisis and argues that weak transparency increases funding costs, especially
in times of financial distress. Transparency can only help prevent a financial crisis and
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should not be seen as a cure for systems already under stress. According to him, the
meltdown in currency, bond and equity markets, over the past year or more of his
study has contributed to massive credit rationing for East Asia, particularly by foreign
creditors.
Poor accounting standards enable banks to evade prudential and other restrictions on
insider lending (Rahman, 1999). Furthermore, Rahman (1999) argued that inadequate
disclosure contributed to the depth and breadth of the banking crisis. Since financial
statements act as the most reliable and easily accessible vehicle for dissemination of
banking information, lack of adequate accounting disclosures prevented investors and
creditors from receiving necessary and timely information for choosing between
successful and potentially unsuccessful banks. It is known that the very threat of
disclosure influences behaviour and improves management, particularly risk
management. It seems that the lack of appropriate disclosure requirements indirectly
contributed to the deficient internal controls and imprudent risk management practices
of the banks in the crisis-hit countries. The financial statements did not reflect the
extent of risk exposures and clear indications of the magnitude of debt problems.
Llewellyn (2002) analyses the causes of the recent banking crises, which include
weak monitoring and supervision by official agencies, the absence of effective market
discipline on banks and structurally unsound corporate governance mechanisms
within banks and their borrowing customers
A permanent solution to the East Asian financial crisis will require a restoration of
interbank confidence in the region' s banks, which, in turn, will require credible
transparency, massive restructuring and state-financed recapitalisation. Interbank
creditors will demand solvency and transparency. The problem is that transparency
could be seen as revealing insolvency, further shaking creditor confidence, wiping out
existing shareholder claims and endangering nondepository creditors (e.g.,
subordinated debts in the case of conventional banks).
Regulators may not want transparency, to prevent public criticism arising from the
failure to resolve or close a troubled bank. Certain banks would favour poor
transparency, mainly because it costs money to institute timely, accurate and detailed
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accounting systems. Resources that might be more profitably employed elsewhere are
relegated to a reporting function. Statements must be formatted to international
standards and "Big Four24" auditors must be hired to give opinion on the quality of
reporting. Many banks in developing countries are small and the costs of complying
with transparent reporting practices may be significant. Transparency also restricts
management's ability to engage in self dealing. Fully transparent reporting may also
reveal competitive strategies or vulnerabilities where a bank holds a large unhedged
position in some asset or currency. These may affect the market discipline's ability to
be effective in the banking system.
Cordella and Yeyati (1998) examine how public disclosure of banks' risk exposure
affects banks' risk taking incentives, and assess the impact of the presence of
informed depositors on the soundness of the banking system. They used the data from
New Zealand banks. The results show that when banks have complete control over the
volatility of their loan portfolio, public disclosure reduces the probability of banking
crises. However, when banks do not control their risk exposures, the presence of
informed depositors may increase the probability of bank failures. This indicates that
banks must be able to have control over their risk exposure in order for public
disclosure to be effective. This again shows the importance of enhancing the
dissemination of financial information. However, their studies do not really look into
the importance of risk disclosure by the banks, but rather at the relationship between
public disclosure and banks' faUiite. Th t' c'c' c5t' \ct it i tth'.
supervisors in enhancing the transparency in banks.
4.4	 Supervisory Information
Bank supervisors need timely and reliable information about the financial condition
and risk profile of banks in order to conduct effective supervision. Although such
information can be obtained in part from regulatory reports and public disclosure, a
key source is on the on-site examination. Bank examinations enable supervisors to
confirm the accuracy of information in regulatory reports. More important, the
examinations allow supervisors to gather confidential information about bank's
24 
"Big Four" accountancy firms include Pricewaterhouse Coopers, KPMG Peat Marwick, Ernst and Young and Delloitte and
Touche.
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financial conditions and to assess qualitative attributes, such as internal controls and
risk management procedures that affect bank risk profiles.
Sijben (2002) argued that the strategy to enlarge market discipline refers to the
availability of information and transparency for both supervisors and market
participants aiming at an appropriate judgement of the soundness of the banks. Hoenig
(2003) suggests that increased disclosure to the market of supervisory information
could be of significant value to the market which could help to enhance the
effectiveness of market discipline.
Effective supervision of banks, which include offsite and onsite supervision, ensures
that banks function safely and soundly, so that financial system can attain the full
confidence of savers and investors. These include the examination of bank's financial
information to produce a wide array of financial ratios, comparison of the financial
indicators of the bank to a peer group, risk based supervision, statistically based early
warning systems and supervisory rating systems, mainly CAMELS 25 (BCBS, 2002).
Bank supervisors can play an important role by checking that the financial condition
of the bank is as reported (De Young et al., 2001, Jordan et al., 2000; Berger et aL,
2000; Flannery and Houston, 1998; Berger and Davies, 1998; Gilbert, 1993). Market
participants, on the other hand, may not be able to uncover the deteriorating health of
a bank in a timely manner, instead discovering it only when bank management,
possibly at the investigation of bank supervisors, eventually makes financial
disclosures that reveal the bank's problems (Gilbert, 1993). These could be
announcements related to income and balance sheet statements such as lower earnings
or increased non-performing loans.
In their assessment of banks, for instance, bank supervisors make use of proprietary
and internal information in each bank, as well as confidential information on
customers. As a result, bank supervisors have a detailed knowledge of individual bank
conditions that could prove useful in several ways. Disclosure of financial position,
risk concentrations and asset profiles, for instance, could provide a new and valuable
25 Refer to page 59 for detafls.
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source of information to the market. In addition, bank supervisors would be in a good
position to identify deficiencies in a bank's own public disclosures.
A growing line of research provides empirical support for the proposition that bank
supervisors at times have an information advantage over other outside monitors.
Flannery and Houston (1998) show that financial markets evaluate accounting data
differently when an examination by a supervisor has occurred recently. For a sample
of banks examined in the fourth quarter of 1988, they find that accounting statements
of examined banks are more informative than those of non-examined banks; they also
find that examined banks' market values are slightly better. These effects are stronger
for smaller banks, banks with higher stock return variances, banks with harder-to-
value assets, and banks not rated by rating agencies. They argue that these findings
provide evidence that bank supervisors (examiners) play a valuable role in the
certification of banks' accounting data and that bank shareholders benefit from this
activity.
A key outcome of an examination is a supervisory rating of the bank's overall
financial condition. The focus here is on the supervisory ratings - known as CAMELS
ratings - as a proxy for the information resulting from a bank examination. CAMELS
ratings, which are assigned by examiners at the conclusion of an examination, are
numerical ratings of the quality of a bank's financial condition, risk profile and
overall performance. This acronym CAMELS refers to the six components of a bank's
condition assessed by examiners: Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management,
Earnings, Liquidity and Sensitivity to market risk 26. Ratings assigned for each
component range from 1 to 5, with banks assigned lower ratings for better
performance, and a composite rating is assigned for the overall condition and
performance of the bank. CAMELS ratings reflect a combination of publicly available
information (such as recent financial statements) and private information produced by
bank examiners during their on-site investigation (such as the quality of individual
loans). Research has shown that supervisors' ratings downgrades had a profound
negative effect on stock prices. De Young et al. (2001) conclude that markets gather
26 A sixth component, S was added in 1997; hence the acronym was changed to CAMELS. The bulk of the academic literature is
based on pre-1997 data and it is thus based on CAMEL ratings.
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some information faster than supervisors while supervisors have an advantage for
other types of information.
Berger and Davies (1998) examine the information content of CAMEL ratings by
testing for stock price reactions when new ratings are assigned. Despite the fact that
CAMEL ratings are confidential, they find that rating downgrades seem to lead to
negative excess stock returns. They interpret this result as evidence that examinations
generate valuable private information and that rating downgrades reveal unfavourable
private information about bank conditions. Similarly, De Young et al. (2001) find that
CAMEL ratings contain relevant information about bank conditions useful to the
market for subordinated bank holding company debt.
Berger et al. (2000) find that BOPEC 27 ratings - the supervisory ratings given to bank
holding companies - contain information about bank conditions that goes beyond the
information in market data, such as bond-rating downgrades. In particular, they find
that supervisory data and market information "Grangercause" (i.e. are useful in
forecasting) one another, suggesting that both supervisors and the financial markets
have some unique information. As noted in Berger et al. (2000), supervisory and
market assessments may be concurrent, implying that each may be emphasising or
finding different information. They used a sample of 184 bank holding companies
over a period 1989 (Quarter 4) to 1992 (Quarter 2) and they found that regulators
acquire information sooner than bond rating agencies and the equity markets, but the
regulatory assessments are less accurate in predicting the future performance of bank
holding companies than either stock or bond market indicators unless the regulatory
ratings have been recently assigned.
These papers suggest that supervisory ratings contain information about the condition
and performance of banks that is not available to the public. Thus, despite the
confidentiality of supervisory information, market participants should be assessing the
probability that supervisors will intervene at individual banks. The revelation that a
bank has had a formal action imposed upon it, and thus that bank management is now
subject to much closer oversight by bank supervisors, possibly reducing its value to
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shareholders (Gilbert and Vaughan, 1998), should surprise market participants only
for those banks whose publicly disclosed financials had suggested that the bank would
not be under close regulatory scrutiny.
Cole and Gunther (1995, 1998) find that the information contained in CAMEL ratings
decays quickly with respect to predicting bank failure from 1986 to 1992. In
particular, they find that a model using publicly available financial data is a better
indicator of the likelihood of bank failure than the previous CAMEL rating is once the
rating is more than one or two quarters old. These two studies address the issue of
information decay directly; however, the primary purpose of CAMEL ratings is not to
identify future bank failures, but to provide an assessment of banks' overall conditions
at the time examinations.
However, Hirtle and Lopez (1999) suggest that CAMEL ratings cease to provide any
useful information about the current condition of a bank much longer than the time
obtained in Cole and Gunther (1995, 1998), which is after about six to twelve
quarters. Thus, based on their findings, the examinations should take place at least at
this frequency, since supervisors would probably want to examine a bank while the
information from the previous examination continues to have some value.
Peek et al. (1999) provides evidence that the bank supervisor (Federal Reserve) has an
informational advantage over the public that can be exploited to improve activist
monetary policy. This informational advantage is generated by confidential
supervisory knowledge about troubled, non-publicly traded banks. As a result, this
information can remain confidential for an extended period of time because these
banks do not have an incentive to fully disclose publicly the extent of their financial
troubles, and since they are not publicly traded, are not required to be so.
The above studies show that bank supervisors have an information advantage over
other parties, in particular the public. For example, in their assessments of the bank,
bank supervisors make use of proprietary and internal information at each bank, as
27 This acronym BOPEC stands for the live key areas of supervisory concern: the condition of the bank holding companies' bank
subsidiaries, Other non-bank subsidiaries, Parent company, Earnings and Capital adequacy. BOPEC ratings are assigned
according to an absolute scale ranging from I, indicating strong performance, to 5, indicating poor performance.
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well as confidential information on customers, which is generally unavailable to
market participants trying to track a bank's condition and performance. The analysis
of such information and the steps bank takes to control and manage risk, when
aggregated, form much of the basis needed to understand the risk exposures at the
bank.
4.5	 Concluding Remarks
Disclosure not only provides useful information about the condition of the banks, it
also can provide information that is useful for evaluation of competitor banks. Market
participants including rating agencies, could therefore make a valuable contribution to
improving the level of transparency in financial reporting by rewarding
comprehensive, full disclosure and penalising inadequate disclosure i.e. market
discipline exists. They could also demonstrate a direct link between investor
confidence and transparent disclosure. Therefore, disclosure does enhance
transparency, as users could use the information to distinguish the financial condition
of the bank with other banks. As mentioned earlier in the literature (i.e. Fons, 1998;
Rahman, 1999 and Llewellyn, 2002) by having sufficient disclosure and more
transparency in risk reporting, bank failures can be reduced in the future. Financial
statements of banks have failed to provide timely and reliable information regarding
various important factors that appear to have contributed to triggering the recent
banking crises. If such information had been available, banks would have had an
incentive to avoid the excessive risk exposures and the market participants and the
bank supervisors could have taken preventive action.
In addition, bank supervisors need timely and reliable information about the financial
condition and risk profile of banks in order to conduct effective supervision. Effective
supervision of banks ensures that banks function safely and soundly, so that financial
system can attain the full confidence of savers and investors. Even though, bank
supervisors have additional information than what is required by financial reporting
standards to perform their supervision, they should have discretion to balance the
amount of information they release to the market against proprietary information that
should remain undisclosed to the public in certain circumstances where its release
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might induce a financial panic or bank run, or otherwise provide some banks with an
unfair competitive advantage.
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Chapter 5
Islamic Banks versus Conventional Banks: Risk Disclosure and
Management
5.1	 Introduction
The importance of Islamic banks has increased dramatically throughout recent years.
Islamic banks have grown in size and number around the world. The main objective
for Islamic banking to develop is to satisfy the financial needs of devout Muslims who
observe the avoidance, among other things, of interest whether paid or received,
which is prohibited in Islam, unlike the conventional banks 28 where interest is an
integral part of the business.
It is worth investigating how these Islamic banks report their activities. This is
because under the Shari 'a29, Islamic banks are responsible for ensuring that the
investors' and depositors' money is invested in viable projects. The profit-sharing
scheme is in fact the main characteristic of the Islamic banks, which distinguishes
them from the conventional banks.
Section 5.2 looks into the differences between the Islamic banks and the conventional
banks, particularly in the area of risk reporting. Section 5.3 discusses the risk
management in Islamic banks. Section 5.4 provides the discussion on the availability
of derivatives in Islamic banks. The accounting standards related to Islamic banks are
analysed in terms of their adequacy in reporting the risks for Islamic banks in Section
5.5. Finally, Section 5.6 provides concluding remarks.
5.2	 Islamic Banks versus Conventional Banks
In assessing risk reporting for Islamic banks, it is important to recognise the
differences between Islamic banks and their counterparts, conventional banks. Due to
the nature of their operation, there are many differences between them. These are
mainly in the Shari 'a requirements and the resulting economic substance of the
Islamic banks' activities. The essential feature of Islamic banking is that it is interest-
28 
"Conventional banks" as used in this chapter refers to all interest-based banks.
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free. Islam prohibits Muslims from taking or giving nba (interest) regardless of the
purpose for which such loans are made and regardless of the rates at which interest is
charged.
The Qur 'an uses the strongest terms for its prohibition. It challenges those who are
not prepared to leave dealing in interest to prepare for war with Allah and His
Messenger30 . (Al-Qur'an, 2.279). It is worth noting that the Qur'an condemns and
prohibits nba (interest/usury) in the most powerful of terms and makes a very clear
distinction between interest and trade. It urges Muslims to take only the principal sum
and to forgo even this sum if the borrower is unable to pay (Al-Qur'an, 2: 275-81).
The prohibition of interest in Islamic banks generally leads on the funding side, to the
use of profit sharing arrangements (Mudaraba). The Islamic bank, in its capacity as
fund manager or a Mudanib, manages the funds of the investors to generate profits
subject to the rules of Mudaraba. Profits will be shared according to the agreed
sharing ratio and losses will be borne wholly by the rabbul-mal (owner of the capital)
except in cases of misconduct and negligence.
The bank may also enter into Musharaka or Mudaraba contracts with the users of the
funds, sharing profits and losses according to some agreed formula.
With respect to Mudaraba, holders of profit-sharing investment accounts (which take
the place of conventional interest-bearing bank deposit accounts) are essentially
stakeholders with a type of limited term equity interest. The return on their investment
in the bank is uncertain, since they share in the profit (asset returns net of operating
expenses) generated by the bank, alongside the shareholders. This also exposes the
investment account holders to the risk of losing part or all of their initial investment.
Table 5.1 and 5.2 show the main sources and uses of funds for Islamic banks, which
in some respect differ from conventional banks.
29 Shari 'a is the sacred law of Islam. It is derived from the Qur 'an (The Muslim Holy book), the Sunna (the sayings and deeds of
Prophet Mohammed), Jjma (consensus), Q:yas (reasoning by analogy), and Maslaha (consideration of the public good or
common need).
°° Prophet Mohammed (Peace Be Upon Him).
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Table 5.1: Sources of Funds for Islamic Banks
SOURCES OF FUNDS	 DESCRIPTION	 COMMENTS
1. Current accounts	 Based on the principle of al-wadiah	 No profit and loss to be shared
(trust) or loan, whereby depositors 	 because the guaranteed funds can
are guaranteed repayment of their 	 only be used to balance the liquidity
funds.	 needs of the bank and for short-term
transactions on the banks'
_________________________________ _________________________________ responsibility.
2. Savings accounts	 Based also on the aI-wadiah
principle, whereby the holders earn
hiba (premium), at the banks'
discretion depending upon financial
results. In Gulf countries, it is based
on Mudaraba.
3. Unrestricted investment accounts 	 Based on mudaraba principle,	 Differs from those of the savings
whereby the mudarib (active partner)	 accounts by virtues of: a) a higher
has absolute freedom in the 	 fixed minimum amount, b) a longer
management of the investment of the 	 duration of deposits, and c) most
subscribed capital.
	
	
importantly, the investor may lose
some of or all his funds in the event
_________________________________ of the bank making losses.
4. Restricted investment accounts	 Based also on mudaraba principle,	 Differs from those of unrestricted
and usually are directed towards	 investment account because the
larger investors and institutions,	 restricted investment account is
related to a specified project
according to the restriction dictated
by investment account holders, and
the investor has the choice to invest
directly in a preferred project carried
_________________________________ _________________________________ out by the bank.
From Table 5.1, it can be seen that the banking services provided by Islamic banks to
providers of funds include current, savings and profit-sharing investment accounts. In
fact, investment management is the main service provided by almost all Islamic
banks. In general, profit-sharing investment accounts may be divided into unrestricted
investment accounts, over the investment of which the Islamic banks as Mudarib has
complete discretion, and restricted investment accounts to be invested in a
contractually specified category of assets (although the Mudarib may be left some
discretion over this). Normally, unrestricted investment accounts are commingled
with the banks own funds in a so-called bilateral Mudaraba. This is not normal in the
case of restricted investment.
AAOIFI3 ' upholds that unrestricted investment accounts, the largest funding source
for most Islamic banks, are part of the financial position (balance sheet) to be
classified between liabilities and equity capital. It is maintained that these investment
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (refer to Section 5 in this Chapter for details).
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accounts are not a liability for an Islamic bank because the bank is not obligated in
case of loss to return the original amount of funds received from the account holders
unless the loss is due to negligence or breach of contract. At the same time, however,
unrestricted investment account holders, despite being partners in profit sharing with
the Islamic bank, are not treated similarly to the shareholders of the Islamic bank.
This is because holders of investment accounts do not enjoy the same governance
rights (voting rights and election of directors and external auditors).
According to AAOIFI, funds provided by restricted investment accounts holders are
not reflected as part of an Islamic bank's financial position. The relevant information
about such accounts is provided in the statement of changes in restricted investments
and their equivalent or as a footnote to the statement of financial position (balance
sheet), a treatment similar to that for funds under management. (Refer to FAS 1, para.
6 1-64).
In Table 5.2, the uses of funds are presented. It can be seen that as an alternative to
borrowing funds and paying interest on them, Islamic banks use a version of the
Mudaraba contract. In addition, as an alternative to lending funds and charging
interest on them, Islamic banks use various contracts, for example, Musharaka,
Murabaha, Bai' muaJ/al, Bai' Salam, Istisna 'a, Ijarah and Qard' hasan, including the
Mudaraba contract to invest funds under management as well as their shareholders'
funds. Details of these contracts have been explained in Table 5.2.
Al-Omar and Iqbal (2000) found that Murabaha accounts for 66 per cent of total
financing assets of Islamic banks and Ijarah accounts for another 4 per cent. Thus, the
fixed-return (non profit and loss sharing) modes account for 70 per cent of total
financing. The profit and loss sharing modes account for only 18 per cent of
financing. Another 12 per cent go to 'Others' category, of which most also comprise
fixed-return modes. They used the 10 largest Islamic banks 32 total financing in US
Dollars for the period 1994-96.
32 Albaraka Islamic Investment Bank, Bahrain Islamic Bank, Faysal Islamic Bank of Bahrain, Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd,
Dubai Islamic Bank, Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt, Jordan Islamic Bank, Kuwait Finance House, Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad,
and Qatar Islamic Bank.
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Table 5.2: Uses of Funds for Islamic Banks
USES OF FUNDS
	
DESCRIPTION	 COMMENTS
Profit and loss sharing mode 	 At the core of Islamic banking
1.Mudaraba (profit-sharing)	 The bank contributes entire funds, 	 Differs from speculation, which
and the entrepreneur contributes 	 includes an element of gambling in
expertise and works to execute a 	 buying and selling transactions.
potentially successful project. Profits
are shared in percentage agreed
beforehand. Financial losses are
borne exclusively by the bank if the
entrepreneur is not negligent or in
violation of the terms. The liability of
the entrepreneur is limited only to his
time and efforts. It is usually
employed in investment projects with
short gestation periods and in trade
and commerce.
2. Musharaka (partnership)	 The bank is not the sole provider of	 Banks can exercise the voting rights
funds to finance a project. Two or	 corresponding to their share of the
more partners contribute to the joint 	 firms' equity capital. Their
capital of an investment in equal or 	 representatives can sit on the firm's
varying degrees. Profits are shared 	 board of directors. All parties invest
according to what the partners agree 	 in varying proportions, and have the
and the losses are shared strictly 	 right to participate in the
according to respective capital 	 management of the enterprise.
contributions. It is usually employed
to finance long-term investment
projects.
Non profit and loss sharing mode
3. Murabaha (mark up)	 The bank finances the purchase of a	 Two types of murabaha sale exist. In
good or assets by buying it on behalf	 the first type, Islamic bank does not
of its client and adding a mark-up on 	 have a specific customer. In the
the cost before reselling it to the 	 second type, Islamic bank purchases
client on a 'cost-plus' basis profit	 the goods after a customer has made
contract,	 a promise to purchase them from the
bank.
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Table 5.2 (continued)
4. Bal' muajjal (deferred payment)	 Islamic banks have also been	 It is considered lawful infiqh
resorting to purchase and resale of
	
(jurisprudence) to charge a higher
properties on a deferred payment	 price for a good if payments are to be
basis,	 made at a later date. According to
JIqh this does not amount to charging
interest, since it is not a lending
transaction but a trading one.
5. BalSa/am (prepaid purchase)	 Bank pays the money first for a 	 Opposite of the murabaha,
product that the seller promises to
deliver at a future date. This applies
normally to finance agricultural
products.
6. istisna 'a (manufacturing or	 This is a contract to acquire goods on
construction)	 behalf of a third party where the price
is paid to the manufacturer in
advance and the goods produced and
delivered at a later date. This applies
to manufactured products.
7. ijarah and ijarah wa iqtina -	 The banks buy the equipment or
muntiahia bi/tam/eek (leasing)	 machinery and lease it out to their
clients who may opt to buy the items
eventually (ijarah wa iqlina), in
which case the monthly payments
will consist of two components, i.e.
rental for the use of the equipment
and instalment towards the purchases
price.
8. Qard hasan (benevolent loan)	 This is the zero-return loan that the	 Banks are allowed to charge the
Qur 'an urges Muslims to make	 borrowers a service fee to cover the
available to those who need them, 	 administrative expenses of handling
The borrower is obliged to repay only the loan, provided that the fee is not
the principal amount of the loan, but 	 related to the amount or maturity of
is permitted to add a margin at his	 the loan.
own discretion.
9. Islamic securities	 A it	 tonati Xssnc equ1y
portfolio where the underlying assets
comprise ordinary shares in well run
businesses, the productive activities
of which exclude those on the
prohibited list (alcohol, pork,
armaments) and financial service
based on interest income.
The above discussion indicates that the profit and loss sharing modes of financing
(application of funds) are not much used by Islamic banks, although such modes are
used for mobilising funds. The reason is that the credit risk of profit and loss sharing
modes, for example Mudaraba and Musharaka, is expected to be high due to the
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard with asymmetric information. This
occurs when the banks do not have sufficient information on the actual profit of the
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entrepreneur. The bank ought to provide capital to the entrepreneur relying
completely on its integrity, ability and good management.
A comparative analysis of the financial statements of an Islamic bank and a
conventional bank reveals that there are similarities in some areas while in others
there are differences. Both have an identical component of shareholders' equity. Both
have cash and liquid assets; in Islamic banks, however, these are mainly cash assets
contrary to the practice of conventional banks, which maintain such interest-bearing
instruments as treasury bills. Both also have fixed assets and other liabilities; their
components differ, however.
To illustrate these differences, a comparative analysis of an Islamic bank and a
conventional bank is shown in Table 5333 From Table 5.3, it can be seen that Islamic
banks are allowed to invest in leasing transactions (Ijarah). In contrast, conventional
banks must have separate specialised subsidiaries to handle leasing transactions.
Table 5.3: Components of Financial Statements in one Islamic Bank compared to
a Conventional Bank.
Islamic Bank	 Conventional Bank
Assets	 Assets
Liquid assets (cash and cash equivalents)34 Liquid assets (including treasury notes and
bills)
Sales Receivables (Murabaha and others)	 Investments and deposit
Islamic	 financing assets, including Loan portfolio
Mudaraba, Musharaka, Ijarah, Istisna 'a
and Salam
Fixed and other assets	 Fixed and other assets
Liabilities and equity	 Liabilities and equity
Current and saving accounts	 Deposits - Current accounts
Salam and Istisna'a payables	 Saving accounts
Other liabilities (Zakah Islamic tax] and Promissory notes
tax payable)
Depositors share of profit 	 Minority interest
Borrowing
Equity of unrestricted investment accounts Other liabilities
Minority interests
Shareholders' equity	 Shareholders' equity
A comparison has been undertaken following AAOIFI's requirements (Islamic banks) and the International Accounting
Standards requirements (conventional banks).
Some Islamic banks include 3-month commodity Murabaha as cash equivalents.
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In the income statements of conventional banks, interest income/expenses represent a
substantial part of the statement. In Islamic banks, such components do not exist. The
management fees in the form of the Mudarib percentage of profits on Mudaraba
investments are a major source of income for Islamic banks. If there is a gain
generated from operations prohibited by Shari 'a, such income will not be recognised
in the statement as income. Furthermore, the profits of the conventional banks are
declared after deducting interest expense payable to depositors, and in most Islamic
banks profits declared will be profits after deducting the return payable to unrestricted
investment account holders and adding the bank's share as a Mudarib. This results
from the fact that in Islamic banks, the returns on the assets held by the bank are
shared between the banks and the investment account holders, which is not the case in
conventional banks.
5.3	 Risk Management in Islamic Banks
The concept of 'risk' in an Islamic financial system can best be understood when
viewed from two dimensions - prohibition of gharar and freedom of contract. Gharar
is, according to Shari 'a, any element of chance involving asymmetric information,
uncertainty, risk or even speculation leading to illicit profits, and as such is excluded
by the religious, and consequently by the moral, precepts of Islam. Gharar needs to be
explained in a contracting context and concerns uncertainty of the subject matter. The
supplier's obligation, for example, is to deliver the subject matter of the sale; if he is
not in a position to do so, this amounts to gharar, which is prohibited in Islam.
However, even if the subject matter is non-existent in its essence at the time of the
contract, the contract is deemed valid under certain circumstances, for example in the
case of Istisna 'a (manufacturing or construction) and Bai' Salam (sale of
commodities), as long the delivery of the subject matter is certain. Bai' Salam relates
to tangible commodities (e.g. agricultural products), which can be defined at the time
of the contract, and Istisna 'a refers to manufacturing or construction where the goods
do not exist yet at the time of the contract but detail specifications from engineers do
exist. Therefore, these contracts are not considered as gharar because the subject-
matters are not subject to uncertainty.
71
Noraini Mohd. Ariffin	 Chapter 5: Islamic Banks vs Conventional Banks: Risk Disclosure & Management
Undertaking a business transaction or an investment decision also involves some
degree of risk-taking regarding the future performance or outcome of the activity.
However in such cases, risk taking is based on educated analysis and understanding of
the risks that are necessarily present and understood, whereas speculation creates a
risk that would otherwise be non-existent.
The main difference between gharar and risk-taking is related to the nature of risk
and its potential contribution to the social good. Gambling (speculation) involves the
creation of risk for the sake of risk in the hope of very high gains, whereas risk taking
that is a part of some real economic activity that creates economic value in the market
as desirable and permissible.
Islam offers full freedom of contracts to economic agents as long as the resulting
contract is within the boundaries defined by Shari 'a, which mainly exclude nba,
gharar and maysir (speculation). Given the freedom of contracts and the
understanding of gharar, Islam fully recognises risk generated by financial and
commercial factors and elements intrinsic to the formation of the business transaction.
In conventional banks, depositors have a fixed claim on the bank's assets, according
to a predetermined rate of return plus the return of their capital. A conventional bank
must therefore service its obligations to depositors irrespective of its actual
profitability, or &lse become inso'vent. Consequently, any uncertainty In the Income
streams generated by, and change in the value, of the bank's assets is borne by
shareholders alone.
Islamic banks, in contrast, are structured upon the principle of risk sharing. This
applies to the sources of funds and may also apply to the deployment (uses) of funds
(as shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2).
One difference that warrants consideration is that Islamic banks do face a risk not
faced by their conventional counterparts. Though conventional banks and Islamic
banks are exposed to credit risk, liquidity risk and currency risk, the risk for the
Islamic banks is higher, due to their extensive trade and investment activities in
Mudaraba and Musharaka. Nevertheless, some risks to which conventional banks are
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exposed do not exist in Islamic banks, for example, interest rate risk, since interest is
prohibited in their operations. However, this is still debatable. For example, Islamic
banks face "rate of return risk", a type of market risk, on Ijarah and longer-term
Murabaha. Table 5.4 summarises the different kind of risks that any bank may face.
Table 5.4: Risks faced by Conventional Banks and Islamic Banks
____________________________ 
Conventional Commercial Bank Islamic Bank
Credit risk	 A	 A (high)
Liquidity risk	 A	 A (high)
Currency risk	 A	 A
Interest-rate risk	 A	 N/A
Risk of trade and investment N/A	 A
transactions_______________________________________ _____________________________________
A: Applicable	 N/A: Not Applicable
Source: Al-Omar and Abdel Haq (1996).
Credit risk is expected to be high under Mudaraba and Musharaka (jrofit and loss
sharing mode) due to the asymmetric information problem in which the entrepreneur
(obligor) does not provide sufficient information to the financier on the actual profit
of the bank (Khan and Abmed, 2001). This form of credit risk is referred to as 'capital
impairment risk' (e.g. in IFSB, 2005); as the obligor has no contractual obligation to
return the financier's capital intact.
As shown in Table 5.4, the liquidity risk for the Islamic banks is higher because they
generally cannot hold cash equivalents35 (liquid assets) like conventional banks.
Islamic banks are not leveraged by deposits as conventional banks are. Murabaha and
Ijarah constitute a large percentage of the Islamic banks' assets. As mentioned earlier
in Table 5.1, Murabaha will create debt obligations against buyer firms; in other
words, it creates a fixed liability for the purchase. However, if the buyer defaults on
his payment, it is generally agreed by Islamic jurists that Islamic banks could charge
penalties but the bank could not get any benefit out of these penalties. These penalties
could be transferred to charity rather than used by the bank, otherwise that would
mean taking nba (interest). In addition, Islamic banks can have Murabaha
" There are now some Shari a-compliant cash equivalents available, such as Bahraini Salam Sukuk with a 90-day maturity
(details in p. 74)
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collateralisation using Rahn36, whereby collateral may be disposed of in the event of
default.
The liquidity risks in Islamic banks arise from the lack of sufficient Shari 'a based
liquid instruments. It is not possible to transform financial assets into negotiable
financial instruments. Once a debt has been created, it cannot be transferred to anyone
else except at par value. Depositor funds are either callable on demand or require very
short withdrawal notice periods.
There is currently no Islamic inter-bank money market, except in Malaysia. In
Malaysia, for example, an Islamic inter-bank money market was introduced in
January 1994 as a short-term intermediary to provide a ready source of short term
investment outlets based on Shari'a principles. This market is considered to be the
first Islamic money market in the world. Inter-bank trading in Islamic financial
instruments such as Islamic banker's acceptances, Islamic inter-bank investments
where a bank with surplus funds can make an investment with another bank in deficit
on the basis of Mudaraba, and an inter-bank cheque clearing system are the key
activities of this market. Through this the Islamic banks and banks participating in
Interest-free Banking Scheme37 should be able to match their funding requirements
effectively and efficiently.
In Bahrain, the Central Bank of Babrain, Babrain Monetary Agency (details in
Section 6.5) sets up the Liquidity Management Centre in 2002 to sell Shari'a
compliant securities which Islamic banks can hold as liquid assets. The short term
securities (i.e. 3-month) known as Sukuk Al-Salam are issued monthly and to be hold
until maturity and non-tradeable. In addition, Ijarah Sukuk, which is tradeable but is
exposed to rate of return risk are issued for longer periods (i.e. between four to six
years). The main objective of issuing Ijarah securities is to address the requirements
and needs of Islamic financial institutions and investors for attractive investment
opportunities.
36 Ra/in refers to an arrangement whereby a valuable asset is placed as collateral for debt.
In March 1993, Bank Negara Malaysia (the Central Bank of Malaysia) has allowed the conventional banks to offer Islamic
banking services using their existing infrastructure and branches to increase the number of players in Islamic banking under a
scheme known as Skim Perbankan Tanpa Faedah (Interest-free Banking Scheme).
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Islamic banks are prohibited by Shari 'a from borrowing at short notice by discounting
debt obligation receivables (for example through a central bank discount window).
There is also no Shari 'a compliant lender of the last resort facility offered by central
banks. This means that Islamic banks are particularly exposed to liquidity risk tie up
their investment account holders funds in illiquid long term assets, such as Ijarah
(lease) assets, or Mudaraba (venture capital)/Musharaka (partnership) profit sharing
arrangements.
However, Al-Sadah (1999) found in his studies that some Islamic banks (for example
"Mohammed Bank", "Ahmed Bank" and "Khalifa Bank" 38 in Bahrain) take into
consideration the level of liquidity on each type of account (investment, saving and
current accounts) to meet investors' withdrawals. The level of liquidity is influenced
by the liquidity requirements imposed by the regulatory agencies on Islamic banks.
Each Islamic bank will use different liquidity management systems in order to achieve
the same aim; there is some portion in the accounts that acts as the liquidity cushion
for satisfying unexpected withdrawals. This enables the Islamic banks to meet the
unexpected liquidity demands of current and investment account holders and prevents
possibility of a run on the bank.
In addition to those risks commonly faced by conventional banks, Islamic banks face
other unique risks as a result of different characteristics of the assets and the liabilities
structure. They are fiduciary risk and displaced commercial risk (AAOIFI, 1 99939)•
Fiduciary risk is a category of operational risk, namely the risk of breach of the
Mudaraba contract, or misconduct or negligence, on the part of the bank as Mudarib,
with the result that the Mudaraba fund becomes a liability of the bank.
Displaced commercial risk is a category of market (rate of return) risk, resulting in the
transfer of the risk associated with investment accounts to shareholders. This arises
when, under commercial pressure banks forgo a part of the Mudarib's share of profit
' These names are fictitious for confidential reasons.
In March 1999, the AAOIFI Capital Adequacy Committee issued a Statement on the Purpose and Calculation of the Capital
Adequacy Ratio for Islamic Banks.
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and transfer it to the investment account holders in order to prevent withdrawals due
to a non-competitive return. Displaced commercial risk arises because the bank may
not be able to pay competitive rates of return to its investment account holders as
compared to its peer group of Islamic banks and other competitors. Investment
account holders will again have the incentive to seek withdrawal. To prevent
withdrawal, the bank will need to apportion part of its own share of profits to the
investment account holders.
Khan and Ahmed (2001) examine risk management issues in 17 Islamic financial
institutions from 10 different countries using questionnaires and field-level interviews
with Islamic bankers. They find that Islamic bankers rank the rate of return risk as the
most critical risk they face due to the fact that, for example, a Murabaha contract
cannot be repriced and they cannot use swaps to hedge this risk. The results also point
out that the lack of some instruments (like short term financial assets and derivatives)
and a money market (except in Malaysia and to some extent in Bahrain) hampers risk
management in Islamic financial institutions.
5.4	 Islamic Derivatives
In order to hedge the risks arising in their activities, similar to conventional banks,
Islamic banks could consider using derivative instruments. A derivative instrument is
one whose value depends on the values of other more basic underlying variables.
However, these derivative instruments are not accepted by most JIqh scholars because
they argue that all derivatives are not Shari 'a compliant (due to gharar, maysir or
nba), and therefore should be prohibited.
A number of contracts exist in Islamic banking that could be considered a basis for
derivative instruments within an Islamic framework. These are Bai' Salam, Urboun
and Khiyar al-Shart. Bai' Salam is a sale contract in which the buyer pays
immediately against the deferred delivery of a specified amount of fungible (not
uniquely identifiable) goods of a given quality at a predetermined future date. This is
similar to the conventional forward contract. However, the big difference is that in a
Bai' Salam contract, the buyer pays the entire amount in full at the time the contract is
initiated. The contract also stipulates that this payment must be in the form of cash.
The buyer in a contract therefore is an Islamic bank. Since there is full prepayment,
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this potential contract is beneficial to the seller. As such, the predetermined price is
normally lower than the potential price. The price behaviour is certainly different
from that of conventional forward contracts, where the forward price is typically
higher than the spot price by the amount of the carrying cost. Credit or counterparty
risks of forward and Bai' Salam contracts are therefore different. In a Bai' Salam
contract, the risk however would be one-sided, in that since the buyer has fully paid, it
is only the buyer who faces the seller's default risk and not both ways as in a forward
contract. In order to overcome the potential for default on the part of the seller, the
Shari 'a allows the buyer to require security which may be in the form of a guarantee
or pledge.
An Urboun contract is an agreement whereby a buyer of goods makes an immediate
down payment of part of the price against future delivery. The buyer has the option to
pay the balance, being the purchase price less the down payment, at any time until a
specified final purchase date. However, should the buyer choose not to buy the goods
by the final purchasing date, the down payment will be forfeited. It is very similar to
the call option in conventional finance. The main difference is that a call option is
purchased by paying a premium which is not offset against the purchase price should
the option be exercised.
The Khiyar al-Shart contract is a contract in which one or both parties to a contract
(or even a third party) holds an option (embedded within the contract) to confirm or
rescind the contract within a specified time contingent upon the fulfilment of a
stipulated condition. The contract has embedded options that could be triggered if the
underlying asset's price exceeds certain bounds. The exercise features of this contract
are similar to a conventional put option. What differentiates the Khiyar al-Shart
option from conventional options is that there can be no separate fee paid at the start
of the contract in respect of granting the option right. Therefore, it is the delivery price
of the underlying asset which includes an element that recognises the economic value
awarded to the option holder in the contract.
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It is argued by many jiqh scholars that these derivatives (except Bai' Salam40) are
unlawful because they can lead to speculation. For example, the argument is often put
forward that the huge trading volume of derivative markets is indicative of extensive
speculation, that the market attracts and accentuates speculative behaviour. A second
issue that cause uneasiness amongfiqh scholars is the fact that a large portion of those
trading in derivative markets have no intention of either making or taking delivery of
the underlying asset, therefore they must be speculators and this amounts to gharar.
Hence, there is an urgent need to clarify these issues so that a number of derivative
instruments can be accepted by the JIqh scholars and used in hedging the banking
risks in ways which are Shari 'a compliant. In an increasingly competitive and
sophisticated business environment, denying the use of a flexible and powerful array
of instruments for risk management would place the Islamic banks at a disadvantage.
Thus, in evaluating the permissibility of derivatives yet another dimension of Jlqh may
be needed, that is the social welfare (Maslaha) dimension.
5.5	 Accounting Disclosure for Islamic Banks
This section will briefly discuss the accounting standards which are relevant to
Islamic banks in general and then review the situation on risk disclosure in the
standards.
The financial statements of any bank represent in numerical form its assets and
liabilities at a certain date. They a'so state, again in nurn ica fon, t
expenditures of the banks, that is, its income. The presentation of such information is
essential to rational investment decisions and therefore needs to provide an acceptable
level of transparency. The way in which financial statements are presented is
becoming standardised and the standard form is well recognised all over the world.
The Islamic banks are no exception.
In order to standardise the presentation of the financial statements of Islamic banks
and to inspire confidence in their users, a non-profit making self-regulating
organisation was established in 1991 by a number of Islamic banks and other
40 Fiqh scholars allow Bal' Salam but reject conventional futures contracts. Conventional forward contracts may be permissible,
but some scholars argue that either delivery or settlement may be deferred but not both.
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interested parties, the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial
Institutions (AAOIFI). Representatives of the "Big Four" accountancy firms (refer to
footnote 23) sit on the member board 4t . The organisation is funded by subscriptions
ranging from US$2,000 per year to US$40,000 for the larger institutions, and an
endowment fund.
The AAOIFI, which is based in Bahrain, has to date issued 19 accounting standards
five auditing standards, four governance standards, two on ethics plus a statement on
capital adequacy, and 18 Shari 'a standards. The standards are implemented in various
Islamic banking jurisdictions, including Bahrain, Sudan, Jordan, Qatar, UAE and
Lebanon and also used as guidelines in other countries such as Malaysia and Saudi
Arabia. The existence of these standards has significantly improved transparency and
disclosures, and also resulted in greater harmonisation of Shari 'a practices. In part,
the Islamic accounting standards are adaptations of International Accounting
Standards (lASs) concentrating on added disclosure due to the uniqueness of the
Islamic banks. However, they also fill a number of major gaps in lASs when applied
to Islamic banks.
Karim (1990) claims that Islamic banks have taken the initiative to self-regulate their
financial reporting for fear that the regulatory bodies in the countries in which they
operate might otherise	 rit	 'cri'ait \kt	 c' 'ct c
banks.
Financial Accounting Standard No. 1, 'General Presentation and Disclosure in the
Financial Statements of Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions' (FAS 1) is
applicable to the financial statements published by Islamic banks to meet the common
information needs of the main users of such statements. This standard is applicable to
all Islamic banks regardless of their legal form, countries of incorporation, or size.
This standard defines the financial statements (refer to Appendix 2) that should be
periodically published by Islamic banks to satisfy the common information needs of
41 Members of AAOIFI come from several countries which include Bahrain, Cayman Islands, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait,
Malaysia, Palestine, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sri Langka, Sudan, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey and United Arab Emirates (by
alphabetical country order).
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users of financial reports set forth in the Statement of Financial Accounting No. 1,
'Objectives of Financial Accounting for Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions. The
standard also establishes the general principles for the presentation of information and
defines certain information that should be disclosed the financial statements of Islamic
banks in order to achieve the objectives of accounting and financial reports within the
limitations of financial accounting.
This standard has been effective for financial statements for fiscal periods beginning 1
Muharram 1417H or 1 January 1996.
With regard to risks, general disclosure in FAS 1 covers concentrations of asset risks,
which refers to the magnitude of assets invested or deposited in an economic sector, a
customer or a geographical area with unique economic characteristics. In addition,
disclosure should be made in the financial statements of the risk associated with net
assets (net liabilities) which are denominated in foreign currency.
In terms of market risk disclosure, FAS 1 limits itself to the statement that 'disclosure
should be made of the net realisable value of an asset if such value is less than the
asset's recorded amount. However, all expected losses should be recognised when
reasonably measurable'. FAS 1 demands that disclosure be made of any amount an
Islamic bank is obligated to deposit vth othets as eompetsatig oa'iees,
disclosure with regard to liquidity risk. Islamic banks should also disclose the
distribution of unrestricted investment accounts and their equivalent and other
accounts (assets), by type, in accordance with their respective periods to maturity or
expected periods to cash conversion (for assets). This can disclose liquidity
requirements during the next period and liquidity requirements during the following
periods.
Conventional banks, as mentioned in Chapter 3, may follow International Accounting
Standard, lAS 1, 'Presentation of Financial Statements' and lAS 30, 'Disclosure in the
Financial Statements of Banks and Similar Financial Institutions' in preparing their
financial statements, which also as argued earlier do not have sufficient disclosure on
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risk information. In fact, the recommendations by the regulators, in particular the
BCBS require better information on risk reporting42.
Considering both sets of standards, in general, lASs and AAOIFI's FASs have much
in common in terms of being international standards, the aim is to promote
comparability and transparency and the issuance which follows a 'due process'. lASs
and AAOIFI's FASs have helped to standardise accounting practices of enterprises,
thereby making the financial information of these institutions comparable and
transparent thus allowing investors to make better informed decisions. The main
difference between these two standards, in particular lAS 30 and FAS 1, is that lAS
30 does not cover the results of Shari 'a compliant transactions as found in FAS 1.
Therefore, the same set of financial statements can largely comply with FASs and
lASs. A good example is found in a large Islamic bank (Shamil Bank, former Faysal
Islamic Bank). In their 1998 financial statements, they prepared two sets of financial
statements, one according to AAOIFI's standards and another one in accordance with
lAS. The differences can be seen similar to Table 5.3 in this chapter, except that there
is no interest item in Islamic banks. The income mainly comes from investments.
However there are some doubts about FAS 2 'Murabaha and Murabaha to the
Purchase Orderer' and lAS 18 'Revenue Recognition'. FAS 2 covers Islamic credit-
sale transactions. There may be problems of compatibility with the requirements of
lAS 18 for such transactions. lAS 18 requires the identification of a trading profit
margin and a separate charge for credit which is interest-based. The former is
recognised when the asset is made available to the buyer (lAS 18 pars. 14-19), while
the latter is recognised on a time proportion basis over the credit period (lAS 18 par.
30 (a)). Such a treatment is not Shari 'a compliant. In a Murabaha contract, the
seller's mark-up is not divisible into a trading profit and a separate charge for credit,
since the latter would be a form of nba.
Based on the above, the financial statements and related notes provided by AAOIFI
standards could give better disclosure and more meaningful information to the users,
42 Refer to Chapter 2.
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particularly with respect to unrestricted and restricted investments which are totally
ignored by lAS. These investments are the main sources of funds of most Islamic
banks. In addition, when both standards are not compatible, FAS will give a 'truer and
fairer' view than lAS because FAS properly reflect the substance of the results of a
Shari 'a compliant transaction when applied to Islamic banks.
Errico and Farahbaksh (1998) mention that the issue of what standards are used for
conventional banks has received little attention, even in countries where all banks
follow Islamic principles. Furthermore, they argue that a number of standards and best
practices established by the BCBS are not always applicable (as they stand) to Islamic
banking. An appropriate regulatory framework governing Islamic banks needs to
place greater emphasis on the management of operational risk and information
disclosure issues than is normally the case in conventional banking.
Ismail and Abdul Latiff (2000) look into the financial reporting of Islamic banks in
Malaysia, Bahrain, Turkey and Pakistan and make some comparisons using survey
methods (questionnaire and interview). In addition, they study the use of AAOIFI
standards and lASs by these banks. They found that the regulatory reporting
frameworks of Malaysia and Pakistan either explicitly or implicitly adopt the
International Accounting Standard Committees' conceptual framework. The results
also indicate that AAOIFI does not particularly endorse the concept of substance over
form. They argue that there should be improvement in regulation and practice as
regards the disclosure and treatment that reflect the obligation and rights of banks and
clients.
Karim (2001) suggests that the perspective adopted by the supervisory authorities to
regulate Islamic banking has tended to influence the accounting treatment of
investment accounts adapted by Islamic banks, although most of the countries in
which these banks operate either look directly to lASs as their national standards or
develop national standards based primarily on lASs. This has rendered the financial
statements of Islamic banks non-comparable, thereby departing from the concept of
comparability which is considered in the IASC (1989) Framework for the Preparation
and Presentation of Financial Statements as one of the four principal qualitative
characteristics that make the information provided in the financial statements useful
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for users. This implies that the calls for worldwide adherence to lASs to achieve
harmonisation in financial reporting regardless of cultural differences should not go
unchallenged. Rather, Islamic banks should be asked to implement AAOIFI's
standards, as is currently the case in some countries. This would render the financial
statements of these banks comparable because AAOIFI's standards are specifically
developed to cater for the unique characteristics of the Shari 'a contracts that govern
the Islamic banks' financial instruments (Karim, 2001).
The issuance of ED 7 which aims to provide more detailed disclosure of banking risks
will help the banks to be more transparent and the market participants to get more
information from the financial statements, for example, detailed disclosure on
concentration of risks faced by banks. However, again this ED 7 still does not cover
the results of Shari 'a compliant transactions that are more relevant in the case of
Islamic banks. For example, Islamic banks are still not making use of derivatives to
hedge the risks as practised by conventional banks.
In this case, it is important for the standard setters, particularly AAOIFI and IFSB, to
design their own risk disclosure standard which is more applicable to Islamic banks.
However, they could adapt the requirements for risk disclosure as in ED 7, and tailor
them to suit the nature arid specificaties of Islamic banks. In particular, Islamic banks
have different financial instruments compared to coireniona\ bariXc, 'nicn ge 'rrse
to different risk exposures. These risk exposures need to be disclosed to the users,
particularly the investment account holders as they require more transparency to
monitor their investments. Therefore, it is important for paragraph 7 in this ED 7 to be
expanded to address which types of disclosure are likely to be more relevant for
which class of financial instrument.
5.6	 Concluding Remarks
The successful banks will be those, which are able to retain customer loyalty and
current profitability by developing new financial products, which meet customers'
needs for the future. There is no reason why Islamic banks cannot be successful in this
brave new world of banking. Indeed, the exceptional position which they command
within the Islamic Ummah (nation) gives them many advantages which are denied to
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conventional banks. The Islamic banks have been established on the basis of Shari 'a
and Islamic socio-economic principles, in which faith and trust are basic.
For that reason, Islamic banks have an obligation to be transparent by making
adequate disclosures to their investment account holders, not only with regard to their
own financial condition as is the case with conventional banks but also in respect of
the management of trust money. This can assist the users in understanding the banks'
activities and hence to maintain their trust in the banks.
In order to provide a competitive range of alternative financing vehicles, Islamic
banks will need to work together to develop and adopt the standards of disclosure and
risk management, that are expected in the international markets. The purpose of
Islamic banks is not simply to provide banking services; it is also to enable the
Muslim community to conduct its financial affairs in accordance with the Shari 'a.
The accounting standards must be credible and of high quality to cater to the needs of
market players.
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Transparency in Islamic Banks: Issues and Implications
6.1	 Introduction
Islamic banks face great challenges to successfully serve the Islamic Ummah in which
they operate. They have to seek the most appropriate means through which accounting
standards could be developed and implemented in order to present adequate, reliable
and relevant information to financial statement users. The establishment of Islamic
banks is intended to cater for the needs of Muslims in order to follow the principles of
Shari 'a. Such ways and means are characterised by many features, including the
prohibition of interest, the use of profit sharing and other investment vehicles, which
have been explained in a previous chapter. Since Islamic banks mobilise funds on a
profit sharing basis, it becomes essential that all parties to their transactions should
have full access to information covered by agreements. Adequate disclosure and
transparency provide an assessment of the degree of risk associated with participation.
Accordingly, the attractiveness of Islamic banks to Muslims stems mainly from their
compliance with Shari 'a in their dealings, whether with shareholders, current and
investment account holders or others for whom such banks invest their funds.
On the other hand, the Muslim's choice of investing or depositing funds in or dealing
with one Islamic bank versus another, is 1oaseà on his!her evaluation of and
confidence in the bank's ability to maintain its capital at a level sufficient for solvency
purposes. In addition, the bank's ability to realise rates of returns commensurate with
the assumed investment risk for both its shareholders and the investment account
holders is also important in decision making. Lack of such confidence might cause
Muslims to stop dealing with an Islamic bank. Among the important sources of such
information are the financial reports of Islamic banks which are prepared in
accordance with standards that are applicable to Islamic banks.
This chapter aims to look into the issues that arise in Islamic banks in order to satisfy
the needs of their users for making investment decisions and to enhance transparency
in Islamic banks' financial reporting. Section 6.2 presents the financial reporting by
institutions that comply with Shari 'a principles. Section 6.3 discusses the capital
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adequacy requirement for Islamic banks by looking specifically at Basel II. Section
6.4 provides the challenges faced by Islamic banks' transparency in financial
reporting. The roles of the Babrain Monetary Agency and the Islamic Financial
Services Board are discussed in Sections 6.5 and 6.6. Finally, Section 6.7 provides
concluding remarks.
6.2 Financial Reporting by Institutions that Comply with SIzari'a Principles
In order to achieve transparency, financial reports in the form of financial statements
play an important role for any organisation to assist users in making decisions, by
providing information on the activities conducted by that organisation. Financial
reporting by Islamic banks should logically be focused on the fair reporting of the
entity's financial position and results of its operations, in a manner that would reveal
what is halal (permissible) and haram (forbidden). This is in compliance with Allah's
instructions to co-operate in performing good deeds43 . This means that financial
reporting by Islamic banks has objectives which Muslim financial accountants should
be aware of and comply with. They should not enter this field without a conscious and
clear understanding of the objectives of financial reporting.
Muslim accountants could follow the professional code of ethics44 issued by the
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI),
which depends primarily on the principles and rules of the Islamic faith and Shari 'a.
These ethical principles stem from the presentation and constant religious incentives
that surpass in their purposes all other incentives. More generally, the Shari 'a
emphasises transparency and avoidance of gharar, for example the Prophet's
injunction to Muslims to write down their contracts and also the stress in the Qur 'an
on the importance of writing down faithfully for each transaction (Al-Qur 'an 2:282).
Muslims who deal with Islamic banks are concerned, in the first place, with obeying
and satisfying Allah in their financial and other dealings (principles and rules of
Shari 'a).
' Refer to Al-Qur an, 5:2.
AAOIFI (1991): Code of Ethics for Accountants and Auditors of Islamic Financial Institutions
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Islamic banks as mentioned earlier have unique characteristics as compared to
conventional banks. The relationship between Islamic banks and the parties that deal
with them differs from the relationship of those who deal with conventional banks.
Unlike conventional banks, Islamic banks do not use interest in their mobilisation and
uses of funds, whereas conventional banks borrow and lend money on the basis of
interest.
Furthermore, the characteristics of Islamic banks tend to raise a set of issues
concerning corporate governance and agency problems (Archer and Karim, 1997;
Archer et al., 1998) that have no parallels in either commercial banks or investment
banks.
The existence of AAOIFI as a standard-setting body for Islamic financial institutions
can assist the preparation of financial statements by Islamic banks by providing
accounting, auditing and Shari 'a standards for Islamic banks. Statement of Financial
Accounting No. 1, 'Objectives of Financial Accounting for Islamic Banks and
Financial Institutions' (Statement of Objectives) and Statement of Financial
Accounting No. 2, 'Concepts of Financial Accounting for Islamic Banks and
Financial Institutions' (Statement of Concepts), issued by AAOIFI constitute the
framework to which it refers in developing financial accounting standards to assure
consistency and to enhance users' confidence.
The Statement of Objectives also highlights the common information needs of users
of the financial statement of Islamic banks. These include information about the
Islamic bank's compliance with the principles of Shari 'a in all of its financial and
other dealings; and information disclosing the income earned and expenditure
incurred by the Islamic banks from prohibited transactions or sources, if any, and the
maimer in which these were disposed of. In addition, the information about the
Islamic bank's economic resources and related obligations, and the effect of
transactions, other events and circumstances on the entity's economic resources and
related obligations are also important. The information to assist in the determination
of Zakah on the Islamic bank's funds and the purpose for which it will be disbursed,
and to estimate cash flows that might be realised from dealing with the Islamic bank,
are also included in this statement. Furthermore, the statement also mentions the
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information to assist in evaluating the Islamic bank's discharge of its fiduciary
responsibility to safeguard funds and to invest at reasonable rates of return, and finally
information about the Islamic bank's discharge of its social responsibilities.
The Statement of Concepts was prepared by AAOIFI to express basic principles of
financial accounting. These concepts or basic principles are consistent with the
broader view of Islamic principles. Islamic thought accommodates principles, not
specifically stated in the Shari 'a, provided that such principles are beneficial or
harmless to society and do not violate any precept of Shari'a.
The information should be directed principally at assisting the users in evaluating the
adequacy of the Islamic bank's capital to absorb losses and business risks; assessing
the risk inherent in its investments; and evaluating the degree of liquidity of its assets
and the liquidity requirements for meeting its other obligations. This relates to the
issue of capital adequacy and the basis of its calculation, which is discussed in the
following section. In addition, the investment account holders also need information
about profits earned from their investments in Islamic banks.
6.3	 Capital Adequacy Requirement - Basel II
The Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) is one of the measures which bank regulators use
to measure the adequacy of a bank's equity capital and as a buffer against credit risk
to which banks are exposed. It is also a measure of a bank's overall risk exposure.
There was evidence that, in the absence of an authoritative guideline for the treatment
of unrestricted and restricted investments, the Basel capital adequacy formula was
being incorrectly and inconsistently applied to Islamic banks. For example,
unrestricted investment account holders could either be treated as liabilities (resulting
in an overstatement of capital requirements and hence an understatement of capital
adequacy) or ignored (with the opposite effect).
Basel II was proposed by the BCBS in June l999. Like the 1988 Accord, this Basel
II's first pillar maintains both the current definition of capital and minimum capital
ratio of 8 per cent of capital to risk weighted assets. Since the Islamic banks have
' This Basel 11 has been explained in detail in Section 3.2.4.
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equity of unrestricted investment accounts in their capital structure, this can cause
some problems in measuring their minimum capital requirements. There is also the
issue of whether restricted investment accounts have capital adequacy implications.
Karim (1996) argued that the application of a CAR framework based on the BIS's
requirement does not cater for the unique characteristics of one of the major
instruments - profit sharing investment accounts - through which Islamic banks
mobilise funds. He proposed four scenarios for the calculation of CAR and examined
their implications on the financial and marketing strategies of Islamic banks. He
argues that both the financial and marketing strategies of an Islamic bank are
contingent on the scenario to be adopted by regulatory authorities for the treatment of
profit sharing investment account financing. This in turn would determine whether
shareholders of Islamic banks would be able to avail themselves of the benefits of
high investment accounts financing while keeping their equity capital at a minimum
to increase their rate of return at no extra risk.
In 1999, AAOIFI issued the 'Statement on the Purpose and Calculation of the Capital
Adequacy Ratio (CAR) for Islamic banks' which sets out a standard method of
calculating the CAR for Islamic banks. For the purpose of calculating its CAR, the
Islamic bank's own capital is calculated according to the Basel methodology and
comprises two tiers. Tier I consists of the Islamic bank's permanent share capital and
reserves (as shown in its balance sheet) but excluding revaluation reserves and
prudential reserves (profit equalisation reserves and investment risk reserves 46 as
defined in the AAOIFI's Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) No. 11, 'Provisions
and Reserves').
Tier 2 consists of revaluation reserves together with the profit equalisation reserve and
investment risk reserve mentioned above, but not general provisions 47 as defined in
Profit equalisation reserve is the amount appropriated by the Islamic bank out of the Mudaraba income, before allocating the
Mudarib share, in order to maintain a certain level of return on investment for investment account holders and increase owner's
equity. (para 16), whereas investment risk reserve is the amount appropriated by the Islamic bank out of the income of
investment account holders, after allocating the Mudarib share, in order to cater against future losses for investment account
holders. (para 17).
' A general provision is an amount set aside to reflect a potential loss that may occur as a result of currently unidentifiable risks
in relation to receivables, financing or investment assets. The amount reflects estimated losses affecting these assets attributable
to events that have already occurred at the date of the statement of financial position, and not estimated losses attributable to
future events.
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the FAS 11. In the numerator of the Islamic bank's CAR, Tier 2 items may be
included only up to a total equal to 50 per cent of the total of Tier 1 items.
For the purpose of calculating its CAR, the risk-weighted assets of an Islamic bank
consist of the risk-weighted assets financed by the Islamic bank's own capital and its
liabilities, together with 50 per cent of the risk-weighted assets financed by the
Islamic bank's profit-sharing investment accounts. This applies to both unrestricted
investment accounts that are accounted for on the Islamic bank's balance sheet, and
restricted investment accounts that are accounted for off the balance sheet. The risk
weightings to be used in calculating the Islamic bank's risk-weighted assets are the
same as those set out in the Basel Agreements. The 50 per cent of the risk-weighted
assets financed by investment accounts is a guideline. A banking supervisor could set
a lower (or even higher) one for Islamic banks. This statement was effective
beginning 1 Muharram 1412H or 1 January 2000.
The original Basel Accord ('1988 Accord') adopted a 'risk bucket' approach for
calculating regulatory capital, treating all banks alike, and thus not giving safer banks
the incentive to distinguish themselves from riskier ones in order to save on capital
requirements. The major novelty of Basel II is the replacement of the existing risk
weighting scheme by a system where the risk weights for financial assets are
determined by the credit rating of the borrower, as defined for example by a rating
agency. According to Basel II, for each given class of borrowers or obligors, those
with high ratings have a risk weight smaller than 100 per cent but those with the
lowest ratings have a risk weight larger than 100 per cent. Unrated borrowers or
obligors have a risk weight of 100 per cent.
The reliance on external ratings in determining capital charges proposed under the
new Accord could result in a substantial increase in demand for additional capital
during periods of economic downturn and high non-performing loans. It is also seen
that the new proposals tend to discriminate against banks incorporated in developing
countries and to favour the largest institutions in the Group of Ten (GlO) countries.
Greater risk-sensitivity contains pro-cyclical elements. During prosperous times,
ratings will improve, encouraging banks to lend more, whereas during a downturn,
ratings will be lowered, potentially leading to sharp withdrawals of funds or a credit
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crunch48 . This could be hard on developing countries, increasing their vulnerability to
contagion and currency crises. Furthermore, most of the Islamic banks are located in
developing countries so this may have a significant impact on them.
Basel II does not cater for the specificities of Islamic banks any more than the original
1988 Accord. However, the existence of this Basel II can aid Islamic banks to
improve their disclosure requirements in order to be transparent (Pillar 349)•
Disclosure can trigger a 'dynamic competitive process' in which disclosure of
information by a bank with a good risk management system invites other institutions
to follow suit.
Another important aspect of this Basel II for Islamic banks is the introduction of
operational risk, which is expected to represent on average 20 per cent of the
minimum regulatory capital charge. Given the newness of Islamic banks, this risk in
terms of personnel risk and system risk can be considerable in these institutions.
Operational risk in this respect particularly arises as the banks may not have enough
qualified professionals (in capacity and capability) to conduct the Islamic financial
operations safely. On the other hand, given the different nature of their business, the
computer software available in the market for conventional banks may also not be
appropriate for Islamic banks. This gives rise to system risks of developing and using
information technologies in Islamic banks. These have been taken up by IFSB where
it has issued an exposure draft (Exposure Draft No. 2) on Capital Adequacy in March
2005 based on Basel II with the necessary modifications and adaptations to cater for
the specificaties and characteristics of Islamic banks (IFSB, 2005b).
6.4 Challenges faced by Islamic Banks' Transparency in Financial Reporting
Islamic banks are facing many challenges that are likely to affect their ability to grow
and operate within a more competitive environment. They are still faced with a slow
pace of innovation. Islamic banks differ from conventional banks in many respects, in
48 According to the Council of Economic Advisors (1991), credit crunch is 'a situation in which the supply of credit is restricted
below the range usually identified with prevailing market interest rates and the profitability of investment projects'.
Pillar 3 of Basel 11 is intended to provide banking institution specific guidance in the important area of capital; in addition to
promoting safety and soundness in banks and financial systems that will support and enhance both Pillars 1 and 2 of the
framework by enabling the market to make an informed assessment of a bank's overall capital adequacy position.
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particular their unique profit sharing characteristics. They have to compete with the
existing conventional banks as well as other Islamic banks to attract funds from
current and investment account holders. New instruments are needed; a uniform
regulatory environment and legal framework have yet to be developed.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Islamic banks are still not making use of
derivatives to hedge the risks as practised by conventional banks. Derivatives are not
accepted by fiqh scholars because according to them this leads to maysir which
consequently leads to gharar. Derivatives are being used by conventional banks not
only for hedging and arbitrage, but also as a competitive tool in marketing their
products. Therefore, it is important for Islamic banks to give consideration to some of
these derivatives because there are ways in which a derivative can be created, for
example 'synthetic options' in the form of Urboun (over-the-counter Islamic
derivatives). Furthermore, there is a wide array of benefits to be reaped from
derivatives. For example, in the case of futures contracts some fiqh scholars have
objected stating that deferred sale is not allowed 50 while yet others cite precedents to
deferred sales such as Bai' Salam (details on pages 76 and 77 ) but have objected to
futures on other grounds, mostly because they encourage speculation.
In order for derivatives to be used by Islamic banks, they must have these necessary
features (Billah, 1997). All derivatives in general must be free of at least the following,
five items: Riba, rishwah (corruption), maysir, gharar and jahi (ignorance). So, what
is being intended is fair play and justice to all parties to a transaction.
In addition to these requirements for derivatives, the Shari 'a has some basic
conditions with regard to the sale of an asset (in this case a real asset as opposed to
financial assets). Since a derivative instrument is a financial asset dependent on the
value of its underlying asset, the Shari 'a conditions for the validity of a sale would
also be relevant. Aside from the fact that the underlying asset must be halal at least
two conditions have to be met. Firstly, the underlying asset or commodity must
5° Mufti Taqi Usmani (1996) objected to futures contracts for two reasons: It is a well recognised principle of the Shari a that
sale or purchase cannot be effected for a future date and in most futures transactions, delivery of the commodities or their
possession is not intended. However, fiqh scholars allow Bai' Salam but reject conventional futures contracts. Conventional
forward contracts may be permissible, but all scholars argue that either delivery or settlement may be deferred but not both. In
Bai' 5alam, payment is made in advance, but delivery is deferred.
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currently exist in its physical, sellable form51 , and secondly, the seller should have
legal ownership of the asset in its final form. These conditions of the validity of a sale
would obviously render impossible the trading of derivatives. However, most scholars
are of the view that the Shari 'a provides exceptions to these conditions to enable
deferred sale where needed (Shafi, 1997).
Asymmetric information in financial markets exposes investors to many risks and
hazards. It can also lead to 'financial panic', for example widespread collapse of
financial intermediaries. Because investment account holders cannot assess the quality
of the assets in which their funds are invested, they are likely, if they have doubts
about the overall health of the banks, to withdraw funds from both sound and unsound
banks. This leads to Islamic banks facing displaced commercial risk i.e. withdrawal
risk (AAOIFI, 1999).
Asymmetric information also leads to the problem of moral hazard and adverse
selection in financial markets. To minimise asymmetric information, there is thus a
need to make the activities of banks as transparent as possible. For an Islamic bank,
due to its unique characteristics of profit sharing arrangements, it is particularly
important to be transparent (Sundararajan and Errico, 2001). Furthermore, in an
Islamic banking framework, as argued by Sundararajan and Errico (2001), investment
account holders have more incentives to monitor bank performance than conventional
depositors because neither capital value nor returns on investment deposits are fixed
and guaranteed by banks, but depend on bank performance in investing the funds.
More transparency would increase the confidence of clients of Islamic banks and
would help in avoiding panics.
Table 6.1 shows the type of risks in the Islamic financial products and the ways to
mitigate these risks. Due to the particularities of the Islamic banks, these risks should
be disclosed to users of the financial statements. However, there is no standard yet,
requiring the Islamic banks to disclose these risks. Even AAOIFI's standards seem not
to be entirely adequate, particularly in terms of risk reporting. For example, FAS 1, as
explained in Chapter 5, does cover the presentation of items in Islamic banks'
General principles for not accepting derivatives may apply but there is an exception if certain conditions are met. For example
the use of generic items in Salam and items defined by specification in Isiisna'a.
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financial statements but fails to cover the disclosure of qualitative information on risk
and possible risk mitigation, which can give more useful and relevant information to
the users. The exposure draft issued by IFSB in March 2005 (Exposure Draft No. 1)
on Risk Management, similar to the BCBS's publications on sound practices and
principles pertaining to market, credit and operational of banks, but catering for the
specificities of Islamic banks, could provide Islamic banks with the guidelines for risk
management.
Table 6.1: Possible Risk Mitigation in Islamic Products
Islamic Products	 Type of Risks	 Possible Risk Mitigation
Murabaha	 • Change in price before	 • Transfer of the ownership
resale	 at the outset 52
• Default risk (failure to pay	 • Use of charity account to
in time.	 impose penalty charge for
• Rate of return risk (fixed	 delayed payment
______________________________	
mark-up)	 ______________________________
Istisna 'a	 • Credit risk	 • Performance bond from the
• Performance risk	 manufacturer's or
contractor's bank
• Letter of guarantee during
construction or warranties
________________________________ ________________________________ 	
after_delivery
Ijarah	 • Credit risk	 • Guarantee from the lessee
• Ownership risk	 • Repossession of asset
Mudaraba (asset side)	 • No control over funds	 • Dealing with highly reputed
• High degree of moral	 Companies
hazard - bank relies on	 • Securities and guarantees
obligor's capability and	 against loss due to
integrity	 negligence or
mismanagement -
__________________________________ __________________________________ 	
Collateral
Musharaka	 • Equity risk	 • Management participation
Baj' Sa/am	 •	 Credit risk (seller's default) 	 •	 Parallel Salam used
•	 Price risk (market may	 (collateral) - Hedges price
fluctuate)	 risk
Source: Husain Yusof G (2002)
Another challenge faced by Islamic banks with respect to the transparency issue is the
reluctance of certain Islamic banks to follow the AAOIFI's standards, for example the
banks in Kuwait, the UAE and Egypt, which makes their financial statements non-
The purpose is to ensure simultaneous purchase and resale so that there is no delay or gap between the two actions and
ownership is transferred at the very outset.
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comparable. They are obliged to follow the standards required by their own central
banks, which are lAS or based on lAS. This will lead to difficulties in comparing and
understanding the financial statements of different Islamic banks. There is also a lack
of consistency in the accounting treatment of various Islamic banking operations. For
example, a study by Ismail and Abdul Latiff (2000) revealed that all the banks in
Bahrain adhered to AAOIFI's treatment for restricted investments and unrestricted
investments53.
Pakistan keeps investment accounts (Mudaraba deposits) as an off the balance sheet
item. In contrast, Albaraka (Turkey) keeps all Mudaraba deposits, even restricted
funds, on the balance sheet separate from liabilities with disclosure of a bank's
obligations. The majority of the rest of the banks disclose Mudaraba investments as
liabilities. Even the presentation of the Islamic banks' financial statements differs,
making it hard for the users to relate the results of one bank to another's. Accounting
standards are crucial for information disclosure, building and monitoring users'
confidence, and also for surveillance. Proper standards will also help the integration
of Islamic financial markets with international markets.
Furthermore, different Shari 'a interpretations also exist in different countries in which
Islamic banks are located. For example, Islamic banks in Malaysia have different
interpretations of Shari 'a rulings and product permissibility from the Gulf countries,
Sudan and others, particularly in the sale of debt which is allowed in Malaysia but not
in the other countries. In Malaysia, there is a centralised Shari 'a Supervisory Board
Committee. In Gulf, it is not allowed for the Islamic banks to trade securities based on
debt except for those created under Ijarah. Nevertheless, there is already an
acceptance on the trading of securities that are based on combination of debt assets
(BBA and others) and Ijarah assets, subject to Ijarah assets must be at least 51 per
cent of the total assets used for the securities. In Sudan, banks are not allowed to use
Parallel Salam or Isuisna 'a and in Kuwait, Kuwait Finance House does not use
binding Murabaha.
" Restricted investments are kept off the balance sheet, while the unrestricted investments are treated as quasi-capital (limited-
term equity) in between liabilities and shareholders' equity (FA5 I).
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The ability of Islamic banks to meet the above challenges depends on the support
from the regulators and the standard-setting bodies, particularly AAOIFI and IFSB in
suggesting sufficient regulations and standards.
In addition to that, central banks play an important role in ensuring that the banks
follow the guidelines set by them and recommending some measures to improve the
performance of these banks. An example is the Bahrain Monetary Agency in Bahrain,
which is discussed in the following section.
6.5	 The Role of the Bah rain Monetary Agency
The Bahrain Monetary Agency (BMA) is the central bank in Bahrain and its
supervisory requirements for Islamic banks are similar to those for conventional
banks, which include appropriately qualified and experienced management, adequate
capital, liquidity and internal monitoring systems, and the proper assessment and
control of risk.
On 12 January 2002, BMA issued new Islamic banking regulations under the title
'Prudential Information and Regulatory Framework for Islamic Banks (PIRI)'. The
regulations follow guidelines from the (Babrain-based) AAOIFI and the BCBS and
were developed in conjunction with the accounting firm, Ernst & Young, following
consultation with many of the country's banks.
The objective of the regulations (which cover six main areas, including capital
adequacy, asset quality, management of investment accounts, earnings quality,
liquidity and corporate governance), which are similar to CAMEL (refer to Section
4.4) but cover additional areas such as corporate governance, is not simply to provide
a regulatory framework, but to also access information that can be used to monitor
banks' operations and identify any sign of deterioration in their performance.
The BMA has set its capital adequacy ratio requirement at a figure of 12 per cent54,
which is derived from the capital adequacy formula stipulated by Base! and adopted
by AAOIFI. To cater for fiduciary risk and displaced commercial risk, the two unique
' The figure of 12 per cent includes 8 per cent recommended by the BCBS for conventional banks and another 4 per cent to cater
for additional risks faced by Bahraini banks, for example market and operational risks.
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risks faced by Islamic banks, the BMA has accepted AAOIFI recommendations and
requires 50 per cent of the risk-weighted assets of the profit sharing investment
accounts to be included in the denominator of the capital adequacy ratio. The risk-
weighted assets of an Islamic bank consist of 100 per cent of the risk-weighted assets
financed by the Islamic bank's own funds and 50 per cent of the risk-weighted assets
financed by the bank's investment accounts (both unrestricted investment and
restricted investment accounts). BMA notes that as the numerator of the capital
adequacy ratio, tier capital (Tier 1 and 2) is the cornerstone of a bank's strength and
should represent a permanent and unrestricted commitment of funds, be freely
available to absorb losses and thereby enable a bank to keep operating whilst any
problems are resolved and not impose any unavoidable charge on the earnings.
It is important for Islamic banks to maintain sound quality assets and the Agency must
be notified where exposure to a single counterparty will be equal to or exceed 10 per
cent of the eligible capital base. For management of investment accounts, banks need
to ensure that there are adequate policies in place that safeguard the interests of not
only the shareholders of the bank but also those of profit sharing investment account
holders. The banks are not permitted to transfer funds between restricted investment
accounts and corporate books (carrying self-financed assets and those financed by
unrestricted investment accounts) without the BMA's prior approval.
In order to determine earnings quality, the BMA requires disclosure to itself of
earnings based on amounts received with a breakdown of the ageing of the amounts
receivable, with additional breakdowns of earnings from the bank's 10 largest
customers, related parties and geographical segments. This information is to assist the
BMA in assessing the soundness of the bank through monitoring the trend of its
earnings quality and risk concentration.
BMA notes that monitoring and controlling liquidity is one of the most critical
responsibilities of a bank's management, pointing out that it is of even greater
importance in Islamic banks due to the interpretation of some fiqh scholars that
Mudaraba contracts 55 are non-binding in terms of maturity, implying that investment
AAOIFI Shari 'a Standard on Mudaraba states that it is non-binding.
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account holders can withdraw their funds at any time, subject to foregoing their share
of profit (but not of loss) for the most recent period. The BMA stipulates that banks
should monitor their maturity mismatch position for both corporate books (carrying
self-financed assets and those financed by unrestricted investment accounts) and
restricted investment account holders. It has laid down criteria for reporting inflows
and outflows from 0-6 months on a cash basis and from 6 months to 5 years on
maturity basis. The agency has set mismatch limits for the unrestricted investment
accounts of 10 per cent of the eligible capital base for the 0-8 day time band and 20
per cent for the 8 days to 1 month band. However, on a consolidated basis for both
corporate books (carrying self-financed assets and those financed by unrestricted
account holders) and restricted investment accounts, the BMA has set a ceiling of 15
per cent for the 0-8 days time band and 25 per cent for the 8 days to 1 month time
band.
On corporate governance, the BMA said that in addition to compliance with all
AAOJFI's accounting standards, governance standards and pronouncements issued by
AAOIFI's Shari 'a board, banks are also required to submit a statement of strategy and
objectives for a minimum period of 3 years, outline their organisational structure, and
note responsibilities of key management personnel. New recruitment of key
management will require prior approval of the BMA and needs to be reported
immediately. The bank must also have an independent Shari 'a supervision committee
complying with the AAOIFI's governance standard for Islamic institutions and an
audit committee which must be composed solely of non-executive directors. This is a
requirement of AAOIFI's Governance Standard on Audit and Governance
Committee56.
These regulations will, assuming a reasonable degree of market discipline, give the
Bahrain banks a competitive edge in the Islamic banking industry, taking into account
both the investment and commercial banking aspects of Islamic banking, and it is
hoped that other countries will adopt similar regulations in order to be competitive.
The BMA is indeed among the authorities which established the Islamic Financial
Services Board (IFSB), which is explained in the next section.
See AAOIFI's Governance Standard for Islamic Financial Institutions No. 4, 'Audit and Governance Committee for Islamic
Financial Institutions'.
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6.6	 The Role of the Islamic Financial Services Board
The setting up of the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) is the culmination of an
extensive two-year consultative process initiated by Professor Rifaat Ahmed Abdel
Karim, when he was a Secretary General of AAOIFI at a breakfast meeting in Bahrain
in January 1999. The idea was subsequently forwarded to a group of governors and
senior officials of the central banks and monetary authorities of several Islamic
countries. They have been helped by AAOIFI, the Islamic Development Bank, and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to set up the Board. The aim of the Board is to
promote, disseminate and harmonise best practices in the regulation and supervision
of the Islamic financial services industry. It was officially established on 3 November
2002 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in the presence of the Prime Minister of Malaysia at
that time, Datuk Sen Dr Mahathir Mohamad.
The Board will serve as an association of central banks and monetary authorities, and
other institutions that are responsible for the regulation and supervision of the Islamic
financial services industry.
The Board is expected to play a key role in guiding authorities who have limited
experience of regulating Islamic financial institutions. One of the expressed aims of
the Board will be to set and disseminate standards and core principles, as well as to
adapt existing international standards for the supervision and regulation of the Islamic
financial services industry consistent with the Shari 'a compliance. The activities of
the Board include liasing and co-operating with other standard setters in the areas of
monetary and financial stability around the world. In addition, the Board will promote
good practices in risk management in the industry through research, training and
tecimical assistance.
The IFSB is intended to play a role broader than that of the BCBS, since it also will
address the whole range good practice issues facing the Islamic financial services
industry. There are huge challenges for the IFSB. The main ones apart from the
capital ratios, reserves and risk management standards are corporate governance,
transparency and investor protection. There are two exposure drafts issued by IFSB in
March 2005 on Risk Management (Exposure Draft No. 1) and Capital Adequacy
(Exposure Draft No. 2).
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6.7	 Concluding Remarks
Islamic banks' regulators have the responsibility to ensure that the banks are regulated
and supervised so as to maintain and enhance the confidence of the participants in the
financial services industry and investors towards Islamic banks. The accounting and
the reporting system of Islamic banks should reflect the risks faced by them and the
ways to mitigate these risks in order for users to properly assess the position of the
banks. In this regard, the guidelines in Basel II could be used by Islamic banks with
necessary modifications and adaptations to cater for the specificaties and
characteristics of Islamic banks.
Despite many challenges, Islamic banks have proved themselves by their viable
operational existence in the past two decades. However, Islamic banks do need a
comprehensive and uniform set of standards to address the issue of transparency with
respect to risk. The role of IFSB in providing guidelines on risk reporting to Islamic
banks could be seen as a good initiative to solve the above issue. Islamic banks have a
moral obligation, which makes their role unique in order to alleviate some of the
problems that face the Islamic Ummah today.
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Chapter 7
Research Methodology
7.1	 Introduction
This chapter discusses the research methodology used in this study and the methods
used to answer the research questions outlined in section 1.2 of the thesis. As already
mentioned in the earlier chapters, the transparency of the banks' annual reports (in
this case, Islamic banks) with regard to risk reporting is very important to the
soundness and the stability of the whole banking system. The public usually expects
more risk information in order to evaluate a bank. This study aims to elicit the
opinions of several respondents who deal directly with Islamic banks, including
Islamic banks themselves, on several issues pertaining to risk reporting, transparency
and market discipline in Islamic banks.
Most research textbooks represent research as a multi-stage process to follow in order
to undertake methodology and complete the research project (e.g. Saunders et. al,
2001 and Sekaran, 2000). This process include formulating and clarifying a topic,
reviewing the literature, choosing a strategy, collecting data, analysing data and
writing up (Saunders et. al, 2001). Figure 7.1 illustrates the overall description of
research process used in this study.
Section 7.2 summarises the literature review in the study. Section 7.3 describes the
research objectives and questions for this research project. The research propositions
are formulated in section 7.4. Type of data and the method to collect the data are
discussed in sections 7.5 and 7.6. Section 7.7 explains the criteria used in selecting the
respondents. Section 7.8 and 7.9 discuss the pilot study and the data acquisition
methods. Statistical methods used to test the propositions are discussed in section
7.10. A summary is provided in section 7.11.
7.2	 Review of Related Literature
According to Sekaran (2000); 'the critical literature review will form the foundation
on which the research is built'. A thorough literature review was carried out to
summarise the existing body of knowledge in the areas of specific interest to this
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study. The main sources of the literature review were journals, conference
proceedings, books, reports, theses and bank regulators' papers.
Figure 7.1: The Research Design
IReview the Relevant Literature
IIdentif' Research Issuesi
IFormulate Research Objectives and Research Questionsi
IDevelop Research Propositionsj
JChoose Type of Dataj
IChoose Data Collection Methodsi
JCollect Dataj
IDecide on Data Analysis Methodsi
naly Dat
IWrite up Thesisi
Source: Author (2005)
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The literature review should be a description and critical analysis of what other
authors have written (Jankowicz, 1995). This is done to ensure that no important
variable is ignored that has in the past been found to have had an impact on the
problem.
The literature review could be either in: (Saunders et. al, 2001):
a single chapter; or
• a series of chapters.
For this study, the literature review was summarised in a series of chapters (Chapters
2 to 6) discussing the following:
1. Disclosure of risks in conventional banks (Chapter 2)
2. Best practices for conventional banks on risk disclosure (Chapter 3)
3. Transparency and market discipline in conventional banks (Chapter 4)
4. Islamic banks versus conventional banks: Risk management and disclosure
(Chapter 5)
5. Transparency in Islamic banks: Issues and implications (Chapter 6)
Chapter 2 discusses the importance of adequate risk disclosure by conventional banks
and the roles of segment reporting in that context. It is argued that adequate risk
disclosure could improve market discipline (Pillar 3, Basel II). Accounting standards
on segment reporting (lAS 14, SFAS 131, SSAP 25, and the UK SORP on Segmental
Reporting for Banks) and the role of segment reporting are also discussed in this
chapter.
Chapter 3 identifies the gaps between the current accounting standards and the current
best practice as advocated by regulators (BCBS). The chapter discusses the existing
international accounting standards that are relevant to banks, which include lAS 30
and lAS 32 and also the new ED 7. It then, provides example of the best current
practices for conventional banks by reviewing three leading banks in Europe. In
addition, this chapter explains the signalling theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986)
with regard to the disclosure issues. Chapter 4 provides the link between transparency
and market discipline and discusses some of the causes of the previous banking crisis.
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In addition, the role of bank supervisors in facilitating transparency is also discussed
in this chapter.
Chapters 5 and 6 look at the case of Islamic banks. First, the differences between
conventional banks and Islamic banks are discussed in Chapter 5. This leads to the
recognition that different accounting standards need to be designed to cover the
specificaties of Islamic bank's transactions and risks. Then, Chapter 6 explains the
issue of transparency within the context of Islamic banks and the implications of
transparency for Islamic banks.
7.3	 The Research Objectives and Questions
This study investigates the transparency of Islamic banks with respect to risk
reporting in the annual reports. After reviewing the literature, the researcher is in a
position to narrow down the problem from its original broad base and define more
clearly the issues of concern.
Based on a thorough literature review, two sets of research issues are identified in
this study:-
First: Islamic banks are required to adhere to Shari 'a rules in their dealings and
transactions, and therefore their risks are also influenced by the Shari 'a limitations on
risk mitigation. Furthermore, most Islamic banks are located in emerging market
countries, in which the market is not efficient yet. It is important to get the perceptions
of the respondents on this issue in comparison to those currently disclosed in
conventional banks.
Second: Current financial reporting standards do not require enough disclosure on
risks and risk management, as can be seen from a comparison between on one hand
lAS 32, ED 7 and FAS 1 and the best practice of several leading banks in Europe on
the other hand. Therefore, it is interesting to evaluate the extent of risk disclosure
within the context of Islamic banks and what information is required by bank
supervisors to supervise Islamic banks. Basel II has also included market discipline in
its Pillar 3, which requires the banks to increase disclosure in order to improve market
discipline.
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7.3.1 The Research Objectives
Having discussed the two research issues, what follows defines the research
objectives of this study, which can be summarised as follows:
1. To ascertain the perceptions of Islamic bankers 57 on nature of risks, risk
measurement and risk management approaches of Islamic banks in
comparison to those of conventional banks and with reference to the market
environment in which Islamic banks typically operate.
2. To ascertain the information that the supervisors of Islamic banks require most
to monitor the risk profile of Islamic banks, but which is not required by
existing financial reporting standards (with reference to lAS 32, ED 7 and
FAS I)), and also the most important supervisory tool to monitor the risk
profile of Islamic banks.
3. To examine the implications of transparency with particular reference to
market discipline for Islamic banks and disclosure of risk and risk
management.
4. To evaluate the adequacy of risk reporting in existing Islamic banks' annual
reports.
5. To explore policy implications from the above for the Islamic banks'
regulators (central banks) and standard setters (IFSB and AAOIFI), with
reference to Pillar 2 and Pillar 3 of Basel II.
7.3.2 The Research Questions
As mentioned earlier, the topic of the present study is concerned with the opinions of
several groups of respondents on the issue of transparency with regard to risk
reporting in Islamic banks. Therefore, the following research questions need to be
addressed and investigated (see Table 7.1 below).
RQ1 How does the risk perception of Islamic bankers differ from conventional
bankers with respect to the market in which Islamic banks typically operate? Do
Islamic banks use the more technically advanced risk measurement techniques?
Apart from using similar risk mitigation approaches as in conventional banks,
do Islamic banks widely use Shari'a compliant risk mitigation approaches? Also
"The term 'Islamic bankers' used in this thesis refers to CFOs/CEOs and risk managers of Islamic banks in the study.
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which risk mitigation approaches used by conventional banks are not used by
Islamic banks?
Table 7.1: Phrasing Research Objectives as Research Questions
Research Objectives	 Research Questions
1. To ascertain the perceptions of Islamic I-a. How does the risk perception of Islamic
bankers on nature of risks, risk measurement bankers differ from conventional bankers with
and risk management approaches of Islamic respect to the market in which Islamic banks
banks in comparison to those of typically operate?
conventional banks and with reference to
the market environment in which Islamic 1-b. Do Islamic banks use the more
banks typically operate.	 technically advanced risk measurement
techniques?
I-a To identify what risks are perceived as
1-c. Apart from using similar risk mitigationimportant in Islamic banks and whether
approaches as in conventional banks, do
there are differences among countries
Islamic banks widely use Shari'a compliant
surveyed.
risk mitigation approaches?
1-b To identify the risk measurement and 1-d. Also which risk mitigation approaches
risk management techniques which are used by conventional banks are not used by
widely used in Islamic banks and whether Islamic banks?
Shari'a	 compliant	 risk	 mitigation
approaches are used by Islamic banks.
2-a. How important for monitoring the risk
2-a. To ascertain the information that the
profile and management of Islamic banks is
	
supervisors of Islamic banks require most to
	 . .	 .	 .	 .
the additional risk information which is not
	
monitor the risk profile of Islamic banks,
	 .
required by current financial reporting
but which is not required by financial
standards (with reference to lAS 32, ED 7 and
	
reporting standards (with reference to lAS 	 .
FAS 1) but is provided to bank supervisors?
32, ED 7 and FAS 1)
2-b. Which supervisory tool is perceived by
2-b. To identify the supervisory tool which
bank supervisors to be the most important to
	
is perceived to be the most important to
	 .
supervise the risk profile and risk management
supervise the risk profile and risk
of Islamic banks?
management of Islamic banks.
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Table 7.1 (continued
3. To examine the perceived role of
transparency in Islamic banks from a risk
reporting point of view with particular
reference to Basel II.
3-a To evaluate how much the respondents
agree or disagree in their opinions on the
importance of transparency in Islamic
banks.
3-b To evaluate how much the respondents
agree or disagree in their opinions on the
importance of market discipline in Islamic
banks.
3-c To evaluate how much the respondents
agree or disagree in their opinions on the
role of the supervisors of Islamic banks in
supervising Islamic banks from a risk point
of view.
3-d To evaluate how much the respondents
agree or disagree in their opinions on the
implications of Basel II to Islamic banks on
risk profile and risk management.
3-c To evaluate how much the respondents
agree or disagree in their opinions on the
role of external rating agencies in
enhancing the transparency of Islamic
banks.
3. What is the perceived role of transparency
in Islamic banks from a risk reporting point of
view with particular reference to Basel II?
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Table 7.1 (continued)	 _______________________________________
4. To evaluate the adequacy of risk 4. To what extent are existing public
reporting in existing Islamic banks' annual disclosures on qualitative risk information in
reports.	 Islamic banks' annual reports perceived by the
supervisors of Islamic banks and other
4-a To identify variables which are interested parties to be adequate to provide
perceived to be most inadequately reported sufficient transparency for Islamic banks?
in existing Islamic banks' annual reports.
4-b To identify variables which are
perceived to be most adequately reported in
existing Islamic banks' annual reports.
5. To explore policy implications from the 5. What are the implications of the above for
above to the Islamic banks' regulators the implementation of Basel II, for banking
(central banks) and standard setters (IFSB supervision (Pillar 2) and for regulation of risk
and AAOIFI), with reference to Pillar 2 and disclosures (Pillar 3)?
Pillar 3 ofBasel II.
RQ2 How important for monitoring the risk profile and management of
Islamic banks is the additional risk information which is not required by current
financial reporting standards (with reference to lAS 32, ED 7 and FAS 1) but is
provided to bank supervisors? Which supervisory tool is perceived by bank
supervisors to be the most important to supervise the risk profile and risk
management of Islamic banks?
RQ3 What is the perceived role of transparency in Islamic banks from a risk
reporting point of view, with particular reference to Basel II?
RQ4 To what extent are existing public disclosures on qualitative risk
information in Islamic banks' annual reports perceived by the supervisors of
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Islamic banks and other interested parties 58 to be adequate to provide sufficient
transparency for Islamic banks?
RQ5 What are the implications of the above for the implementation of Basel II,
for the regulation of risk disclosures (Pillar 3) and for banking supervision
(Pillar 2)?
7.4	 Development of Research Propositions
Having reviewed the related literature, identified research issues and formulated
research objectives and questions, what follows is the formulation of the research
propositions relating to the transparency of risk reporting in Islamic banks.
The research propositions are thus developed based on the main findings of prior
research literature as well as by referring to lASs (lAS 1, lAS 32 and ED 7) and
AAOIFI's accounting standard (FAS 1) and also the unique characteristics of Islamic
banks as compared to conventional banks. The propositions relate to opinions of
several groups of respondents6° about the transparency of risk reporting in Islamic
banks. These are as follows:
- Propositions 1 - 5 concern Islamic bankers' (CFOs/CEOs/General Managers and
Risk Managers) opinions about the nature of risks, risk measurement and risk
management teclmiques in Islamic banks and relate to Section A (Questions 1 2
and 3) in Version 161.
- Propositions 6 - 7 concern supervisors of Islamic banks' (central banks) opinions
about the information which they require, but is not required by financial reporting
standards to monitor risk profile in Islamic banks. These propositions relate to
Section A (Questions 1, 2 and 3) in Version 2 and Question 9 (Section B) in
Version 1.
Other interested parties include external auditors, external rating agencies and representatives from IFSB and AAOIFI.
This study covers a period prior to the more recent (December 2003) revision of lAS 32 which is applicable for annual periods
beginning on or after 1 January 2005.
The respondents used in this study include Islamic banks' management (Chief Financial Officers - CFOs/Chief Executive
Officers -CEOs/ General Managers and Risk Managers), central banks, external auditors, external rating agencies, IFSB and
AAOIFI. See Section 7.7 for details.
61 There are three versions of the main questionnaire. Version 1 is directed to the Islamic bankers (CFOs/CEOs/General
Managers/Risk Managers). Version 2 is given to the supervisors of Islamic banks (central banks), and Version 3 is designed for
other groups which include external auditors, external rating agencies, IFSB and AAOIFI. See Section 7.9.1 for details.
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- Propositions 8 - 12 deal with the perceptions of the survey respondents on the
issues of transparency, risk disclosure, market discipline, role of supervisors of
Islamic banks, role of external rating agencies and signalling hypothesis, and
relate to Question 10 (Section B) in Version 1 and Question 4 (Section B) in
Version 2 and 3.
- Proposition 13 deals with the perceived level of adequacy of risk reporting in
existing Islamic banks' annual reports, and relates to Question 5 (Section C) in
Version 2 and 3.
7.4.1 Islamic bankers' opinions about the nature of risks, risk measurement
and risk management techniques in Islamic banks
Propositions 1 and 2
As mentioned in Chapter 2, a number of risks are inherent in the conventional banks.
These include credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk and operational risk. Banks,
therefore, need to be extremely cautious about their exposure to these risks and to
develop systems for their identification, control and management.
There is no exception for Islamic banks. As can be realised from Chapter 5, there are
basically six financing techniques which are used as alternatives to interest-based
financing by most Islamic banks. These are Murabaha, Mudaraba, Musharaka,
Ijarah, Istisna 'a and Salam.
However, the various instruments used by Islamic banks are exposed to similar risks
as in conventional banks, but apparently to different degrees because of Shari 'a
requirements. For example, interest rate risk is one of the most important market risks
faced by conventional banks. Since Islamic banks do not deal in interest-based
instruments, some may argue that Islamic banks do not face this risk. However,
Islamic banks face "rate of return risk", a type of market risk, such as in Ijarah and
longer-term Murabaha. Both contracts are also exposed to credit risk.
Istisna 'a is a contract of exchange with deferred delivery, applied to specified made-
to-order items, whereas Salam is a contract for deferred delivery of a commodity or
flingible goods. It was originally sanctioned during the time of the Prophet
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Mohammed (Peace Be Upon Him) to facilitate the trading activities of farmers who
were awaiting the harvest of crops. Both contracts are exposed to several risks, which
include credit risk and price risk.
Apart from the credit risk of the client of the bank, the latter, in Istisna 'a, will be
carrying a performance risk. Since the bank's client has neither recourse nor any
contractual relationship with the actual manufacturer or contractor, the bank will
always be liable for any failure.
In addition to the credit risk (seller's default) which exists for Salam, the bank will be
facing market risk. While spot prices at the time of delivery are expected to be higher
than that of the Salam price, the market may fluctuate in any direction.
Table 7.2 presents the type of risks in Murabaha, Ijarah, Salam and Istisna 'a and
possible risk mitigation techniques.
Table 7.2: Risks in Murabaha, Ijarah, Salam and Istisna'a contracts
Islamic Products	 Type of Risks	 Possible Risk Mitigation
Murabaha	 Change in price before resale 	 Transfer of the ownership at the
Default risk (failure to pay in	 outset
time.	 Use of charity account to
Rate of return risk (fixed mark-	 impose penalty charge for
____________________________ up) 	 delayed payment
Jjarah	 Credit risk	 Guarantee from the lessee
Ownership risk	 Repossession of asset
Sal am
	
Credit risk (seller's default) 	 Parallel Salam used (collateral)
Price risk (market may 	 - Hedges price risk
________________________________ fluctuate) 	 ________________________________
Istisna 'a	 Credit risk	 Performance bond from the
Performance risk 	 manufacturer's or contractor's
bank
Letter of guarantee during
construction or warranties after
_____________________________ _____________________________ delivery
Table 7.2 shows that Islamic financial instruments are exposed to similar types of
risks to which conventional banks are exposed, namely credit and market risks.
Murabaha and Ijarah constitute a large percentage of the Islamic banks' assets (Al-
Omar and Iqbal, 2000). Their popularity in Islamic banks could be due to the fact that
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banks can predict the returns from these two instruments fairly well, in addition to
which they provide the banks with regular cash flows which help the banks to
partially meet their liquidity requirements. Hence banks may view these two
instruments less risky than the other instruments, particularly Istisna 'a and Salam.
Therefore, it is proposed that:
Proposition 1: Salam arid Istisna 'a are perceived as more risky than Murabaha and
Ijarah.
Profit sharing contracts (Musharaka and Mudaraba) are considered to be more risky
than mark-up based contracts (Murabaha, Salam, Istisna 'a and Ijarah) (Khan and
Ahmed, 2002). This is because they are exposed to the risk of capital impairment as a
result of operating losses. In addition, in both instruments, the banks are exposed to
credit risks. This is where the Mudarib or the partner in Musharaka fails to pay the
bank its due share of profits. It is permissible to create risk mitigating structures for
Mudaraba (or Musharaka), but these do not seem to be widely used62.
Therefore, it is proposed that:
Proposition 2: Profit sharing contracts (Musharaka and Mudaraba) are perceived as
more risky than mark-up based contracts (Murabaha, Salam, Istisna 'a and Ijarah).
Proposition 3
Even though Islamic banks have to conform to two types of laws; Shari 'a (religious)
law and positive (secular) law, there is no uniformity in the fatwas followed by them
around the world.
Another challenge faced by Islamic banking industry is different interpretations by
JIqh scholars in different countries on Shari 'a, which has served only to confuse and
slow down the development of the industry. For example, Islamic banks in Malaysia
have different interpretations of Shari 'a rulings and product permissibility from the
62 The creation of the "repayment account" as reported by Qatar Central Bank operates by transferring credit risk from the
Mudarib to the ultimate customer when Mudaraba is used for project finance, and this is particularly important when the ultimate
customer is a sovereign or equivalent.
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Gulf countries, Sudan and others, particularly in the sale of debt which is allowed in
Malaysia but not in the other countries.
In Malaysia, there is centralised Shari 'a Board Committee. In Gulf, it is not allowed
for the Islamic banks to trade securities based on debt except for those created under
Ijarah. Nevertheless, there is already an acceptance on the trading of securities that
are based on combination of debt assets (BBA and others) and Ijarah assets, subject to
Ijarah assets must be at least 51 per cent of the total assets used for the securities. In
Sudan, banks are not allowed to use parallel Salam or parallel Istisna 'a and in Kuwait,
Kuwait Finance House does not use binding Murabaha. These different
interpretations of Shari 'a may have an impact also on the perceptions of risk in these
countries.
Therefore, it is proposed that:
Proposition 3: Differences in Shari 'a interpretation may lead to different perceptions
of risk by Islamic bankers in different countries in the study.
Proposition 4
As mentioned in the literature review (Chapter 2) and a review of leading banks in
Europe, conventional banks use several risk measurement and mitigation techniques.
They include credit ratings, gap analysis, duration analysis, VaR, RAROC and others.
Islamic banks are still developing and serious challenges face them. Some Islamic
banks are small in size. The lack of cati1gs or e',ctemal so'ice ol creôil assessment for
the clients of most Islamic banks is also a serious limitation for using these
approaches. Hence, it would not be expected that Islamic banks use the same
techniques used by their conventional counterparts, in particular the more technically
advanced risk measurement approaches (for example, Value at Risk, Simulation
techniques, Estimates of Worst Case - Stress Tests, RAROC and Internal Rating
Based System).
Therefore, it is proposed that:
Proposition 4: Not many Islamic banks use the more technically advanced risk
measurement approaches.
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Proposition 5
The proposition in this section was developed from the unique characteristics of
Islamic banks. As mentioned earlier, Islamic banks are still not using derivatives to
hedge risks as currently practiced by conventional banks. Conventional banks have a
variety of risk management techniques, which include credit derivatives and financial
derivatives to manage the exposure to market risks, for example swaps, forwards,
futures and options. Derivatives in their present form are not accepted byjiqh scholars
because according to them, this leads to maysir, which consequently leads to gharar.
The results from Khan and Ahmed (2001), as discussed in Chapter 5, point out that
the lack of some instruments (like short-term financial assets and derivatives) and a
money market (except in Malaysia and to some extent in Bahrain) hampers risk
management in Islamic financial institutions. Islamic banks which invest the funds of
profit sharing investment accounts (PSIA) in longer maturity Murabaha or Ijarah
assets cannot similarly mitigate the risk of being squeezed if market expectations of
returns subsequently increase before the assets mature. This is particularly true of
Murabaha assets, for which (unlike floating rate Ijarah) no re-pricing is permitted by
Shari 'a.
However, it is important for Islamic banks to make serious attempts to develop
Shari 'a compliant derivatives. For example 'synthetic options' in the form of Urboun,
parallel Salam (similar to conventional future contract) and parallel Zst/sna 'a, which
have been accepted by some fiqh scholars. Other example includes the creation of the
"repayment account" as reported by Qatar Central Bank. It operates by transferring
credit risk from the Mudarib to the ultimate customer when Mudaraba is used for
project finance, and this is particularly important when the ultimate customer is a
sovereign or equivalent.
Therefore, it is proposed that:
Proposition 5: Islamic banks use a number of risk mitigation methods that are
intended to be Shari 'a compliant and are different from methods used by conventional
banks.
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7.4.2 Supervisors of Islamic banks' opinions about the information required
most to monitor risk profile in Islamic banks
Propositions 6 and 7
A growing line of research, as discussed in Chapter 4, provides empirical support for
the proposition that bank supervisors at times have an information advantage over
other outside monitors (Flannery and Houston, 1999; Berger et al, 2000 De Young et
al, 1998; Jordan et al, 1999; Cole and Gunter, 1998; and Berger and Davis, 1998).
These studies indicate that bank supervisors have more information than the public.
For example, Cole and Gunter (1998) predict bank failure using public information
and supervisor's CAMEL ratings and the findings show CAMEL ratings provide
better prediction. This information is in addition to that which is required by current
financial reporting standards (lASs). lAS 30, lAS 32, ED 7 and FAS 1, as described
earlier in Chapters 3 and 5, require the items to be disclosed in the financial
statements of the banks. However, in order to perform effective supervision, bank
supervisors may require additional information including proprietary and confidential
information (apart from the issue of frequency).
Islamic banks, being part of the financial system, are also subject to the supervision of
the central banks of their respective countries. As the supervisors of Islamic banks, the
information required is similar to conventional banks with the exception of Shari 'a
requirements. Supervisors of Islamic banks Teq'tnTe the information from the Siarl 'a
Supervisory Committee to ensure that the operations of Islamic banks are not in
violation of Shari 'a principles. In addition, supervisors of Islamic banks have a
responsibility to ensure that Islamic banks are adequately regulated and supervised so
as to maintain and enhance the confidence of the participants in the financial services
industry, in their dealings with Islamic banks.
Therefore, it is proposed that:
Proposition 6: Like supervisors of conventional banks, supervisors of Islamic banks
require additional risk information over that which is required by current financial
reporting standards in order to monitor the risk profile and management of the banks.
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Effective supervision of banks, which includes offsite and onsite supervision, ensures
that banks function safely and soundly, so that the financial system can attain the
confidence of savers and investors. Bank examinations enable supervisors to confirm
the accuracy of information in regulatory reports
Different countries use different methods and approaches to assess bank risks. These
approaches, as discussed in Chapter 4, include supervisory ratings, financial ratios,
peer group analysis, risk based supervision and statistical methods shall gradually be
adopted in order to make supervision effective. However, as mentioned above, many
supervisors use a rating system to draw together assessments of the various
components of a bank's condition (De Young et al., 2001)
The supervisory ratings, for example CAMELS ratings (refer to footnote 26 on page
59 to distinguish between CAMEL and CAMELS) allow supervisors to gather
confidential information about bank's financial conditions and to assess qualitative
attributes, such as internal controls and risk management procedures that affect bank
risk profiles. CAMELS ratings, which are assigned by examiners at the conclusion of
an examination, are numerical ratings of the quality of a bank's financial condition,
risk profile and overall performance. CAMELS ratings reflect a combination of
publicly available information (such as recent financial statements) and private
information produced by bank examiners during their on-site investigation (such as
the quality of individual loans).
Most Islamic banks are supervised by central banks in the countries they are located.
These central banks also have similar supervision methods, for example CAMELS, as
used in conventional banking supervision but according to Shari 'a requirements. For
example, in determining an adequate level of capital, some central banks follow the
guidelines issued by AAOIFI, which require 50% of the risk-weighted assets of the
profit sharing investment accounts to be included in the denominator of the capital
adequacy ratio in order to cater for the fiduciary and displaced commercial risk
associated with Islamic banking. In addition, corporate governance structure for
Islamic banks is unique as it has a Shari 'a Supervisory Committee.
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The nature of risks and Shari 'a compliant risk mitigants in Islamic banks are different
from conventional banks that may affect the supervision of Islamic banks.
Therefore, it is proposed that:
Proposition 7: Supervisory bank rating systems (e.g. CAMELS or similar) are
perceived to be the most important assessment approaches to supervise Islamic banks
as compared to other approaches (e.g. statistically based).
7.4.3 Transparency and market discipline
Proposition 8
As mentioned in Chapter 4, Flaimery (1998) suggests that market information may
improve the overall process for regulators by enabling them to identify incipient
problems more promptly. In addition, market information may provide bank
regulators with an incentive and justification to take action more quickly, once
problems have been identified. As discussed in Chapter 4, market information does
add value to supervisory information. A number of studies show that equity market
and debt market indicators can marginally increase the explanatory power of BOPEC
or CAMEL forecasting models (Gunther et a!., 2001, Berger et al., 2000). Indeed, as
suggested by Pillar 3 of Basel II, market discipline is to supplement Pillar 1
(minimum capital requirement) and Pillar 2 (supervisory review).
Since there are differences between the nature of Islamic and conventional banking, it
is interesting to ascertain whether it is perceived that market discip\ine coulà also
enhance banking supervision in Islamic banks. Unlike a conventional bank which is
basically a borrower and lender of funds, an Islamic bank is essentially a partner with
its investment account holders, on the one side, and also a partner with entrepreneurs,
on the other side, when employing investment account holders' funds in productive
direct investment.
These financial arrangements imply quite different stockholder relationships from the
conventional model since investment account holders have a direct financial stake in
the bank's investment and equity participation. These may have an impact towards the
banking supervision, because the investment account holders could assist the
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supervisors of Islamic banks in their supervision by ensuring that their funds are
invested in productive investment.
Therefore, it is proposed that:
Proposition 8: Market discipline could facilitate banking supervision in Islamic
banks, similarly to conventional banks.
Proposition 9
The following proposition is intended to point out the importance of transparency in
Islamic banks. As discussed earlier in Chapter 4, it is widely recognised that effective
market discipline depends on market participants having information about the risks
and financial condition of banking firms (Crockett, 2001; Nier and Baumann, 2003).
Therefore, attention is being focused increasingly on ways to improve transparency in
conventional banks, particularly by international organisations, for example the BCBS
and the World Bank.
Islamic banks have unrestricted profit sharing investment account holders that require
more transparency than depositors in conventional banks, in order to monitor their
investment in Islamic banks. Unlike depositors in conventional banks, the return on
investment account holders' investment in the bank is uncertain, since they share in
the profit (asset returns net of operating expenses) generated by the bank. The
unrestricted investment account holders are also exposed to the risk of losing any or
all of their initial investment.
Collective investment schemes (CIS) are funds which pool investors' money and
invest on their behalf, which has similarity with investment accounts in Islamic banks.
However, CIS are different from investment accounts due to the fact that each fund is
separate legal entity and investment accounts in Islamic banks are not separate legal
entities from the Islamic bank which manages them. This exposes the investment
account holders to higher risks than CIS holders.
Therefore, it is proposed that:
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Proposition 9: Transparency with regard to risk reporting is perceived to be more
important for unrestricted profit sharing investment account holders in Islamic banks
than for depositors in conventional banks.
Proposition 10
As mentioned in Chapter 2, disclosure alone does not necessarily result in
transparency. In order to achieve transparency, effective disclosure is required, which
means that a bank must provide timely, accurate, relevant and sufficient disclosures of
qualitative and quantitative information that enables users to make proper assessment
of the institution's activities and risks inherent in those activities. Islamic banks are no
exception. In addition, due to profit sharing arrangements as proposed in Proposition
9, it is more important to have more transparency and more effective risk disclosure as
compared to conventional banks.
Therefore, it is proposed that:
Proposition 10: In the countries in which Islamic banks are surveyed, it is perceived
that effective disclosure helps market participants to assess the investment account
holders' performance.
Proposition 11
Basel II contains three pillars. The first pillar (Pillar 1) addresses minimum capital
ratios, which for credit risk is calculated thogh rie'w "ris\ buc'kefing" approaches.
The second pillar (Pillar 2) adds supervisory review of banks' internal risk and capital
management practices, and significantly, requires that major banks adopt
comprehensive, internal economic capital models. The third pillar (Pillar 3) concerns
better market discipline through improved standards and practices of disclosure,
including risk disclosure
The riskiness of banks' assets can hence be assessed only on an ongoing and case-by-
case basis by the supervisory authorities. It is therefore, prudent to make Basel II as
the basis for capital determination and to raise the standard adequacy for taking into
account, for example the ratio of demand deposits in total bank resources and the
degree of risk involved in different Islamic modes of finance. In view of the special
nature of investments and the risks faced by the assets of Islamic banks, application of
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Basel IT has become a challenging task. Therefore, there is a need to modify Basel II
to in order to cater for the specificities of Islamic banks.
In Islamic banking, it is even more important to disclose accurate financial results,
since mobilisation of funds is mainly based on profit and loss sharing and thus
information on financial results is very essential.
Therefore, it is proposed that:
Proposition 11: Basel II is applicable to Islamic banks with modifications.
Proposition 12
As mentioned in Chapter 4, credit rating agencies could act as intermediaries in the
disclosure process. The objective of credit analysis is to determine the relative
likelihood of a future loss arising on a particular obligation. Ratings are intended to
serve as indicators or forecasts of the potential for credit loss because of failure to
pay, a delay in payment, or partial payment (Moody's, 1997).
There is no difference in this respect between Islamic banks and conventional banks.
Both are subject to credit rating analysis but in the case of Islamic banks, certain
factors take on greater importance. This is generally because of the lack of appropriate
regulation, agreed principles of accounting, accepted standards for capital adequacy
and tools for managing liquidity (Moody's, 1997). However, the main problem for
credit risk under Pillar I of Basel II is that few of the Islamic banks' credit risks (i.e.
recipients of financing) have external credit rating.
Therefore, it is proposed that:
Proposition 12: External credit ratings of Islamic banks are perceived to help the
public to assess the banks' financial condition.
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7.4.4 The level of risk information adequacy in existing Islamic banks' annual
reports
Proposition 13
The Signalling Theory as discussed in Chapter 2 suggests that when banks'
performance is good, banks will wish to signal their high quality information to the
market. It is hoped that this information could assist the financial statement users in
their decision-making (Watts and Zimmerman; 1986). The benefits of signalling are
expected to motivate corporate disclosure. Asymmetric information between the bank
and the financial markets may result in agency costs. Such agency costs arise when
the bank's actions, for example with respect to risks taken by the bank, are only
imperfectly observable by investors and when there are conflicts of interest as to
which action should be taken by the bank. Enhanced disclosure may reduce
asymmetric information about the actions taken by the bank and therefore reduce the
associated agency costs (Cordella and Yeyati, 1998; Nier and Baumann, 2003).
The literature in Chapter 4 shows that the financial crises, particularly in the East
Asian countries, that took place in the mid 1990s were due, among other things, to
inadequate risk disclosure in the financial reports (Fons, 1998; Rahnian, 1999; and
Llewellyn, 2001). If adequate information on risk exposure had been provided or
required periodically, banks might have exercised better risk management, or allowed
international investors and creditors to register their concern over time, and thus
avoided the sudden withdrawal of capital from the region. For an Islamic bank, due to
its unique characteristics of profit and risk sharing arrangements, it is even more
important to be transparent (Sundararajan and Errico, 2001). Therefore, it is hoped
that by being transparent, Islamic banks could mitigate future banking crisis.
Segment reporting as discussed in Chapter 2 can assist the user of financial statements
in making judgements about the opportunities and risks facing an enterprise by the
disclosure of finer information that provided in the primary financial statements (lAS
14). This, in turn can enhance the transparency of the enterprise. Users need as much
information as is compatible with confidentiality, delivered on time, clear and
comprehensible to assess the banks' solvency, liquidity and profitability.
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As suggested in Pillar 3 of Basel II, in order to strengthen market discipline, banks
must disclose both qualitative and quantitative information on their risks and risk
management policies. This is a highly challenging area for Islamic banks. Islamic
banking is still in its initial phase of development and it is expected that its risk
reporting, particularly qualitative risk information may not be adequate to provide
sufficient transparency for market discipline.
Therefore, it is proposed that:
Proposition 13: The existing disclosure about the qualitative information on risks and
risk management techniques in Islamic banks' annual reports in the countries
surveyed is not adequate to provide sufficient transparency that can enhance market
discipline.
Table 7.3 summarises all the propositions used in this study.
7.5	 Type of Data
This study is mainly concerned with the analysis of opinions about the transparency of
risk reporting in Islamic banks. Thus, the information needs in this research are the
perceptions of the Islamic bankers, supervisors of Islamic banks, external auditors,
external rating agencies, IFSB and AAOIFI on the above issues.
7.6	 Data Collection Method
How can a researcher measure something that is in a person's mind? The simple
answer is to ask people.
Figure 7.2 summarises a range of research strategies for doing social science research,
which include case studies, surveys and experiments (de Vaus, 2002). Each strategy
involves a different way of collecting and analysing empirical evidence (Yin, 1994).
The use of each strategy depends upon three conditions: (1) the type of research
question, (2) whether an investigation has control over actual behaviour events, and
(3) whether the focus is on contemporary as compared to historical phenomena.
For the current study, since it is exploratory in nature and is quantitative, a
questionnaire survey is chosen in order to answer the research questions. Furthermore,
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Table 7.3: Propositions used in this study
	Proposition I
	
Salam and Istisna 'a are perceived as more risky than Murabaha and
Ijarah.
Proposition 2 Profit sharing contracts (Musharaka and Mudaraba) are perceived as
more risky than mark-up based contracts (Murabaha, Salam, Istisna 'a
and Ijarah).
	Proposition 3
	
Differences in Shari 'a interpretation may lead to different perceptions of
risk by Islamic bankers in different countries in the study.
	
Proposition 4
	
Not many Islamic banks use the more technically advanced risk
measurement approaches.
Proposition 5 Islamic banks use a number of risk mitigation methods that are intended
to be Shari'a compliant and are different from methods used by
conventional banks.
Proposition 6 Like supervisors of conventional banks, supervisors of Islamic banks
require additional risk information over that which is required by current
financial reporting standards in order to monitor the risk profile and
management of the banks.
Proposition 7 Supervisory bank rating systems (e.g. CAMELS or similar) are perceived
to be the most important assessment approaches to supervise Islamic
banks as compared to other approaches (e.g. statistically based).
	
Proposition 8
	 Market discipline could facilitate banking supervision in Islamic banks,
similarly to conventional banks.
Proposition 9 Transparency with regard to risk reporting is perceived to be more
important for unrestricted profit sharing investment account holders in
Islamic banks than for depositors in conventional banks.
Proposition 10 In the countries in which Islamic banks are surveyed, it is perceived that
effective disclosure helps market participants to assess the investment
account holders' performance.
	
Proposition 11
	 Basel II is applicable to Islamic banks with modifications.
	
Proposition 12	 External credit ratings of Islamic banks are perceived to help the public
to assess the banks' financial condition.
Proposition 13 The existing disclosure about the qualitative information on risks and risk
management techniques in Islamic banks' annual reports in the countries
surveyed is not adequate to provide sufficient transparency that can
enhance market discipline.
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there is not much secondary data available for forming an opinion on the research
area. Questionnaires are considered an efficient data collection method when the
researcher knows exactly what is required and how to measure the variables of
interest (Sekaran, 2000).
Figure 7.2: Range of Research Strategies
I
isearch juestionsl
Case study	 I
	
iSurvey	 I
	
IExperimen
Questionnaire
Interview (structured)
In-depth interview
Observation
Content analysis
Questionnaire
Interview (structur
In-depth interview
Observation
Content analysis
Questionnaire
Interview (structured)
In-depth interview
Observation
Content analysis
Source: de Vaus (2002)
Questionnaires are printed lists of questions used to find out what people think or feel
about an issue, product or service. They can be filled in away from the researcher in
the form of a self-administered, group-administered or postal questionnaire. The term
'questionnaire' is also often used to describe a set of questions administered face-to-
face or by telephone in the form of a structured interview (Oppenheim, 2001; Sekaran,
2000).
The reasons for choosing a survey questionnaire method are as follows (Oppenheim,
2001; Sekaran, 2000):
. low cost of data processing
I low cost of data collection
I ability to reach respondents who live at widely dispersed addresses or abroad
However, the use of questionnaires has limitations. They include:
• low response rate
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• consequent biases
The limitations can be minimised by careful thinking and pilot tests (de Vaus, 2002).
In this questionnaire, the survey respondents will be given a set of statements on a
Likert scale of 1 to 5. According to de Vaus (2002), the choice between open-ended
(attitude questions) or close-ended (opinion questions) depends on many factors such
as the question content, the respondents' motivation, method of administration, type
of respondent, and the amount of time available to develop a good set of unbiased
responses. Likert scale questions are necessarily close-ended questions, i.e., asking
respondents' opinions on a set of statements. A copy of the questionnaires is given in
Appendix 4.
Another important aspect to consider prior to deciding on methods of analysis is that
variables may be measured by using different level of scales. According to de Vaus
(2002), there are three main levels of measurement scales. These are:
a) Nominal scale, in which a distinction between categories of a variable can be
made, but one cannot rank the categories in any order (e.g., the gender).
b) Ordinal scale, in which it is meaningful to rank the answers by categories, but it is
not possible to quantify precisely how much difference there is between
categories.
c) Interval/ratio scale, in which ranking of categories can be made and it is also
possible to quantify the differences between the categories precisely.
7.7	 The Selection of Respondents
Chief Financial Officers, Chief Executive Officers or General Managers and Risk
Managers in Islamic Banks are used as respondents. This is because the information
required is about the opinions of those responsible for financial and risk reporting in
Islamic banks. The Islamic banks in Malaysia and Babrain particularly, and other
countries (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Sudan, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Indonesia,
Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, Iran, Bangladesh and Pakistan) were included in the sampling
frame. The lists were taken from the International Directory of Islamic Financial
Institutions issued by Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance in London, and by
contacting the banks directly either by e-mails or postal mails. The total number of
Islamic banks was selected from 14 different countries, which include Malaysia,
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Sudan, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Middle East countries. The final sample consists of
28 Islamic banks, which are considered to be sufficient for this study since they
represent the most established Islamic banks in these 14 countries.
The supervisors of Islamic banks, which mainly come from central banks in these 14
countries are also used as respondents in this study. This is because they are
responsible for the supervision of Islamic banks in their countries, therefore their
views are important in this research. Appendix 3 provides the list of Islamic banks and
central banks used in this study.
External auditors who audit Islamic banks in the above countries are included because
they involve directly in the financial and risk reporting in Islamic banks.
External rating agencies are also included because they were considered to be
influential and knowledgeable users who provide ratings to Islamic banks.
Other respondents include the representatives from IFSB and AAOIFI because they
involved in the process of presenting financial statements to the public.
7.8	 The Conduct of Pilot Study
Each question and the questionnaire as a whole must be evaluated rigorously before
final administration of the questionnaire (de Vaus, 2002). A pilot test is important to
assess the adequacy of the research design and the instruments to be used for data
collection.
The drafted questionnaires were first pilot tested on a group of eight PhD students in
Islamic banking during the Islamic Finance Seminar in August 2003. The respondents
were asked about the following questions:
1- How long did it take them to complete the questionnaire?
2- Were the instructions clear?
3- Were any of the statements (items) unclear or ambiguous?
4- Did they object to answering any of the questions?
5- If they have any comments and suggestions.
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In general, the respondents confirmed that the average time taken to complete the
questionnaire was 20 minutes, the instructions were clear, the statements were clear
and not ambiguous and they did not object to answering any question. The comments
and suggestions include reducing the number of pages were received and were taken
into account and are included in the updated questionnaires.
The second pilot test was conducted during the International Islamic Banking
Conference at Monash Prato Center, Italy in September 2003. Ten questionnaires
were distributed. The groups included the representatives from central banks and
Islamic banks and could be similar to the final population of the sample. Five (50%)
usable responses were received, which include two from central banks, two from
external auditors and one from Islamic banks. Based on the results of this pretesting,
the questionnaire was amended and finalised for the main surveys as follows:
1- Headings were added for each section for easy reference during the analysis
process, and also so that the respondents can easily answer the questionnaire.
2- Section B: 'Market discipline issues' originally contained 28 statements and
additional 3 statements were added in order to collect more data, which could help
in answering the research questions.
7.9	 Methods of Data Acquisitions
Having discussed the pre-testing of the questions and questionnaires, the discussion
moves to cast light on the administration of the questionnaires, face-to-face
interviews and examination of the Islamic banks' annual reports.
7.9.1 Questionnaire Administration
For the aim of this research study, structured questionnaires were designed in order to
elicit the opinions on the selected respondents on the transparency and risk reporting
in Islamic banks. The reliability of the data obtained and the response rate achieved
will depend greatly on the sound design of the questions and the structure of the
questionnaire (Saunders et al., 2000). The construction and validation of the
questionnaire for this research was based on an extensive review of the literature and
previous similar questionnaire survey. In particular, the survey by Khan and Ahmed
(2001) was found to be quite useful in developing the questions. The administration
of the questionnaires was conducted from December 2003 to February 2004. For
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Islamic banks, two key persons working in selected Islamic banks were chosen and
the questionnaires were sent to them either by e-mail, by hand or by post. The
questiormaires were sent also to the representatives of central banks, external
auditors, external rating agencies, IFSB and AAOIFI.
There are three versions of the finalised questionnaire. The first version of the
questionnaire (for CFOs/CEOs/General Managers and Risk Managers of Islamic
banks) consists of nine pages and three sections and required approximately 30
minutes to complete. The second version of the questionnaire (for central banks)
consists of seven pages and four sections and required approximately 30 minutes to
complete. The final version of the questionnaire (for IFSB, AAOIFI, external auditors
and external rating agencies) consists of seven pages and four sections and required
also approximately 30 minutes to be completed. Table 7.4 presents the main contents
of the questionnaire:
Table 7.4: Main Contents of the Questionnaire
VERSION 1	 VERSION 2	 VERSION 3
(Super-visors of Islamic banks	 (External auditors, external(Islamic bankers -
- central banks)	 rating agencies, representativesCFOs/CEOs/General
of IFSB and AAOIFI)Manager and Risk
________________ Managers)	 ______________________________ ________________________________
SECTION A	 Risk identification	 The extent of information The extent of information
Risk measurement	 required by supervisors of required by external auditors,
Risk management	 Islamic banks to monitor risk external 	 rating	 agencies,
RQ I	 profile of Islamic banks	 representatives of IFSB and
RQ 2	 AAOIFI	 to assess the
transparency of Islamic banks
RQ 3
SECTION B	 Market discipline	 Market discipline	 Market discipline
(see Table 7.4)
	
RQ 3
	
RQ 3
	 RQ 3
SECTION C	 Demographic information Adequacy of the risk Adequacy 	 of	 the	 risk
information	 in	 existing information in existing Islamic
Islamic banks' annual reports banks' annual reports
RQ4	 RQ4
SECTION D	 Demographic information 	 Demographic information
Data acquisition is organised as follows:
a. A questionnaire (Version 1) was used to elicit opinions of the Islamic banks'
CFOs, CEOs or General Managers and Risk Managers on the inherent risks, risk
measurement, risk management techniques and the transparency of Islamic banks with
regard to risk reporting. The covering letter accompanying the questionnaire clarified
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and explained the objectives of the research study. The questionnaire then was divided
into two sections. Section A (Qi to Q3) deals with the importance of the risks as
experienced by the banks in the financial instruments, the risk measurement and risk
management/mitigation techniques employed by the banks.
Q4 is intended to get the information on the accounting standards used by the Islamic
banks.
Section B deals with the issue of transparency and market discipline. In Q5, the
respondents were asked whether the banks provide any voluntary disclosures in the
annual reports and then indicate the extent of this disclosure (Q6) and give the items
that they provide voluntarily in the annual reports (Q7). In Q8, they were asked to
rank the importance of these users in using the information published in the annual
reports and which of these users have more power to monitor the behaviour of Islamic
banks (Q9).
Q10 is intended to get their perceptions on the issue of market discipline in Islamic
banks (see Table 7.5 below). 31 statements were presented to the survey respondents.
This part of the questions applied to all the respondents, which means that it appears
in all versions. Replies from the respondents were obtained by asking one to answer
questions using a 5-point Likert scale (ranking from Strongly Disagree 1 to Strongly
Agree = 5) (see Appendix 4A).
Table 7.5: Main Content of the Questionnaire relating to Transparency and
Market Discipline
Statements 1-4, 6, 17-21
	
The importance of transparency,
_________________________________________ disclosure and market discipline
Statements 7-9, 12
	
The relationship between market
___________________________________ discipline and banking supervision
Statements 10-11, 13-14	 The role of supervisors of Islamic banks
Statements 15-16	 Withdrawal (liquidity) risk and displaced
commercial risk
Items 22-24	 Basel II
Items 25- 29 The information about external rating
agencies on the issue of transparency and
disclosure
Items 30-31
	 Signalling hypothesis and risks disclosure
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b. In Version 2 of the questionnaires, Section A (Qi) aims to elicit opinions of
the supervisors of Islamic banks (central banks) on the information that the bank
supervisors require most to monitor the risk profile of an Islamic bank. 14 items were
given and the respondents were asked to answer the degree of importance in a 5-point
Likert scale (ranking from Very Unimportant = I to Very Important 5) (see
Appendix 4B). These 14 items include the items which are required by financial
reporting standards and not required by financial reporting standards.
Q2 in Section A (Version 2) is intended to get other non-public information required
by the supervisors of Islamic banks to monitor the risk profile and management of
Islamic banks. The respondents were asked to rank the importance of the risk
assessment approaches in supervising Islamic banks in Q3 of the same section.
c. With regard to the adequacy of risk reporting in existing Islamic banks' annual
reports, a set of questions was designed in Section C of Version 2 and 3 to elicit the
respondents' opinions on this issue. 13 items were used which include the disclosure
of all the risks, the liquidity, profitability, solvency, capital adequacy, risk
measurement, risk management, accounting policies, corporate governance and other
risk information (BCBS, 1998). The information was used as a measure of
transparency in Islamic banks' annual reports. Replies from the respondents were
obtained by asking each one to answer questions using a 5-point Likert scale (ranking
from Very Inadequate = 1 to Very Adequate = 5) (see Appendices 4B and 4C).
d. In Version 3 of the questionnaire, Section A (Qi) presents the same items as in
QI (Version 2) but the questions were designed to get the respondents' opinions on
the importance of the items to assess the transparency in Islamic banks. The reason
why the same items were used but in different questions is to see whether the
respondents differ in their opinions or not. Then, the same respondents were asked to
give additional information in Q2 (Section A). Q3 asks whether the current risk and
segment reporting in Islamic banks are satisfactory (see Appendix 4C).
e.	 The last section in each version covers the background data of the respondents
and their organisation. The aim of obtaining this information was that it could be used
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when analysing the data obtained from the other parts of the questionnaire to see
whether personal characteristics had any effect on the respondents' answers.
In total 110 questionnaires were distributed as shown in Table 7.6.
7.9.2 Face-to-face Interview
After the receipt of completed questionnaires from each respondent, the researcher
met the CFO/CEO, Risk Managers and the supervisors of Islamic banks in Malaysia
to discuss the questionnaires and follow up questions were asked to lead the
respondent to answer more fully and accurately. An audio recorder was used in the
interview. Malaysia was chosen because of accessibility. Due to time and budget
constraints, the researcher was unable to visit other countries to conduct the
interview, so the follow-up e-mails were used as an alternative to clarify some of the
answers.
Table 7.6: Distribution of the Questionnaires in the Main Survey
GroupNumber _________ Country ________)
_______________________________ ___________ Malaysia Bahrain Others
Islamic banks - CFOs/ CEOs 	 28	 2	 5	 j 21
Islamic banks - Risk managers 	 28	 2	 j_5	 21
Central banks	 26	 9	 5	 12
External auditors	 20	 4	 5	 111
Externalrating agencies	 4	 ___________ _________ _________
IFSB2	 2	 ________ ________
AAOIFJ2	 _________ 2	 _______
Total	 110	 19	 (22	 69
7.10 Methods of Data Analysis
Having chosen the appropriate method of analysis, the choice of statistics is affected
by both the method of analysis itself, the level of measurement of variables and the
complexity of research questions (de Vaus, 2002). In this study, the returned
questionnaires were numbered and accordingly the data collected were keyed into
SPSS software package which is used for data analysis.
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Once the data had been entered in the computer and checked for errors, they were
ready for analysis. The basic objectives in data analysis are to answer the research
questions and to test the propositions developed for the research.
Siegel and Castellan (1988) have argued that the proper interpretation of parametric
tests is not only based on normal distribution, but also assumes that the scores being
analysed result from measurement in at least an interval scale. However, as indicated
earlier, most questions in this study's questionnaire used a 5-point Likert scale in
order to measure the respondents' opinions about sets of statements concerning
transparency of risk reporting in Islamic banks. Responses to the statements can be
summed. This implies that the Likert scales are commonly treated as interval scales
but one might still use non-parametric statistics, because of non-normality. The
problem is that a Likert scale is essentially an ordinal scale, and not an interval scale.
However, as argued by Oppenheim (2001), the most important criticism levelled
against this type of scale is its lack of reproducibility, which means that the same total
score may be obtained in many different ways. This being so, it has been argued that
such scores have little meaning or that two or more identical scores may have totally
different meanings. For this reason, normally, the pattern of responses becomes more
interesting than the total score.
Since this scale is relatively easy to construct and the scores provide more precise
information about the respondents' degree of agreement/disagreement (Oppenheim,
2001), the Likert scale will still be used in this study despite its disadvantages.
A number of statistical techniques will be employed in this research. They include
descriptive statistics and statistical analysis using non-parametric tests. The reason
why non-parametric tests are used, apart from the normality assumption not being met
(refer to Appendix 5), is the small sample size. These techniques are as follows:
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics are summaries of data, which can be tabular, numerical or
graphical. Green et al (2000) state that descriptive statistics involve summarisation of
distribution scores by using tabular or graphical presentation and computation of
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descriptive statistical measures. Different types of descriptive statistics such as the
mean, the mode, the median, standard deviation, the minimum, the maximum and
coefficient of skewness are calculated.
ii-	 Statistical Analysis: Non-parametric Tests
Descriptive statistics have a useful role to play in providing indicators regarding the
topic under investigation, but the role of statistical inference is considerably more
significant in enabling conclusions to be drawn about the values of specific measures
or characteristics relating to the whole population from the values obtained from a
sample of that population (Curwin and Slater, 1991).
In this study, one objective was to test whether there are significant differences in
perceptions of respondents at the overall sample level and among various groups of
respondents. Significance testing is usually concerned with accepting or rejecting
hypotheses or propositions. The testing can be conducted by parametric and non-
parametric tests. Parametric tests usually suit samples which are drawn from a
normally distributed population and data collected on an interval or ratio scale. Non-
parametric tests are used when the normal distribution assumptions of parametric tests
are not met (Coakes and Steed, 2001). The non-parametric tests are usually referred to
as distribution free tests, i.e., these tests do not rely on any seriously restrictive
assumptions concerning the shape of the sampled population(s) (Siegel and Castellan,
1988). These tests are usually preferred when data are collected using a nominal or
ordinal scale and when the parametric distribution within the population is not
specified (Sekaran, 2000). It has been stated that when data are measured on nominal
and ordinal scales, they do not meet the stringent assumptions of the parametric tests
and when the sample is very small, non-parametric teclmiques are ideal (Siegel and
Castellan, 1988).
Therefore, non-parametric tests were considered to be appropriate for the current
study, because the data collected were mainly nominal and ordinal; the responses
were not normally distributed, as shown from descriptive statistics, the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov Test for normality (see Appendix 6). In addition, the sample for the present
study is very small, which justifies the use of non-parametric test.
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The assumptions for the non-parametric tests include:
1. Random sampling
2. Similar shape and variability across distributions.
3. Independence of observations.
In order to analyse data acquired from the respondents, the following non-parametric
tests were used:-
a. The Chi-square Test of Significance
The Chi-square test is used to measure the association between dependent variables
and independent variables (Saunders et al., 2000). Chi-square calculations are based
on frequency distributions. The test is appropriate for testing the goodness of fit
variables. This is because the test can be applied to determine whether or not an
observed set of frequencies matches some expected set of frequencies. Chi-square
contingency tables tests are particularly valuable tests, because they are relatively
simple to understand and apply. Moreover, the data can be of any level [i.e., nominal,
ordinal interval or ratio (Clark, 1998)]. For example, values from a 5-point linear,
numeric scales are equal interval data, but the range of values is limited. There are no
fractions or decimals in such data, and the integer values can be used to define five
categories for analysis of relationship with another categorical variable using
contingency table analysis. To ensure the validity of a chi-square test of significance,
expected cell frequencies are supposed to be five or greater than five. In this study, a
Chi-square contingency table test was used to all the theoretical propositions (P1
through P 13), with the exception of theoretical Propositions 3, 4 and 5. The
significance level used for this Chi-square test is 10% as it is possible to adjust the
cut-off point from a traditional 5% significance level to a higher percentage level due
to a small sample size (Stevens, 1996)
b. Mann-Whitney U Test of Significance
This test is the non-parametric alternative to the independent group t test. Once again,
the decision to use Mann-Whitney U test was based on the fact that the normality
assumption was not met, and the distribution was negatively skewed (see Chapter 8
and 9). This test was used to test the theoretical proposition (P13) for the differences
in the perceptions of the following pairs of group: Central banks and Other Groups.
The significance level used for this Maim-Whitney U test is 10%.
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c. Kruskal-Wallis Test of Significance
This test is a non-parametric alternative to the one-way between groups Analysis of
Variance (ANOVA) and allows one to measure the possible differences between two
groups or more. In the present study, the Kruskal-Wallis test was used to test the
theoretical propositions (P3 and P6 to P13) concerning the market discipline and
transparency and the adequacy of risk reporting in Islamic banks' annual reports. The
significance level used for this Kruskal-Wallis test is 10%.
d. Friedman test
The Friedman test is used to find a tendency for some variables to receive higher
ranks than others, for example assigning the ranks of 1 to 10 to the most preferred and
least preferred variables, respectively (Kinnear and Gray, 2000). The Friedman test
ranks the scores for each of the cases and then calculates the mean score for each
sample. If there is no significant differences between the samples, their mean score
ranks should be similar (Bryman and Cramer, 1990). The Friedman test determines
whether the rank totals for each condition or variable differ significantly from the
values which would be expected by chance (Siegel and Castellan, 1988). This test was
used to test the theoretical propositions (P1, P2, P6 and P7) in the current study. The
significance level used for this Friedman test is 1%.
7.11 ConcJuding Remarks
This chapter provides discussion about the research methodological approach of this
study. The research objectives and questions were developed and then the research
propositions were formulated in this chapter. The data collection method was
presented which was mainly the questionnaire survey. The survey samples in this
research study had been categorised into three groups, i.e. Islamic bankers, the
supervisors of Islamic banks and other groups which include external auditors,
external rating agencies and the representatives from IFSB and AAOIFI.
The final part of this chapter discussed the statistical techniques which were used in
order to analyse the collected data. In this study, non-parametric statistical tests were
used due to the violations of the distribution assumptions of parametric tests.
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Having discussed the research instrument, the sample of the survey, the pilot study,
the administration of the research instrument and the form of data analysis, the next
chapter presents the findings of the empirical work conducted for this study.
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Chapter 8
Research Findings 1: Nature of Risks, Risk Measurement and Risk
Management in Islamic Banks and the Information required by the
Supervisors of Islamic banks
8.1	 Introduction
In Chapter 7, the following research questions were developed:
RQ1 How does the risk perception of Islamic bankers differ from conventional
bankers with respect to the market in which Islamic banks typically operate? Do
Islamic banks use the more technically advanced risk measurement techniques? Apart
from using similar risk mitigation approaches as in conventional banks, do Islamic
banks widely use Shari 'a compliant risk mitigation approaches? Also which risk
mitigation approaches used by conventional banks are not used by Islamic banks?
RQ2 How important for monitoring the risk profile and management of Islamic
banks is the additional risk information which is not required by current financial
reporting standards (with reference to lAS 32, ED 7 and FAS 1) but is provided to
bank supervisors? Which supervisory tool is perceived by bank supervisors to be the
most important to supervise the risk profile and risk management of Islamic banks?
The research propositions were discussed in Chapter 7.
This chapter presents the findings of the empirical work in the following order:
Section 8.2 provides the description of the sample. Reliability analysis is presented in
Section 8.3. Section 8.4 presents the findings of the empirical work to answer RQ 1
and RQ 2 and to provide evidence for Propositions 1 to 7. Finally, Section 8.5
provides concluding remarks.
8.2	 The Sample
As mentioned in Chapter 7 (section 7.6), the questionnaire survey was conducted in
December 2003. The selected countries were Malaysia, Bahrain and others (Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, Sudan, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Egypt, Qatar,
Turkey, Iran, Bangladesh and Pakistan). The questionnaires were distributed to:
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1- CFOs/ CEOs/ General Managers of Islamic banks
2- Risk Managers of Islamic banks
3- Supervisors of Islamic banks— Central Banks
4- External auditors for Islamic banks
5- External rating agencies of Islamic banks
6- AAOIFI's representatives
7- IFSB's representatives
8.2.1 Sample Size
Since the questions in the questionnaire could only be answered by certain people in
Islamic banks, central banks, audit firms and rating agencies, the final sample
consisted of only 110 questionnaires, which were distributed as follows:
• 2 representatives of AAOIFI (100% from Balirain) and 2 representatives of IFSB
(100% from Malaysia);
• 28 CEOs/CFOs of Islamic banks (7% from Malaysia, 18% from Bahrain and 75%
from others);
• 28 Risk Managers of Islamic banks (7% from Malaysia, 18% from Bahrain and
75% from others);
• 26 representatives from Central Banks (35% from Malaysia, 19% from Bahrain
and 46% from others);
• 20 external auditors for Islamic banks (21% from Malaysia, 26% from Bahrain
and 53% from others); and
• 4 representatives from external rating agencies of islamic banks.
Table 8.1 shows that 65 (59%) usable responses were received.
Table 8.1: Response to the Survey
Subjects	 Distributed	 Received	 Usable	 Usable
Replies (N)	 Response
Rate (%)
Islamic banks—CFOsICEOs	 28	 18	 16	 57
Islamic banks - Risk managers
	 28	 13	 13	 46
Central banks
	 26	 19	 19	 73
External auditors	 20	 10	 10	 50
External rating agencies 	 4	 4	 4	 100
IFSB	 2	 2	 2	 100
AAOIFI	 2	 1	 1	 50
Total	 110	 67	 65	 59%
Figure 8.1 provides summary of the sample in this study.
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Figure 8.1: The Composition of the Sample
Malaysia Bahrain
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countnes
Country
Figure 8.2 shows the number of responses in the study in Malaysia, Bahrain and other
countries.
Figure 8.2: Number of Responses
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8.2.2 Sample Characteristics
Table 8.2 summanses the demographic information about the respondents. The
general conclusion that can be made from Table 8.2 is that the modal groups of the
respondents were:
1- In the age group of 35-44 (48%).
2- Male (85%).
3- Holding up to MSc qualifications (36%).
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4- I-laying 11-15 years working experience (32%)63
Table 8.2: Sample Characteristics
Variable	 Description
Age	 25-34	 35-44	 45-54	 55-64	 65+
27%	 48%	 19%	 4%	 2%
Gender	 Male	 Female
85%	 15%
Education	 HS	 BSc	 MSc	 PhD	 PQ64
3%	 31%	 36%	 6%	 24%
Working	 0-5	 6-10	 11-15	 16-20	 21+
Experience	 12%	 18%	 32%	 16%	 22%(in years)
Table 8.3 shows that seven Islamic banks (32%) stated that they used lAS only as
compared to two Islamic banks (9%) which used only AAOIFI standards. Ten Islamic
banks (45%) used both lAS and AAOIFI. Looking at the other standards, mainly the
national standards in the countries surveyed, only one Islamic bank (5%) used both
lAS and other standards and two Islamic banks (9%) used both AAOIFI and other
standards. One Islamic bank (5%) used all the three standards (lAS, AAOIFI and
other standards).
Table 8.3: The Use of the Financial Reporting Standards
Accounting Standards	 Percentages of banks in the sample
lAS only	 32%
AAOIFI only	 9%
lAS and AAOIFI	 45% **
lAS and other	 5%
AAOIFI and other	 9%
From these percentages, 5"o 01 them (Ofl Islamic bank) usea all me tnree stanuarus (1A, AAU11 ana otner
standards)
Even though 42°o of the sample had higher degrees (Master and PhD qualifications), 70% of the sample has more than 10
years working experience. The main reason is because the respondents are in the senior position in these organisation and not
necessary having higher qualifications.
PQ is Professional Qualification.
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8.3	 Reliability Analysis
The purpose of conducting reliability tests is to determine consistency of the scale
measurement. A reliable scale is one which individual yields much the same results
on two different occasions (de Vaus, 2002). According to Oppenheim (2001),
reliability may be measured in several different ways:
By repeatedly administering the scale to the same people within a short period
(lest-retest reliability). Due to time and budget constraints, this method could
not be applied in this study.
ii-	 Internal consistency method, which is an indicator of how well several
different items measure the same variable. The internal reliability can be
assessed through a number of methods in SPSS software. The most common
method is Cronbach's alpha, where the average of all possible split-half
reliability coefficients is calculated. Cronbach's alpha ranges in value from 0
to I because it can be interpreted as a correlation coefficient. The higher the
value of alpha the more reliable the scale. As a rule of thumb, alpha should be
at least 0.765.
For the present study, Cronbach's alpha was used to measure the internal consistency
of the scale. The results are presented in Table 8.4.
Table 8.4: Reliability Analysis of the Questions
Question #	 I Alpha
Section A (QI in Version 1) 	 0.84
Section B (Ql0 in Version 1,
Q4 in Version 2 and Version 0.81
3)
Section C (Q5 in Version 2
and Version 3)
	
0.94
Section A (QI in Version 2
and Version 3)	 0.78
The results from Table 8.4 indicates for Section A, B and C in all versions, alpha
methods produce high coefficients (> 0.70). This means that each scale in the
65 See de vaus, 2002, pp 184.
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questionnaire measures a single concept and the items that make up the scale are
internally consistent. That is to say, the scale measurement of this questiormaire is
internally reliable.
8.4	 Findings
The findings of the survey in this chapter will be described in the following order:
8.4.1 Islamic bankers' opinions about the nature of risks, risk measurement and risk
management techniques in Islamic banks
8.4.2 Supervisors of Islamic banks' opinions about the additional risk information
which is not required by financial reporting standards to monitor risk profiles
and management of Islamic banks
8.4.1 Islamic bankers' opinions about the nature of risks, risk measurement
and risk management techniques in Islamic banks
The questions in this part aim to get the perceptions of the bankers about the nature of
risks, risk measurement and risk management techniques in Islamic banks. These
questions seek to find the answers to the following research question (Propositions 1
to 5):
. How does the risk perception of Islamic bankers differs from conventional
bankers with respect to the market in which Islamic banks typically operated? Do
Islamic banks use the more technically advanced risk measurement techniques?
Apart from using similar risk mitigation approaches as in conventional banks, do
Islamic banks widely use Shari 'a compliant risk mitigation approaches? Also
which risk mitigation approaches used by conventional banks are not used by
Islamic banks?
8.4.1.1 Risk Perceptions
Proposition 1: Salam and Istisna 'a are perceived as more risky than Murabaha and
Ijarah.
Proposition 2: Profit sharing assets (Musharaka and Mudaraba) are perceived as
more risky than mark-up based assets (Murabaha, Salam, Istisna 'a and Jjarah).
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From Table 8.5, the descriptive statistics show that the means are between 3.96 and
4.48, the median is between 4 and 5 and the mode is 4 for all the risks (except for
credit risk, operational risk and Shari 'a non-compliance risk where the mode is 5).
However, due to the nature of the data collected by using a Likert scale, the median
and the mode seem to be more appropriate measurements for this study's data. The
major advantage of the median and the mode is that unlike the mean, they are
unaffected by extreme scores. Another advantage of these measures, when contrasted
with the mean, is that they do not require any assumptions about the interval
properties of the scale (Howell, 1997).
Table 8.5: Descriptive Statistics for Each Type of Risks (Overall) in Section A
(Version 1)
Items	 Mean Median I Mode SD	 Skewness Chi-	 Response
square rate
1. Credit risk (n —29)	 4.48	 5.00	 5	 0.871	 -1.511	 0.000	 52%
2. Rate ofreturn risk	 4.10	 4.00	 4	 0.772 -0.684	 0.001	 52%
(n=29)
3,Price risk (n 28)	 4.00	 4.00	 4	 0.86 1	 -0.375	 0.046	 50%
4.Foreign exchange risk 	 4.21	 4.00	 4	 0.686 -0.302	 0.066	 50%
(n28)
5. Liquidity risk	 4.19	 4.00	 4	 0.834 -0.804	 0.010	 48%
(n-27)
6. Operational risk	 4.10	 4.00	 5	 1.012	 -0.663	 0.016	 52%
(n29)
7. Shari'a non-	 3.96	 4.00	 5	 1.160 -0.882	 0.008	 48%
compliance risk (n = 27)
Friedman test	 0.0 10*
Notes: * The differences between the items are significant at 1% using the Friedman test of
significance; n = number of responses
Furthermore, there is a negative coefficient of skewness for all the risks. These
descriptive statistics imply that the majority of the survey respondents have a positive
degree of agreement with the proposition for all the risks, particularly credit risk and
operational risk. This is supported by the results of the Chi-square test, which
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indicates that Chi-square values of the responses are significantly different at 10% (p
<0.10).
The Chi-square test is used to explore frequency data in order to test whether the
observed pattern of responses differs significantly from what we might have expected
by chance alone. In this study, the responses for each item were analysed by using
Chi-square test in order to determine whether the degrees of either important or
unimportant of the respondents, with each item mentioned in the survey questionnaire,
are significant.
From the analysis, as shown in Table 8.5 and Figure 8.3, it can be seen that on
average as indicated by mean values, the Islamic bankers rate credit risk as the most
important in the banks, followed by foreign exchange risk and liquidity risk. Shari 'a
non-compliance risk is rated as the least important risk in Islamic banks by the survey
respondents.
Figure 8.3: The Mean Values for Each Risk
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In addition to the Chi-square test, another non-parametric test was used for further
investigating in the perceptions of the survey respondents. The Friedman test is used
to find a tendency for some variables to receive higher ranks than others. Based on
Friedman test as shown also in Table 8.5, there is significant difference among all the
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risks at the 1% level of significance. This again confirms that the risks are different
statistically from each other and credit risk is the most important risk in Islamic
banks; in fact there is the same median for all the risks other than credit risk.
Table 8.6: Risk Perceptions in Different Modes of Financing (Mean and Median
Values)
Credit	 Rate of Price	 Liquidity	 Foreign	 Operational	 Shari'a	 Total	 Chi-
	
risk	 return	 risk	 risk	 exchange	 risk	 non-	 square
	
risk	 risk	 compliance
risk
Ivlurabaha	 4.10	 3.55	 3.38	 3.89	 3.74	 3.72	 4.00	 3.79	 0.000
	
(4.00)	 (4.00)	 (350)'	 (4.00)	 (4.00)	 (4.00)	 (4.00)	 (4.00)
n29	 n=29	 n=26	 n=27	 n=27	 n=29	 n=27
Salam	 4.50	 4.11	 4.25	 3.63	 4.13	 4.18	 3.81	 4.14	 0.000
	
(5.00)	 (4.00)	 (4.50)'	 (3.50)'	 (3.50)'	 (5.00)	 (4.00)	 (5.00)
	n18	 n18	 n=16	 n=16	 n16	 n17	 n16
istisna 'a	 4.47	 4.00	 3.94	 4.25	 3.82	 4.05	 3.85	 4.06	 0.000
	
(5.00)	 (4.00)	 (4.00)	 (4.00)	 (4.00)	 (4.00)	 (4.00)	 (4.00)
	
n19	 n=19	 n17	 n=20	 n17	 n21	 n=20
Jjarah	 4.00	 3.70	 3.63	 3.96	 3.83	 3.86	 3.85	 3.85	 0.000
	
(4.00)	 (4.00)	 (3.50)'	 (4.00)	 (4.00)	 (4.00)	 (4.00)	 (4.00)
	
n27	 n27	 n=24	 n = 26	 n23	 n28	 n26
Mudaraba	 4.45	 4.22	 3.76	 4.27	 4.38	 4.14	 3.85	 4.17	 0.000
(asset side)	 (5.00)	 (5.00)	 (4.00)	 (4.00)	 (5.00)	 (4.00)	 (4.00)	 (4.00)
	
n22	 n23	 n21	 n=26	 n=24	 n=28	 n=26
Musharaha	 4.23	 4.41	 3.85	 3.96	 4.29	 4.37	 3.88	 4.16	 0.000
	
(5.00)	 (5.00)	 (4.00)	 (4.00)	 (5.00)	 (5.00)	 (4.00)	 (4.00)
	
n22	 n=22	 n20	 n25	 n21	 n=27	 n=25
Diminishing	 4.10	 4.25	 4.11	 4.14	 4.05	 4.25	 3.95	 4.14	 0.000
Musharaka	 (4.00)	 (4.00)	 (4.00)	 (4.00)	 (4.00)	 (4.00)	 (4.00)	 (4.00)
	
n=20	 n=20	 n=18	 n=22	 n=20	 n=24	 n=22
Friedman	 0.001'
test
Total	 56
res ondents
Notes: The figures in the bracket are the medians for each risk in different modes of financing;
* The differences between the items are significant at 1% using the Friedman test of significance; n =
number of responses
' The median values are 3.5 and 4.5 respectively, because the total observations are even numbers, so the middle values are
between the two numbers, for example between 3 and 4 and between 4 and 5.
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The modes for operational risk and Shari 'a non-compliance risk are higher than the
medians because the minimum value for operational risk is 2 and for Shari 'a non-
compliance risk is 1.
Table 8.6 and Figure 8.4 summarise the risk perceptions of the respondents in
different modes of financing (mean values and median) for the Islamic bankers in the
study. It shows that Islamic bankers perceive Salam and Istisna 'a (mean value of 4.14
and 4.06 respectively) to be riskier than Murabaha (mean value of 3.79) and Ijarah
(mean value of 3.85). This is supported by the median values where for Salam and
Istisna 'a, the median 5.00 and 4.00 respectively, whereas for Murabaha and Ijarah,
the median is 4.00.
These findings are supported by the results of the Chi-square test presented in Table
8.6 which indicated that the Chi-square values of the items are very significant (p <
1%). In addition, the Friedman test of significance in Table 8.6 shows that there is a
significant difference with regard to the risk in each mode of financing at 1%
significance level.
Figure 8.4: Risk measurement appmaches used by Islamic banks
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In addition, Table 8.6 also shows that profit sharing assets (Mudaraba and
Musharaka) are perceived as more risky than mark-up based assets, particularly
Murabaha and Ijarah, in the exception of Salam66, which has a higher median and a
slightly lower mean than profit sharing assets. This again is supported by the results of
the Chi-square and Friedman test which shows that the differences are very significant
at 1% level.
Table 8.6 shows that Salam and Istisna 'a are perceived as the most risky for credit
risk (the mean values are 4.50 and 4.47 respectively and the medians for both are
5.00). This is followed closely by Mudaraba (mean of 4.45) and Musharaka (mean of
4.23).
Similar perceptions also apply to price risk. Salam is perceived to have the most
important price risk (mean of 4.25), followed by Diminishing Musharaka (mean value
of 4.11). The least important price risk is perceived to be that in the Murabaha
contract.
For rate of return risk, Islamic bankers perceive Musharaka to be the most risky
(mean value and median are 4.41 and 5.00 respectively) and followed by Diminishing
Musharaka (mean value and median are 4.25 and 4.00 respectively).
Liquidity risk of instruments will be smaller if the assets can be sold in markets and/or
have short term maturity. The bankers perceive the Muckiraba contract to have the
most liquidity risk (mean value of 4.27), followed by Istisna 'a (4.25) and Diminishing
Musharaka (4.14). Diminishing Musharaka is perceived to have higher liquidity risk
than ordinary Musharaka because of the longer financing in order to reduce the equity
of the Islamic banks. Furthermore, the median for all these three instruments is 4.00.
Interestingly, Salam is perceived to have the least liquidity risk (the lowest mean and
median).
The reason why Salam has a higher median but a slightly lower mean than the profit sharing assets is because the mean for the
liquidity risk in Salan is small, which lower down the overall mean for Salam. Furthermore, it is perceived that most of the
Islamic banks in the study do not have Salam in their banks, which is a limitation for this study. Salam is equally risky because in
the country like Sudan, for example, the authority did not allow parallel Salam.
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Table 8.6 also shows that Islamic bankers perceive foreign exchange risk to be the
most important in Mudaraba (4.38), followed by Musharaka (4.29). The median is
5.00 for these two instruments. The reason may arise because these instruments are
frequently transacted in foreign currency and therefore changes in currency may
expose these instruments to risks.
Operational risk is lower in mark-up based assets i.e. Murabaha and Jjarah (mean
value of 3.72 and 3.86 respectively and median of 4.00) and the highest in
Musharaka, Diminishing Mushara/ca and Salam (mean values of 4.37, 4.25 and 4.18).
The relatively higher means of the latter instruments indicate that banks find these
contracts complex and difficult to implement. This is supported by the medians of
Musharaka and Salam (both have medians of 5.00).
Shari 'a non-compliance risk is highest in Murabaha contracts (mean value of 4.00
and median of 4.00) and the lowest in Salam (mean value of 3.81 and median of
4.00).
In addition to the above risks, there are two other risks faced by Islamic banks, which
are withdrawal risk (part of liquidity risk) and displaced commercial risk - a form of
market risk (AAOIFI, 1999). The main purpose of including the following statements
is to get the opinion of the respondents on these risks faced by Islamic banks.
Statements:
15. A low rate of return on deposits will lead to withdrawal of funds from Islamic banks.
16. The rate of return on deposits in Islamic banks should be commensurate with the rate of return of
similar financial instruments offered by other banks (conventional and Islamic).
Table 8.7: The Frequency Results of the Responses to Statements 15 and 16
	
Statement # SD/D	 N	 AISA	 Chi-square
15	 23%	 29%	 48°o	 0.000
16	 26%	 23%	 51%	 0.001
Note; Scale: I = Strongly Disagree (SD), 2 = Disagree (D), 3 = Neutral (N), 4 = Agree (A),
5 Strongly Agree (SA)
The frequency results shown in Table 8.7 revealed that 48% and 51% of the
respondents agree/strongly agree with Statement 15 and 16 respectively. These
148
Noraini Mohd. Ariffin	 Chapter 8: Research Findings 1
percentages outnumbered those disagreeing and strongly disagreeing. These findings
are supported by the results of the Chi-square test presented in Table 8.7 which
indicated that the Chi-square values of both statements are significantly different at
1% level.
In addition, Table 8.8 shows that the respondents agree that Islamic banks also
experienced these two risks (negative coefficient of skewness), the mean values are
greater than 3, the median is between 3.00 and 4.00, and the mode is 4 for both
statements. Moreover, the results of the Kruskal-Wallis test indicate that there is no
difference in the degrees of agreement in each group of respondents (Islamic banks,
central banks and others) on the above issue.
Table 8.8: Descriptive Statistics for Statements 15 and 16
Statement #	 Mean Median Mode SD	 Minimum Maximum Skewness	 K-W n *
15	 3.29	 3.00	 4	 1.027 1	 5	 -0.354	 N/S	 65
16	 3.34	 4.00	 4	 1.108 1	 5	 -0.288	 N/S	 65
* Response rate = 59%
Notes: N/S indicates that the differences of the responses between the organisation groups are not
significant at 10% using the Kruska!-WalIis test of significance; n = number of responses
Proposition 3: Differences in Shari 'a interpretation may lead to different perceptions
of risk by Islamic bankers in different countries in the study.
Table 8.9 summarises the mean values and the median by country and it shows that all
countries (Malaysia, Bahrain and Others) perceive credit risk as the most important.
This is consistent with the studies on conventional banks where it was found that
credit risk was considered the most important risk (Trema Management Consulting,
2001). In addition, the Base! Committee reports that weak credit risk management
practices and poor credit quality continue to be a dominant cause of bank failures and
banking crises worldwide. This shows the importance of credit risk in the banking
sector, including Islamic banks.
In Malaysia, for example, the Islamic banking system operates side-by-side with
conventional banking. Therefore, movements in interest rates, either upwards or
downwards will have an effect on Islamic banks' operations. As stated by one Islamic
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bank's risk manager: "Theoretically speaking the interest rate risk is not applicable
but in practice this change in the rate may impact the results and hence expose the
bank as the rate is used as the benchmark or pricing index due to the fact that the
Islamic banking are still in its early stages and can 't have its own pricing indicators ".
Table 8.9: Mean and Median Values: Overall Risks Perceived by Islamic
Bankers
Risks	 Total	 Malaysia	 Bahrain	 Others	 K-W
Credit risks	
.	
N/S
(5.00)	 (5.00)	 (4.50)	 (5.00)
Liquidity risk	 4.19	 4.50	 4.00	 4.17	 N/S
(4.00)	 (4.50)	 (4.00)	 (4.00)
Foreign exchange risk	 4.21	 4.00	 4.20	 4.26	 N/S
(4.00)	 (4.00)	 (4.00)	 (4.00)
Operational risk	 4.10	 4.75	 3.50	 4.16	 N/S
(4.00)	 (5.00)	 (3.00)	 (4.00)
Rateofreturnrisk	 4.10	 4.00	 3.83	 4.21	 N/S
(4.00)	 (4.00)	 (4.00)	 (4.00)
Price risk	 4.00	 4.25	 3.67	 4.06	 N/S
(4.00)	 (4.00)	 (3.50)	 (4.00)
Shari'a non-compliance risk	 3.96	 4.25	 3.83	 3.94	 N/S
(4.00)	 (4.00)	 (3.50)	 (5.00)
Number of responses (n) 	 29	 4	 6	 19
Response rate	 52%	 100%	 60%	 45%
Notes: The figures in brackets are the medians for each risk in three different countries and in total;
N/S indicates that the differences of the responses between countries are not significant at 10% using
the Kruskal-Wallis test of significance
It is interesting to see that in Malaysia, operational risk is considered as important as
credit risk, unlike in other countries (as shown by the highest mean and median). This
is consistent with the emphasis that is placed in Basel II on operational risk in banks
and the recent collapse of several companies due to this risk (e.g. US energy trader -
The median values are 3.5 and 4.5 respectively, because the total observations are even numbers, so the middle values are
between the two numbers, for example between 3 and 4 and between 4 and 5.
150
Noraini Mohd. Ariffin	 Chapter 8: Research Findings 1
Enron, 2001). However, the difference in the perceptions of the respondents in
Malaysia, Babrain and other countries is not significant as explained below.
Table 8.9 also shows the significance test for all these risks. From this table, it can be
seen that all the Kruskal-Wallis values are more than 10%, which means that there is
no significant difference in the perceptions of the Islamic bankers in Malaysia,
Bahrain and other countries.
8.4.1.2 Risk Measurement
Proposition 4: Not many Islamic banks use the more technically advanced risk
measurement approaches.
Based on the analysis, not many Islamic banks are perceived to use the more
technically advanced risk measurement approaches [VaR, Simulation techniques,
Estimates of Worst Case, RAROC and Internal Based Rating System].
Table 8.10 and Figure 8.5 shows the frequencies of the risk measurement approaches
used by Islamic banks in the study.
Table 8.10: Risk Measurement in Islamic banks
Risk measurement	 Yes	 No	 Number of responses (n)
Credit ratings	 57%	 43%	 28
Gap analysis	 68%	 32%	 28
Duration analysis
	 43%	 57%	 28
Maturity matching	 82%	 18%	 28
Earnings at Risk	 43%	 57%	 28
VaR	 29%	 71%	 28
Simulation techniques 	 18%	 82%	 28
Estimates of Worst Case / Stress tests	 43%	 57%	 28
Risk Adjusted Return on Capital 	 14%	 86%	 28
Internal Based Rating System	 46%	 54%	 28
Note: Response rate = 50%
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Figure 8.5: Risk Measurement Approaches used by Islamic Banks
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The results showed that maturity matching (82%), gap analysis (68%) and credit
ratings (57%) approaches are perceived to be the most widely used by the Islamic
banks in this study, followed by internal based rating system (46%), duration analysis
(43%), estimates of worst case (43%) and earnings at risk (43%). This implies that a
more technically advanced risk measurement approaches are perceived not to be
widely used by these Islamic banks, except perhaps for Internal Based Rating System
and Estimates of Worst Case, where 46% and 43% respectively, of the respondents
used that method in their banks. However, the pereeritges of riot using a more
technically advanced risk measurement approaches, for example, RAROC (86%),
Simulation techniques (82%) and VaR (71%) outnumbered the percentages of using
the less technically advanced risk measurement approaches. This is consistent with
the PA Global Survey 2001 in their study on conventional banks, where they found
that most conventional banks already have the basic risk measurement tools in place.
Even though maturity matching is the basic technique of liquidity management, 18%
of the respondents said that they did not use this method. Looking at this 18% of the
respondents who did not use maturity matching, 40% of them are also perceived not
to use all the risk measurement approaches listed in the questionnaire. The main
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explanation could be that their banks did not have such risk measurement approaches
in measuring the bank's risks.
8.4.1.3 Risk Management
Proposition 5: Islamic banks use a number of risk mitigation methods that are
intended to be Shari 'a compliant and are different from methods used by conventional
banks.
The analysis in Table 8. 11 and Figure 8.6 shows that Islamic banks use the same risk
management techniques as the conventional banks for managing the risks, in
particular credit risks. Collateral arrangements and guarantees are the most widely
used by Islamic banks in this survey, followed by loan loss reserves and third party
enhancements. The least used mitigation techniques are Urboun, Parallel Salam and
Parallel Islisna 'a, which are some of the Shari 'a compliant risk mitigation methods.
The reason is mainly because these techniques are subjected to different interpretation
by Shari 'a scholars.
Table 8.11: Risk Management Techniques in Islamic Banks
Risk management 	 Yes	 No	 Number	 of
responses (n)
1. Collateral arrangement	 93%	 7%	 27
2. Third party enhancements	 78%	 22%	 27
3. Loan Loss Reserves	 89%	 11%	 27
4. On Balance Sheet Netting 	 22%	 78%	 27
5. Guarantees	 93%	 7%	 27
6. ParallelSa/a,n contracts 	 11%	 89%	 27
7. Parallel Istisna 'a contracts	 15%	 85%	 27
8. Urboun (over-the-counter Islamic	 4%	 96%	 27
derivatives)
Note: Response rate = 48%
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Figure 8.6: Risk Management Techniques used by Islamic Banks
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Moreover, based on the earlier findings, Salam and Istisna 'a contracts are not widely
used by Islamic banks in this study (38% and 24% of the Islamic bankers state that
they did not have Salam or Istisna 'a contracts in their banks). Even for the Islamic
banks entering into Salam and Istisna 'a contracts, the overall percentage of use for
Parallel Salam and Parallel Istisna 'a was very low (18% and 19% respectively have
used Parallel Salam and Parallel Istisna 'a).
By contrast, another Islamic bank's risk manager has said about the fiduciary duty of
Islamic banks: "In fact I believe Islamic banks should have a strong risk management
process as most our funds are under a Mudaraba contract, we must ensure that all
funds invested are getting appropriate returns ".
8.4.2 Supervisors of Islamic banks' opinions about the information required
most to monitor risk profile and management of Islamic banks
This section discusses the supervisors of Islamic banks' perceptions about the
information required most to monitor risk profile and management of Islamic banks
and the risk assessment approaches to supervise Islamic banks. These questions
attempt to find the answers to the following research question (Propositions 6 and 7):
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How important for monitoring the risk profile and management of Islamic banks
is the additional risk information which is not required by current financial
reporting standards (with reference to lAS 32, ED 7 and FAS 1) but is provided to
bank supervisors? Which supervisory tool is perceived by bank supervisors to be
the most important to supervise the risk profile and risk management of Islamic
banks?
Proposition 6: Like supervisors of conventional banks, supervisors of Islamic banks
require additional risk information over that which is required by current financial
reporting standards in order to monitor the risk profile and management of the banks.
Table 8.12 presents the frequency results of the responses to items ito 14 in Question
1, Version 2.
Table 8.12: The Frequency Results of the Responses to Items ito 14 __________ _______
Item	 % Neutral	 % Important *	 Chi-square n **
1. Type of risks	 0%	 100%	 0.003	 19
2. Severity of risks	 5%	 95%	 0.003	 19
3. Risk management	 0%	 100%	 0.003	 19
4.Breakdown - operating segments 	 5%	 95%	 0.008	 19
5. Breakdown—geographical segments	 21%	 74%	 0.008	 19
6. Capital adequacy ratio and banks' own 	 5%	 95%	 0.000	 19
ratio________________ ___________________ ______________ __________
7. Liquidity	 5%	 95%	 0.00 1	 19
8. Maturity matching	 1 1°o	 89%	 0.004	 19
9. Profitability	 16%	 84%	 0.143 N/S	 19
10. Asset quality	 0%	 100%	 0.003	 19
11. Compliance with relevant accounting 	 11%	 89%	 0.004	 19
standards________________ ___________________ _____________ __________
12. Compliance with Shari'a requirements	 0%	 100%	 0.012	 19
13. Shari'a's view—permissibility of taking 	 26%	 74%	 0.196 N/S	 UI
oncertain risks	 ________________ ___________________ _____________ _________
14. Shari'a's view—risk mitigation	 21%	 69%	 0.024	 19
techniques________________ ___________________ _____________ _________
Friedman test	 0.000k
Notes: Scale: 1 = Very Unimportant (VU), 2 = Unimportant (U), 3 = Neutral (N), 4 = Important (I),
5 = Very Important (VI); * Includes "Important" and "Very Important";
N/S indicates that the differences of the responses are not significant at 10% using the Chi-square test
of significance; n number of responses;
* The differences of the items are significant at 1% using the Friedman test of significance
** Response rate = 73%
Regarding the frequency results shown in Table 8.12, the majority of the respondents
rated the information either Important or Very Important on all these items. These
findings are supported by the results of the Chi-square test shown in Table 8.12 which
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revealed that the Chi-square value of each item is significant (in the exception of
profitability and Shari 'a view on permissibility of taking on certain risks). These
results indicated that the respondents largely perceived that all the items are important
for the supervisors to monitor the risk profile and management of Islamic banks.
Table 8.13: Mean Values for the Risk Information Required by Supervisors of
Islamic banks
Items	 Required	 by Total	 Malaysia	 Bahrain Others K-W
IAS/AAOIFI
1.Type of risks	 lAS 32, FAS 1	 4.84	 4.89	 5.00	 4.75	 N/S
_______________________________ __________________ (5.00) ___________ _________ ________ ________
2. Severity of risks	 No	 4.63	 4.56	 4.50	 4.75	 N/S
________________________________ __________________ (5.00) ___________ _________ ________ ________
3. Risk management	 lAS 32, ED 7	 4.84	 4.89	 4.50	 4.88	 N/S
_______________________________ __________________ (5.00) ___________ _________ ________ ________
4.Breakdown-operating segments lAS 14
	 4.26	 4.22	 3.50	 4.50	 N/S
______________________________ _________________ (4.00) __________ _________ _______ _______
5. Breakdown - geographical 	 lAS 14
	
3.84	 3.78	 4.50	 3.75	 N/S
segments___________________ (4.00) ___________ __________ ________ ________
6. Capital adequacy ratio and	 Statement of CAR, 4.74 	 4.89	 5.00	 4.50	 N/S
banks ' own ratio	 AAOIFI	 (5.00) ___________ __________ ________ ________
7. Liquidity	 FAS 1	 4.68	 4.89	 5.00	 4.38	 N/S
_______________________________ __________________ 
(5.00) ___________ _________ ________ ________
8. Maturity matching	 FAS 1	 4.58	 4.56	 5.00	 4.50	 N/S
_______________________________ __________________ 
(5.00) __________ _________ ________ ________
9. Profitability	 FAS 1	 4.37	 4.44	 5.00	 4.13	 N/S
_______________________________ __________________ 
(5.00) ___________ _________ ________ ________
10. Asset quality	 No	 4.84	 4.78	 5.00	 4.88	 N/S
________________________________ __________________ 
(5.00) ___________ _________ _______ ________
11. Compliance with relevant 	 lAS 1, FAS 1	 4.58	 4.44	 5.00	 4.63	 N/S
accountingstandards	 __________________ (5.00) ___________ _________ ________ ________
12. Compliance with Shari'a	 Governance Std 2	 4.79	 4.89	 4.00	 4.88	 0.019
	
requirements____________________ (5.00)	 ____________ __________ ________ _________
13.Shari'a'sview-permissibility	 No	 4.26	 4.44	 3.00	 4.38	 N/S
oftaking on certain risks 	 __________________ (5.00) ___________ _________ ________ ________
14. Shari'a's view- risk mitigation No	 4.00	 4.44	 3.00	 3.75	 N/S
techniques___________________ (4.00) ___________ __________ ________ ________
Numberof responses (n)	 _________________	 19	 8	 2	 9	 _______
Responserate	 _________________ 73%	 89%	 40%	 75% _______
Notes: The figures in brackets are the medians for each item;
N/S indicates that the differences of the responses between countries are not significant at 10% using
the Kruskal-Wallis test of significance
In addition, the above findings are supported by the analysis in Table 8.13 where it is
seen that the supervisors of Islamic banks rated all the risk information to be
important to monitor the risk profile of Islamic banks (the mean values are between
3.84 and 4.84). The most important information as perceived by the bank supervisors
is information on the type of risks, the risk management and the asset quality (all
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have the mean values of 4.84) and compliance with Shari'a requirements (mean
value of 4.79). The differences between the items are statistically significant at 1% as
shown by Friedman test of significance in Table 8.12.
The interview with one of the supervisors of Islamic banks supports this finding. As
stated by him: "Apart from annual reports, the supervisors of Islamic banks require
additional information to be submitted to them either weekly, quarterly or annual
basis, whether it is on the domestic or global position ".
With regard to maturity matching, Table 8.10 shows that 18% of the respondents (in
this case, Islamic bankers) perceive that they did not use that method in risk
measurement. However, when the same item was asked to supervisors of Islamic
banks (in this case, central banks), 89% of them rated information on maturity
matching as 'important' in monitoring the risk profile of Islamic banks. This implies
that this method is important to assess the riskiness of the Islamic banks.
Table 8.13 also shows that the total number of respondents (supervisors of Islamic
banks) in Bahrain is only 2. This is because according to Bahrain Monetary Agency's
representative, the responses represent the collective views of all members of the
directorate. Therefore, additional questionnaires would have the same response.
In addition, from the open-ended questions asked to them, they also point out that
they need additional non-public information (apart from the issue of frequency),
which is also not required by financial reporting standards to supervise Islamic banks.
They include:
1. Rating of the bank by a rating agency.
2. Any non-compliance to Shari 'a requirement - Reputational risk.
3. The implementation of good corporate governance.
This is consistent with the findings of studies in the literature that bank supervisors
have an information advantage over other parties (De Young et al, 2001; Jordan et al,
2000, Berger et al, 2000; Flannery and Houston, 1999 and Berger and Davies, 1998).
They need more information than what is required by financial reporting standards in
order to perform their supervision on Islamic banks, apart from the issue of frequency.
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The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test show that there is only a significant difference
in the opinion of the respondents for item 12: Compliance with Shari'a requirements.
From Table 8.14 and Figure 8.7, it can be seen that while 89% of the supervisors of
Islamic banks in Malaysia and 88% of the supervisors of Islamic banks in other
countries perceive item 12 to be Very Important, there is zero percentage from
Bahrain for Very Important, in fact 100% of Bahrain was for Important. This implies
that in Bahrain, compliance with Shari 'a requirements was perceived as only
"important" and not "very important" to supervise Islamic banks. According to one of
the supervisors of Islamic banks in Bahrain, since Islamic banks have a Shari 'a
Supervisory Board, the Board should concentrate on the Shari 'a issues in Islamic
banks and the regulator could deal with other supervisory matters.
Table 8.14: Compliance with Shari'a Requirements
_____________________________	
Country
Other
________________________________ Malaysia Bahrain countries
Important	 11%	 100%	 12%
Very Important	 89%	 0%	 88%
Figure 8.7: Compliance with Shari'a Requirements -
Responses
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Percentages
Additional questions were also asked in the questionnaire to get the survey
respondents' perceptions on the role of supervisors of Islamic banks in improving
bank's transparency (Statements 10, 11, 13 and 14).
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Statements:
10. The most effective way to ensure the Islamic bank adheres to public risk disclosure requirements
as required by accounting standards is to impose penalties for non-disclosure.
11. Sufficient attention has been given by bank supervisors to ensure that public risk disclosure
requirements are proportionate to the nature and scale of the Islamic bank.
13. Bank supervisors have adequate information that enables them to assess the risks inherent in
Islamic banks.
14. Bank supervisors impose on Islamic banks rules for public risk disclosure that improve banks'
transparency.
The frequency results shown in Table 8.15 revealed that the majority of the survey
respondents agree with all these statements. These findings are supported by the
results of the Chi-square test which are presented in Table 8.15 and which indicated
that the Chi-square values of the responses for all these statements are significantly
different at the 1% level.
Table 8.15: The Frequency Results of the Responses to Statements 10, 11, 13 and 14
	
Statement # SD	 D	 N	 A	 SA	 Chi-square
10	 2%	 6%	 31%	 48%	 13%	 0.000
11	 3°o	 l2°o	 31%	 46%	 8%	 0.000
13	 2°o	 15%	 32%	 42%	 9%	 0.000
14	 0°o	 6°o	 21%	 59%	 14%	 0.000
Note: Scale: 1 = Strongly Disagree (SD), 2 = Disagree (D), 3 = Neutral (N), 4 = Agree (A),
5 Strongly Agree (SA)
Table 8.16: Descriptive Statistics for Statements 10, 11, 13 and 14
Statement # Mean Median Mode SD	 Minimum Maximum Skewness K-W	 n *
10	 3.66	 4.00	 4	 0.853 1	 5	 -0.525	 N/S	 65
11	 3.43	 4.00	 4	 0.9 18 1	 5	 -0.602	 0.024	 65
13	 3.42	 4.00	 4	 0.917 1	 5	 -0.307	 N/S	 65
14	 3.80	 4.00	 4	 0.754 2	 5	 -0.550	 0.022	 65
* Response rate = 59%
Notes: N/S indicates that the differences of the responses between organisation groups are not
significant at 10% using the Kruskal-Wallis test; n = number of responses
In general, a majority of the respondents (73%) agree or strongly agree that the
supervisors of Islamic banks play an important role in improving transparency in
Islamic banks by imposing rules for public risk disclosure. This is evidenced from the
negative coefficient of skewness for all the statements, and the mode is 4 (Agree) for
all statements (Table 8.16).
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The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test show that there is only a significant difference
in the opinion of the respondents on Statements 11 and 14 (p < 10%).
In Statement 11, Table 8.17 shows that while 74% of the supervisors of Islamic banks
agree or strongly agree that "Sufficient attention has been given by bank supervisors
to ensure public risk disclosure requirements are proportionate to the nature and
scale of the Islamic bank", it is only 52% of Islamic bankers and 35% of other
respondents who agree or strongly agree with the same statement.
Table 8.17: Views about Statement 11
_____________	 Group	 _________
	
Islamic banks	 Central banks	 Others
Strongly Disagree	 3%	 0%	 6%
Disagree	 10%	 5%	 24%
Neutral	 35%	 21%	 35%
Agree	 45%	 58%	 35%
Strongly Agree	 7%	 16%	 0%
Total	 100%	 100%	 100%
Statement 14 is another example of the differences in the perceptions of the surveyed
groups. While 72% of Islamic bankers and 89% of the supervisors of Islamic banks
agree or strongly agree with Statement 14, only 53% of other respondents have shared
the same view as shown in Table 8.18.
Table 8.18: Views about Statement 14
________________________ _____________	
Group	 _________
Islamic banks	 Central banks	 Others
Disagree	 7%	 0%	 12%
Neutral	 21%	 11%	 35%
Agree	 62%	 63%	 47%
Strongly Agree	 10%	 26%	 6%
Total	 100%	 100%	 100%
Proposition 7: Supervisory bank rating systems (e.g. CAMELS or similar) are
perceived to be the most important assessment approaches to supervise Islamic banks
as compared to other approaches (e.g. statistically based).
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The analysis in this section aims to elicit the opinion of the supervisors of Islamic
banks on the risk assessment approaches that they used to supervise Islamic banks.
Table 8.19 shows the frequency responses for all the approaches. The results show
that in general the supervisors of Islamic banks perceive the risk assessment
approaches to be either Important or Very Important. This is supported by the results
of Chi-square test of significance which indicated that the Chi-square values are
significantly different at the 10% level (except for Financial Ratios).
Table 8.19: The Frequency Results of the Responses for the Risk Assessment
Approaches used to supervise Islamic Banks
Supervisory assessment VU	 U	 N	 I	 VI	 Chi-
approaches	 square
Supervisory bank rating 0%	 0%	 5%	 21%	 74%	 0.001
systems
Financial ratios	 0%	 0%	 11%	 44%	 45%	 0.135 N/S
Peer group analysis 	 0%	 5%	 11%	 74%	 10%	 0.000
Comprehensive bank risk 0%	 0%	 11%	 27%	 63%	 0.0 16
assessment
Statistical methods	 5%	 11%	 16%	 7%	 21%	 0.037
Friedman test	 0.000*
Notes: Scale: 1 = Very Unimportant (VU), 2 = Unimportant (U), 3 = Neutral (N),
4 = Important (I), 5 = Very Important (VI);
N/S indicates that the differences of the responses are not significant at 10% using the Chi-
square test of significance;
* The differences of the items are significant at 1% using the Friedman test of significance.
As shown in Table 8.20 and Figure 8.8, supervisors of Islamic banks perceive
supervisory bank rating systems (e.g. CAMELS or similar) to be the most important
risk assessment approach to supervise Islamic banks (mean value = 4.68), followed by
comprehensive bank risk assessment and financial ratios (mean values of 4.53 and
4.33 respectively). This is supported by the result of the Friedman test, which is
significant at 1%.
Both supervisory bank rating systems (e.g. CAMELS or similar) and comprehensive
bank risk assessment have the median of 5.00. Statistical methods are perceived to be
the least important approach.
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The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test show that there is a significant difference only
in the opinions of the respondents on supervisory bank rating systems (ci < 10%).
Table 8.20: Descriptive Statistics for the Risk Assessment Approaches used to
supervise Islamic Banks
Supervisory Assessment Mean Median 	 Mode	 SD	 Skewness Kruskal-
approaches	 Wallis test
Supervisory bank rating 4.68
	 5.00	 5	 0.582	 -1.766	 0.069
systems (n = 19)
Financial ratios (n = 19)
	 4.33	 4.00	 4	 0.686	 -0.547	 0.569N1S
Peergroupanalysis	 3.89	 4.00	 4	 0.658	 -1.204	 0.912N/S
(n 19)
Comprehensive bank risk 4.53	 5.00	 5	 0.697	 -1.205	 0.848N/S
assessment (n = 19)
Statistical methods
	 3.68	 4.00	 4	 1.108	 -0.933	 0.442N/S
(n 19)
Notes: N/S indicates that the differences of the responses between countries are not
significant at 10% using the Kruskal-Wallis test of significance; n = number of responses
Figure 8.8: Mean Values for the Risk Assessment Approaches
3.68
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• Supervisory bank rating
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Table 8.21: Views about Supervisory Bank Rating Systems
Country
	
____________________________ Malaysia 	 Bahrain	 Others
Neutral	 11%	 0%	 0%
Important	 11%	 100%	 12%
Very Important	 78%	 0%	 88%
Total	 •	 100%	 100%	 100%
From Table 8.21, it can be seen that 78% of the supervisors of Islamic banks in
Malaysia and 88% of other groups perceived the Supervisory bank rating systems
(e.g. CAMELS or similar) to be very important, while in Bahrain, the bank
supervisors perceived it as just important i.e. they did not perceive it as very
important. The main reason is because in Bahrain, the Bahrain Monetary Agency has
additional items over what is in CAMELS to supervise Islamic banks. They include
liquidity issues, concentration of risks, related party transactions, the management of
investment accounts, corporate governance and provisions/reserves, where there are
no ratings used but the benchmarks are established.
8.5	 Concluding Remarks
It is noted that credit risk is perceived to be the most important risk in Islamic banks
(as perceived by all countries), followed by foreign exchange risks and liquidity risk.
The above findings show that Islamic bankers perceive Salam and Istisna 'a to be
riskier than Murabaha and Ijarah. This again supports Proposition 1. Furthermore,
profit sharing assets (Mudaraba and Musharaka) are perceived to be more risky than
mark-up based assets particularly Murabaha and Ijarah, in the exception of Salam.
Therefore, Proposition 2 is not fully supported.
It is interesting to note that Islamic bankers in Malaysia perceived operational risk to
be as important as credit risk. However, there is no significance difference between
the perceptions of Islamic bankers in Malaysia and other countries on these risks. In
addition to that, Islamic bankers in the countries surveyed agree that Islamic banks
faced withdrawal risk and displaced commercial risk. This provides no support for
Proposition 3.
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Islamic banks are perceived to use less advanced risk measurement approaches and
Shari 'a compatible risk mitigation techniques are not widely used in Islamic banks.
These findings provide support for Proposition 4 and no support for Proposition
5. Many of Islamic banks in the study do not have Salam and Istisna 'a contracts,
therefore no risk mitigation (Parallel Salam and Parallel Istisna 'a) were used here.
Evidence indicates that Proposition 6 and 7 are supported. The questiolmaire
survey concludes that the supervisors of Islamic banks required additional risk
information over that which is required by financial reporting standards (apart from
the issue of frequency) in order to monitor risk profile of Islamic banks. This includes
asset quality, rating of the bank by a rating agency, any non-compliance to Shari 'a
requirement - (Reputational risk) and the implementation of good corporate
governance. Supervisory bank rating systems (e.g. CAMELS or similar) are perceived
to be the most important assessment approaches to supervise Islamic banks, except in
Bahrain where they used other assessment approaches to supervise Islamic banks and
rated CAMELS as "important" only.
The next chapter presents the second part of the research findings in this study.
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Chapter 9
Research Findings 2: Transparency and Market Discipline in Islamic
Banks
9.1	 Introduction
This chapter presents the second part of the research findings in this study and mainly
aims to answer the following research questions:-
RQ3 What is the perceived role of transparency in Islamic banks from a risk
reporting point of view, with particular reference to Basel II?
RQ4 To what extent are existing public disclosures on qualitative risk information
in Islamic banks' aimual reports perceived by the supervisors of Islamic banks and
other interested parties to be adequate to provide sufficient transparency for Islamic
banks that can enhance market discipline?
RQ5 What are the implications of the above for the implementation of Basel II, for
regulation of risk disclosures (Pillar 3) and for banking supervision (Pillar 2)?
In particular, this chapter aims to answer RQ 3 to RQ 5 and to provide evidence for
Propositions 8 to 13, which have been discussed in Chapter 7. This chapter is
organised as follows:
Section 9.2 presents the findings of the empirical work, which is divided into three
subsections. Section 9.3 provides concluding remarks.
9.2	 Findings
The findings of this survey will be described in the following order:
9.2.1 Transparency and market discipline in Islamic banks
9.2.2 The level of adequacy of qualitative risk information in existing Islamic
banks' armual reports
9.2.3 Other information
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9.2.1 Transparency and market discipline in Islamic banks
This section intends to discuss several issues related to transparency and market
discipline in Islamic banks. The questions asked in this part attempt to find the
answers to the following research question (Propositions 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12):
. What is the perceived role of transparency in Islamic banks from a risk reporting
point of view, with particular reference to Basel II?
Proposition 8: Market discipline could facilitate banking supervision in Islamic
banks, similarly to conventional banks.
The questions in this part aim to elicit the opinions of the respondents on the
effectiveness of market discipline for bank supervisors. The respondents were asked
to indicate their degree of agreement for the following statements.
Statements:
7. Market discipline can effectively reduce the need for official supervision of Islamic banks.
8. Market discipline reduces the need for supervisory oversight in maintaining capital in Islamic
banks.
9. Effective market discipline can lower the supervision costs by the supervisors of Islamic banks.
12. Bank supervisors have a strong interest in facilitating effective market discipline in Islamic banks.
Table 9.1: The Frequency Results of the Responses to Statements 7, 8, 9 and 12
Statement # SDID	 N	 A/SA	 Chi-square
7	 35%	 35%	 30%	 0.000
8	 35%	 400o	 25%	 0.000
9	 12%	 40%	 48%	 0.000
12	 3%	 14%	 83°o	 0.000
Note: Scale: 1 = Strongly Disagree (SD), 2 = Disagree (D), 3 Neutral (N), 4 = Agree (A),
5 = Strongly Agree (SA)
Table 9.1 reveals that most of the survey respondents either disagree with or are
neutral about statements 7, 8 and 9. For Statement 12, 83% of the respondents either
agree or strongly agree. This is supported by the results of the Chi-square test of
significance which indicated that the Chi-square values of the responses are
significant at the 1% level.
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Based on the descriptive statistics used to analyse this part as shown in Table 9.2, the
mean was between 2.95 and 4.03 the median was between 3.00 and 4.00 and the mode
was between 2 and 4. There is a negative coefficient of skewness for statement 12,
and a positive coefficient of skewness for statements 7, 8 and 9. This implies that
respondents mainly disagreed with statements 7 and 8 and this is also evidenced by
the lowest mean values in both statements (3.09 and 2.95 respectively) and the median
of 3.00. However, the respondents did agree that bank supervisors have a strong
interest in facilitating effective market discipline (mean is 4.03 and there a positive
coefficient of skewness) but were less convinced that effective market discipline
could lower the supervision costs. This is supported by the results of Chi-square test
of significance which indicates the Chi-square values of the responses are significant
at the 1% level.
Table 9.2: Descriptive Statistics for Statements 7, 8, 9 and 12
Statement # Mean	 Median Mode SD	 Minimum Maximum	 Skewness K-W	 n *
7	 3.09	 3.00	 3	 1.142	 1	 5	 0.464	 0.071	 65
8	 2.95	 3.00	 3	 0.991	 1	 5	 0.492	 N/S	 65
9	 3.45	 3.00	 3	 0.830 2	 5	 0.007	 N/S	 65
12	 4.03	 4.00	 4	 0.706 2	 5	 -0.592	 0.011	 65
* Response rate = 59%
Notes: N/S indicates that the differences of the responses between the organisation groups are
not significant at 10% using the Kruskal-WalIis test; n = number of responses
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test show that there is only a significant difference
in the opinion of the respondents in statements 7 and 12 (p < 10%).
Table 9.3: Views about Statement 7
_____________	
Group	 __________
Islamic banks	 Central banks	 Others
Strongly Disagree	 4%	 5%	 0%
Disagree	 17%	 47%	 41%
Neutral	 41%	 26%	 35%
Agree	 7%	 6%	 24%
Strongly Agree	 31%	 16%	 0%
Total	 100%	 100%	 100%
Table 9.3 and Figure 9.1 show that 52% of the supervisors of Islamic banks either
disagree or strongly disagree that market discipline can effectively reduce the need for
official supervision of Islamic banks. On the other hand, Islamic bankers are rather
neutral about this statement (41% neutral).
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Statement 12 assumes that the supervisors of Islamic banks have a strong interest in
facilitating effective market discipline. 95% of the supervisors of Islamic banks
strongly agree/agree with this statement, whereas only 76% of Islamic bankers and
82% of other groups share the same view about this statement. This implies that the
supervisors of Islamic banks are more convinced about their interest in facilitating
market discipline than other groups of respondents.
Figure 9.1: Views about Statement 7
Islamic Central Others
banks banks
Groups
D Agree and Strongly
Agree
• Neutral
• Strongly Disagree and
Disagree
Table 9.4: Views about Statement 12
____________	 Group	 _________
	
Islamic banks
	 Central banks	 Others
Disagree	 3%	 0%	 6%
Neutral	 21%	 5%	 12%
Agree	 59%	 47%	 76%
Strongly Agree	 17%	 48%	 6%
Total	 100%	 100%	 100%
In addition, based on the Islamic bankers' perceptions, the supervisors of Islamic
banks are perceived to have the most influence in monitoring the behaviour of the
Islamic banks (61 % of the sample agreed to that), followed by credit rating agencies
and Islamic bank's shareholders. The percentages are calculated based on the three
rankings given by the Islamic bankers.
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From Table 9.5, it can be seen that 61% of the Islamic bankers perceived that the
supervisors of Islamic banks had the most influence on Islamic banks compared to
credit rating agencies and Islamic bank shareholders. This implies that due to the lack
of transparency and in the absence of market discipline, Islamic bank shareholders
play a lesser role in Islamic banks and this may lead to corporate governance issues.
Table 9.5: Perceptions on the Group to have the Most Influence on Islamic
Banks (Number of responses = 28)
Groups	 Percentages
Islamic bank supervisors 	 61%
Credit rating agencies	 38%
Islamic bank shareholders 	 38%
Note: Response rate = 50%
Proposition 9: Transparency with regard to risk reporting is perceived to be more
important in Islamic banks than in conventional banks.
Statements 6 and 17 to 21 aim to get the opinion of the respondents on the importance
of transparency in Islamic banks as compared to conventional banks. The main reason
is that Islamic banks have profit sharing investment account holders which require
more transparency in order to monitor their investment in Islamic banks.
Statements:
6. Investment account holders in Islamic banks need more information on all risks faced by the banks
than conventional depositors.
17. The more information on risks that are disclosed, the greater the confidence felt by investment
account holders to invest in Islamic banks.
1 8. Greater risk disclosure in Islamic banks informs investment account holders of the potential risks
to which their investments are exposed.
19. Greater risk disclosure encourages new investments in Islamic banks.
20. The more risk information disclosed in the annual report of Islamic banks, the more are market
participants able to monitor the banks.
21. It is necessary to have a separate statement in the annual report to highlight the Islamic banks'
risks and risk management techniques.
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Based on the analysis shown in Table 9.6, the majority of the respondents in the study
agree with all the statements. This is again supported by the results of Chi-square test
of significance which indicates the Chi-square values of the responses are significant
at 1%.
In addition, as per Table 9.6, the lowest value of the mean is 3.71 and the highest is
4.12, the median and the mode are 4 for all statements, and there is a negative
coefficient of skewness for all. This implies that the respondents agree with what was
discussed by these statements. However, the lowest mean of 3.71 for Statement 19
means that the respondents were not strongly convinced that greater risk disclosure
encourages new investments in Islamic banks. 21% of the Islamic bankers, 16% of the
supervisors of Islamic banks and 0% of other respondents strongly agree with this
statement.
Table 9.6: The Frequency Results of the Responses to Statements 6 and 17 to 21
	
Statement # SD	 D	 N	 A	
SA	 Chi-sqa
	
6	 0%	 4°o	 17%	 40%	
39%	 0.000 -
	
— 17	 000	 5°o	 26%	 35%	
34%	 0.001
	
- 18	 0%	 2°o	 17%	 55%	
26%	 0.000
	
19	 O°o	 500	 34%	 48%	 13%	
0.000
	
- 20	 0%	 10%	 11%	 65%	
23%	 0.000
	
- 21	 2%	 40	 14%	 55%	 25%	
0.000
Note: Scale: I = Strongly Disagree (SD), 2 = Disagree (D), 3 = Neutral (N), 4 = Agree (A),
5 = Strongly Agree (SA)
Table 9.7: Descriptive Statistics for Statements 6 and 17 to 21
Statement # Mean Median Mode SD	 Minimum Maximum 
Skewness	 K-W I *
	
6	 4.12	 4.00	 4	 0.857	 2	 5	
-0.704	 0.091	 65
	
17	 3.98	 4.00	 4	 0.893	 2	 5	
-.0377	 N/S	 T
	
- 18	 4.06	 4.00	 4	 0.710	 2	 5	
-0.365	 N/S	 jj
	
19	 3.71	 4.00	 4	 0.765	 2	 5	
-0.091	 N/S	 65
	
20	 4.09	 4.00	 4	 0.63 1	 2	
5	 -0.456	 N/S	 65
	
21	 3.97	 4.00	 4	 0.847	 1	
5	 -1.054	 N/S	 65
* Response rate = 59% with the exception of statement 18 where the response rate = 58%Notes: N/S indicates that the differences of the responses are not significant at 10% using the Kruskal-
Wallis test; n = number of responses
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test show that there is only significant difference in
the perceptions of the respondents with regard to Statement 6.
Table 9.8 shows that while 41% and 53% of Islamic bankers and the supervisors of
Islamic banks respectively strongly agree that investment account holders in Islamic
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banks need more information on all risks faced by the banks than conventional
depositors respectively, only 18% of other groups (external auditors, external rating
agencies and representatives from IFSB and AAOIFI) share the same view.
Table 9.8: Views about Statement 6
Group__________
	
Islamic banks
	
Central banks	 Others
Disagree	 7%	 0%	 6%
Neutral	 7%	 21%	 29%
Agree	 45%	 26%	 47%
Strongly Agree
	
41%	 53%	 18%
Total	 100%	 100%	 100%
Proposition 10: In the countries in which Islamic banks are surveyed, it is perceived
that effective disclosure helps market participants to assess the investment account
holders' performance.
The question in this part aims to get the opinion of the survey respondents about the
relationship between transparency, market discipline and disclosure. However, the
researcher was aware about the social desirability bias 67 problem based on the ways
the following statements have been phrased. But, the questions were still asked in
order to get some general opinion from the respondents relating to these issues.
Statements:
I.	 Transparency is a pre-requisite for achieving market discipline.
2. Market discipline can work effectively only on the basis of adequate and accurate information
disclosure and transparency.
3. Lack of transparency in financial reporting on risks could lead to difficulties in assessing the
bank's performance.
4. Effective disclosure is essential to ensure that market participants have a better understanding of
the banks' risk profiles.
The frequency results in Table 9.9 show that in general, the respondents in the study
either agree or strongly agree with all these statements, which are supported by the
results of the Chi-square test of significance.
67 In some circumstances, respondents may be tempted to give the socially desirable response rather than describe what they
actually think, believe or do. This has typically been assumed to be a function of two factors, the general strength of need for
approval felt by an individual (personality trait) and the demands of a particular situation (Phillips and Clancy 1972).
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Table 9.9: The Frequency Results of the Responses to Statements 1 to 4
	
Statement# SD
	
D	 N	 A	 SA	 Chi-square
1	 0%	 0%	 8%	 41%	 51%	 0.000
2	 0%	 0%	 5%	 47%	 48%	 0.000
3	 0%	 0%	 5%	 43%	 52%	 0.000
4	 0%	 0%	 6%	 42%	 52%	 0.000
Note: Scale: 1 = Strongly Disagree (SD), 2 = Disagree (U), 3 = Neutral (N), 4 = Agree (A),
5 = Strongly Agree (SA)
Table 9.10: Descriptive Statistics for Statements 1 to 4
Statement # Mean Median Mode SD	 Minimum Maximum Skewness K-W	 n *
1	 4.44	 5.00	 5	 0.639 3	 5	 -0.700	 N/S	 64
2	 4.43	 4.00	 5	 0.585 3	 5	 -0.446	 N/S	 65
3	 4.48	 5.00	 5	 0.589 3	 5	 -0.618	 N/S	 65
4	 4.46	 5.00	 5	 0.614 3	 5	 -0.684	 N/S	 65
* Response rate = 59% with the exception of statement 1 where the response rate =
Notes: N/S indicates that the differences of the responses between organisation groups are not
significant at 10% using the Kruskal-Wallis test; n = number of responses
Furthermore, Table 9.10 shows that the lowest mean value is 4.43 and the highest is
4.48, the mode is 5 for all these statements and the median is 5.00 (except for
Statement 2, where the median is 4.00). There is a negative coefficient of skewness
for all statements. This implies that the respondents strongly agreed with what was
discussed by these statements as per analysis in Table 9.9.
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test show that there is no significant difference in
the perceptions of the respondents with regard to all the statements.
Proposition 11: Base! II is applicable to Islamic banks with modifications.
The main theme of including statements 22 to 24 is to find out the perceptions of the
respondents about Base! II.
Statements:
22. The New Basel Accord (Basel II) is a welcome development for Islamic banks.
23. There is a need to adapt the New Basel Accord (Basel II) to cover the uniqueness of Islamic banks.
24. Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) can facilitate the adoption of the New Basel Accord
(Basel II) in Islamic banks.
Table 9.11 shows the frequency results of the responses to Statements 22 to 24. In
general, it can be seen that the survey respondents agree with all the statements, in
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particular Statement 24, where 86% of the respondents were in agreement with this
statement. There is a less enthusiasm for Statement 22; only 51% agreed or strongly
agreed with the statement, 11% disagreed or strongly disagreed and 38% were neutral.
Again, the results are supported by the Chi-square test values.
Table 9.11: The Frequency Results of the Responses to Statements 22 to 24
	
Statement# SD	 D	 N	 A	 SA	 Chi-square
22	 6%	 5%	 38%	 42%	 9%	 0.000
23	 3%	 6%	 19%	 38%	 34%	 0.000
24	 0%	 0%	 14%	 53%	 33%	 0.001
Note: Scale: 1 = Strongly Disagree (SD), 2 Disagree (D), 3 =Neutra (N), 4 = Agree (A),
5 = Strongly Agree (SA)
Table 9.12: Descriptive Statistics for Statements 22 to 24
Statement# Mean	 Median	 Mode SD	 Minimum Maximum Skewness K-W	 *
22	 3.44	 4.00	 4	 0.957	 1	 5	 -0.768	 N/S	 64
23	 3.94	 4.00	 4	 1.037	 1	 5	 -0.930	 0.036	 64
24	 4.19	 4.00	 4	 0.664	 3	 5	 -0.226	 N/S	 64
* Response rate = 5S%
Notes: N/S indicates that the differences of the responses between organisation groups are not
significant at 10% using Kruskal-Wallis test; n = number of responses
In addition, it can be seen from Table 9.12 that the mean values are between 3.44 and
4.19, the median and the mode are 4 for all these three statements. There is also a
negative coefficient of skewness in all statements as shown in Table 9.12, which again
support the findings in Table 9.11.
The results of the Kruska1-WaWs test show that there is ithy a signifc&ct ecee
in the perceptions of the respondents for statements 23 (p>lO%).
Table 9.13: Views about Statement 23
	
__________	 Group	 __________
Islamic
_________________________________	 banks	 Central banks Others
Strongly Disagree & Disagree	 11%	 0%	 18%
Neutral	 18%	 11%	 29%
Agree& Strongly Agree	 71%	 89%	 53%
Total	 100%	 100%	 100%
As shown in Table 9.13 and Figure 9.2, a majority of central bankers (89%) and
Islamic bankers (71 %) either strongly agreed or agreed with Statement 23: There is a
need to adapt Base! II to cover the uniqueness of Islamic banks, whereas 53% of other
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groups shared the same view about this statement. This implies that fewer members of
groups (which include the representatives of IFSB, AAOIFI, external rating agencies
and external auditors) were convinced about this statement.
Figure 9.2: Views about Statement 23
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Perceiltages
The results from the interviews 68 indicated that there are problems in applying this
Basel II to Islamic banks as stated by one of the Islamic bankers "The main problem
to apply this Accord was in terms of human resource and costs to be invested in the
system. " This problem is faced by conventional banks and is even worse for Islamic
banks due to their relatively small size.
Another problem mentioned by an Islamic bank's risk manager related to the lack of
ratings in Islamic banks and their obligors (clients); and the fact there is no historical
data to implement the Accord:
"No doubt that the Accord will serve the soundness of the financial institutions in the
manner in which they operate. However, it may not suit all banks and financial
institutions or rather the region in which they operate due to the requirement that all
banks or financial institutions and their clients be rated by external rating agencies.
There is a lack of rating agencies specialised in the Gulf region or the Arab world. As
the Accord also suggests that in case there is no rating, the company need to be rated
in accordance to the internal rating model of the Bank or Basel I, which may not
reflect the soundness of the company or not take into consideration important facts or
' Follow-up e mails were used to the Islamic bankers in countries other than Malaysia to clarify several issues due to time and
budget constraints. The answers obtained were used in this chapter.
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realities that form an important aspects for the business."
Another Islamic bank's risk manager stated that:
"Even not all conventional institutions would be able to subscribe to the Accord, let
alone the Islamic institutions. Anyway the IFSB should be of some assistance to this.
Otherwise, the Islamic bank will have to apply the standard method which is
disadvantageous. This is because the Islamic bank does not have the historical data to
use the advanced method".
Proposition 12: External credit ratings of Islamic banks are perceived to help the
public to assess the banks' financial conditions.
Statements 25 to 29 are intended to get the opinion of the respondents in the study
about the role of external rating agencies on the issue of transparency in Islamic
banks.
Statements:
25. Information intermediaries are sufficient in the case of Islamic banks to reduce informational
asymmetries.
26. The Islamic bank credit ratings are based on the ability of the Islamic banks to access the capital
market to raise funds.
27. The external credit ratings affect the ability of Islamic banks to attract investment funds for the
following year.
28. The release of the Islamic bank credit ratings to the public affects the market confidence.
29. The release of the credit ratings to the public leads Islamic banks to disclose less information in the
annual reports.
Table 9.14: The frequency Results of the Responses to Statements 25 to 29
	
Statement # SD
	 D	 N	 A	 SA	 Chi-square
25	 3°	 180o	 46%	 23%	 10%	 0.000
26	 6%	 19%	 32%	 35%	 8%	 0.000
27	 0°o	 9°o	 29%	 51°o	 11%	 0.000
28	 3%	 8°o	 25%	 46%	 18%	 0.000
29	 9°o	 40%	 37%	 14%	 0%	 0.000
iNote: Scale: I = Strongly L)isagree (SD), 2 Disagree (U), 3 = Neutral (N), 4 = Agree (A),
5 = Strongly Agree (SA)
Based on Table 9.14, the respondents in this study generally agree with statements 26
to 28 (in particular statements 27 and 28). However, they seem not to agree with
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statement 29 and are rather neutral for statement 25. Figure 9.3 presents the survey
respondents' views about Statement 29: The release of the credit ratings to the public
leads Islamic banks to disclose less information in the annual reports. The Chi-square
test supports these findings.
Figure 9.3: Views about Statement 29
14%	 0% 9%
40%37%	 -
• Strongly Disagree
• Disagree
o Neutral
DAgree
I Strongly Agree
Table 9.15: Descriptive Statistics for Statements 25 to 29
Statement # Mean
	
Median	 Mode SD	 Minimum	 Maximum Skewness K-W n
25	 3.18	 3.00	 3	 0.958	 1	 5	 0.096	 0.082 61
26	 3.20	 3.00	 4	 1.034	 1	 5	 -0.329	 N/S	 65
27	 3.63	 4.00	 4	 0.802	 2	 5	 -0.349	 0.020 65
28	 3.69	 4.00	 4	 0.967	 1	 5	 -0.729	 N/S	 65
29	 2.55	 3.00	 3	 0.848	 1	 4	 0.064	 N/S	 65
* Response rate = 59% with the exception of statement 25 where the response rate = 55%
Notes: N/S indicates that the differences of the responses between organisation groups are not
significant at 10% using Kruskal-Wallis test; n = number of responses
The descriptive statistics used to analyse this section as shown in Table 9.15 also
support these results. The mean was between 2.55 and 3.69 and the mode was 4
(except for statements 25 and 29, where the mode was 3). The median is 3.00 for
statements 25, 26 and 29 and 4.00 for statements 27 and 28. And responses to
statements 26, 27 and 28 were negatively skewed. This means that the respondents
agreed with the statements, particularly statements 27 and 28 as evidenced by the
medians. For statement 29, the mean value is 2.55 indicating that the respondents
disagreed with the statement. The release of the credit ratings to the public was not
thought to lead Islamic banks to disclose less information in the annual reports.
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The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test show that there is a significant difference in
statements 25 and 27 (p <10%).
Table 9.16: Views about Statement 25
Group
	Islamic banks	 Central banks	 Others
Strongly Disagree	 0%	 0%	 12%
Disagree	 15%	 18%	 24%
Neutral	 52%	 35%	 47%
Agree	 22%	 29%	 17%
Strongly Agree	 11%	 18%	 0%
Total	 100%	 100%	 100%
With regard to Statement 25, 33% of Islamic bankers and 47% of the supervisors of
Islamic banks either agreed or strongly agreed that: Information intermediaries are
sufficient in the case of Islamic banks to reduce informational asymmetries, while
only 17% of other groups expressed the same view. This implies that fewer members
of groups (which include the representatives of external rating agencies themselves,
the representatives of IFSB, AAOIFI and external auditors) were in agreement with
this statement.
As indicated in Table 9.17, 35% of the Islamic bankers and 21% of the supervisors of
Islamic banks were of the opinion to reject Statement 27, whereas 65% of other
respondents shared the same view. This means that the majority of the other
respondents did not strongly agree that the external credit ratings affect the ability of
Islamic banks to attract investment funds for the following year. This group includes
external credit rating agencies themselves.
Table 9.17: Views about Statement 27
_____________	 Group	 _________
	
Islamic banks
	 Central banks	 Others
Disagree	 14%	 0%	 12%
Neutral	 21%	 21%	 53%
Agree	 52%	 63%	 35%
Strongly Agree	 13%	 16%	 0%
Total	 100%	 100%	 100%
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9.2.2 The level of qualitative risk information adequacy in existing Islamic
banks' annual reports
This section aims to examine the level of qualitative risk information adequacy in
existing Islamic banks' annual reports. The questions asked in this part attempt to
find the answers to the following research question (Propositions 13):
. To what extent are existing public disclosures on qualitative risk information in
Islamic banks' annual reports adequate to provide sufficient transparency for
Islamic banks that can enhance market discipline?
Proposition 13: The existing disclosure about the qualitative information on risks and
risk management techniques in Islamic banks' annual reports in the countries
surveyed is not adequate to provide sufficient transparency that can enhance market
discipline.
The frequency results of responses in Table 9.18 show that majority of the
respondents perceived that the risk information disclosures were inadequate in the
existing annual reports of Islamic banks (particularly the qualitative information on
market risks, quantitative information on market risks, operational risk, risk
measurement, risk management strategies and other qualitative risk information),
where the percentages of either very inadequate, inadequate or neutral were greater
than 60%. This is supported by the Chi-square test where the responses are significant
at 1%.
Table 9.19 also shows that Islamic banks in the sample are considered to have
inadequate disclosure with particular regard to qualitative information because the
mean values are below 3, for example the disclosure of risk management strategies
and practices used by Islamic banks for each category of risk (mean value is 2.65).
For quantitative information, for example profitability, the mean value is higher
(4.00).
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Table 9.18: The Frequency Results of the Responses to the following Disclosure
Items
Disclosure Items	 VID/ID N	 AD/VAD Chi-	 n *
________ __________ square
Credit risks.	 45%	 6%	 39%	
0.000	 36
Qualitative information on 56%	 8%	 36%	 0.000	 - 36
market risk faced by Islamic
banks._________ _________ __________
Quantitative information on 55%	 6%	 39%	 0.000	 36
marketrisk.	 _________
Operational risk.	 58%	 3%	 39%	 __________ 36
Liquidity and funding risks. 	 39%	 3%	 58%	 0.000	
36
Capital adequacy position of 19%	 8%	 72%	 0.001	
36
Islamic banks.	 ________
Solvency of Islamic banks.	 28%	 11%	 61%	 0.008	
36
Profitability of Islamic banks. 	 5%	 6%	 89%	 0.000	
36
Risk	 measurement	 and 61%	 8%	 31%	
0.000	 36
evaluation for each category of
risk.________ ________
Risk management strategies 66%	 6% - 28%	 0.000	
36
and practices used by Islamic
banks for each category of risk. ________
Significant accounting policies. 8%	 8%	 84%	 0.000	
36
Corporate	 governance 47%	 8%	 45%	 0.000	
36
information._________
Other	 qualitative	 risk 53%	 19%	 28%	 0.001	
36
information on Islamic banks. 	 _________
* Response rate = 0/70
Notes: Scale: 1 = Very Inadequate (VID), 2 = Inadequate (ID), 3 = Neutral (N), 4 = Adequate (AD),
5 Very Adequate (VAD); n = number of responses
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Table 9.19: Mean and Median Values of Items Disclosed in the Islamic Banks'
Annual Reports
Items	 Mean values
1. Disclosure of credit risks faced by Islamic banks. 	 3.11
(3.50)
2. Disclosure of qualitative information on market risk faced by Islamic
banks.	 (2.00)
3. Disclosure of quantitative information on market risk faced by Islamic
banks.	 (2.00)
4. Disclosure of operational risk faced by Islamic banks.
(2.00)
5. Disclosure of liquidity and funding risks faced by Islamic banks. 	 3.25
(4.00)
6. Disclosure of capital adequacy position of Islamic banks. 	 3.72
(4.00)
7. Disclosure of solvency of Islamic banks. 	 3.47
(4.00)
8. Disclosure of profitability of Islamic banks. 	 4.00
(4.00)
10. Disclosure of risk measurement and evaluation for each category of
risk.	 (2.00)
11. Disclosure of risk management strategies and practices used by Islamic
banks for each category of risk. 	 (2.00)
12. Disclosure of significant accounting policies. 	 3.94
(4.00)
13. Disclosure of corporate governance information. 	 3.08
(4.00)
14. Disclosure of other qualitative risk information	 2.83
5)
Note: The figures in brackets represent the medians for each item
The results from Mann-Whitney U test as indicated in Table 9.20 show that there is a
significance difference with regard to items 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 12 (p< 10%).
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Table 9.20: Mann-Whitney U Test for Perceptions by Central Banks and Others
(external auditors, external rating agencies, AAOIFI and IFSB) of Items
Disclosed in the Islamic Banks' Annual Reports
Items	 I p values
1. Disclosure of credit risks faced by Islamic banks. 	 0.071
2. Disclosure of qualitative information on market risk faced by Islamic 	 p>lO%
banks.	
N/S
3. Disclosure of quantitative information on market risk faced by Islamic 	 p>lO%
banks.	
N/S
4. Disclosure of operational risk faced by Islamic banks. 	 0.076
5. Disclosure of liquidity and funding risks faced by Islamic banks. 	 0.057
6. Disclosure of capital adequacy position of Islamic banks. 	 0.003
7. Disclosure of solvency of Islamic banks. 	 0.0 13
8. Disclosure of profitability of Islamic banks. 	 0.052
9. Disclosure of risk measurement and evaluation for each category of 	 0.042
risk.
10. Disclosure of risk management strategies and practices used by Islamic 	 p>lO%
banks for each category of risk.	
N/S
11. Disclosure of significant accounting policies. 	 p>lO%
N/S
12. Disclosure of corporate governance information. 	 0.015
13. Disclosure of other qualitative risk information on Islamic banks. 	 0.066
Note: N/S indicates that the ditierences of the responses between the two orgamsation groups
are not significant at 10% using the Mann-Whitney U test
Based on the interview with one of the supervisors of Islamic banks, he said: "There
is still little information being reported on risks and risk management of Islamic
ban/cs", which again supports the findings above.
Additional questions were asked in Statements 5, 30 and 31, asking the respondents to
give their perceptions about the adequacy of risk reporting in Islamic banks' annual
reports and the signalling hypothesis.
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statements:
5. All the inherent risks in Islamic banks (credit, rate of return, price, foreign exchange, liquidity and
operational risks) have been disclosed in the annual reports.
30. If the performance of the Islamic bank is good, the bank tends to disclose more information to the
market on its risks and risk management techniques.
31. The benefits to Islamic banks from signalling more risk information outweigh the costs incurred.
Table 9.21: The Frequency Results of the Responses to Statements 5, 30 and 31
	
Statement # SD	 D	 N	 A	 SA	 Chi-square
5	 3%	 22%	 30%	 28%	 17%	 0.004
30	 2%	 12%	 26%	 37%	 23%	 0.000
31	 2%	 3%	 48%	 35%	 12%	 0.000
Note: Scale: 1 = Strongly Disagree (SD), 2 Disagree (D), 3 = Neutral (N), 4 = Agree (A),
5 = Strongly Agree (SA)
Table 9.21 indicates that a minority of the survey respondents agreed (45%) that all
inherent risks in Islamic banks have been disclosed in their annual reports (statement
5). However, 60% did agree with statement 30, which is consistent with the
signalling hypothesis, and 47% either agreed or strongly agreed with Statement 31,
while 5% disagreed and 48% were neutral. The findings are statistically different at
1% level using the Chi-square test of significance.
Table 9.22: Descriptive Statistics for Statements 5, 30 and 31
Statement # Mean	 Median	 Mode SD	 Minimum Maximum Skewness K-W n *
5	 3.34	 3.00	 3	 1.094	 1	 5	 -0.052	 N/S	 65 I
30	 3.68	 4.00	 4	 1.017	 1	 5	 -0.408	 0.014	 65 I
31	 3.54	 3.0	 3	 O.?,\2	 '1	 5	 -0.037	 0.093	 65
* Response rate = 59%
Notes: N/S indicates that the differences of the responses between the organisation groups are not
significant at 10% using the Kruskal-Wallis test; n = number of responses
The above findings were supported by the analysis in Table 9.22 which shows that the
respondents were not really agreed with all the statements. This is evidenced by the
mean values between 3.34 and 3.68, the median is 3.00 for statements 5 and 31 and
4.00 for statement 30, and the mode is 3 for all statements (except statement 30 where
the mode is 4), and the low negative coefficient of skewness for all statements. The
highest mean (3.68) goes to statement 30, which indicates that the majority (60%) of
the respondents agreed that if the performance of the Islamic bank is good, the bank
tends to disclose more information to the public on its risks and risk management
techniques as explained by Table 9.21.
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The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test as shown in Table 9.22 indicates that there is
only a significant difference in the opinion of the survey respondents with regard to
Statements 30 and 31.
Table 9.23: Views about Statement 30
Group_________
	
Islamic banks	 Central banks	 Others
Strongly Disagree	 3%	 0%	 0%
Disagree	 14%	 11%	 12%
Neutral	 28%	 11%	 41%
Agree	 41%	 26%	 41%
Strongly Agree	 14%	 52%	 6%
Total	 100%	 100%	 100%
While 55% of Islamic bankers and 47% of other groups rather strongly agree or agree
about Statement 30, 78% of the supervisors of Islamic banks strongly agree or agree
with this statement. This is shown in Table 9.23.
Table 9.24: Views about Statement 31
____________ Group
	
Islamic banks	 Central banks	 Others
Strongly Disagree	 3%	 0%	 0%
Disagree	 7%	 0%	 0%
Neutral	 52%	 37%	 53%
Agree	 28%	 37%	 47%
Strongly Agree	 10%	 26%	 0%
With regard to Statement 31: The benefits to Islamic banks for signalling more risk
information outweigh the costs incurred, Islamic bankers and other groups are rather
neutral (52% and 53% respectively) compared to the supervisors of Islamic banks
(63% strongly agree/agree). This implies that the supervisors of Islamic banks are
more convinced than the others that the benefits from signalling information for
Islamic banks outweigh the costs incurred.
9.2.3 Other information
The question was also asked to the Islamic bankers whether they provide voluntary
disclosure in the annual reports and the findings as shown in Figure 9.4 indicate that
46% of the Islamic banks surveyed provide voluntary disclosure in the annual reports
and 54% do not provide such information.
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Figure 9.4: Views on Voluntary Disclosures in Islamic banks'
annual reports
According to the Islamic bankers, the voluntary disclosure information that some of
the Islamic banks provide include:
1. Investments, Murabaha receivables, Ijarah assets, investments in managed
Mudaraba, account payables, profit allocations in unrestricted/restricted
investment, share capital, liquidity risk analysis/maturity breakdown of assets and
liabilities, risk analysis (profit margin, credit, concentration), concentration of
assets and liabilities, equity, restricted investment accounts.
2. Financial analysis.
3. Shari'a Board Report.
Looking at the question on segment and risk reporting in Islamic banks, it is perceived
by the respondents (representatives of AAOIFI, IFSB, credit rating agencies and
external auditors) not to be satisfactory (the percentage of answering "Yes" is 47%
and 35% for segment and risk reporting respectively). The number of responses is 16.
Figure 9.5 show these results.
The reasons as given by the survey respondents for not having satisfactory reports
include:
1. Though Islamic banks in Malaysia did segregate their receivables portfolio by
product and maturity, there is inadequate disclosure of risks for each of these
categories that can be easily comprehended by laymen.
2. Current reporting may to a certain extent report/disclose the type of risk, for
example, funding via Profit Sharing Investment Accounts (PSIA), but in general
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does not emphasise the risk management techniques employed by the bank to
address the credit, market and other risks.
3. Not all banks disclose the amount of non-performing financing under credit risk
and market risk.
Figure 9.5 Views on Segment and Risk Reporting in
Islamic Banks' Annual Reports
Segment	 Risk
Reporting	 Reporting
Type of Reporting
4. Related disclosure is also poor with regard to unquoted investments.
5. There is no standardisation in terms of items to be reported and accounting rules
and practices.
6. Regulation and supervision of Islamic banks also weakly standardised.
7. An insider view seems the only way to assess the true level of risk carried by an
Islamic bank.
8. Islamic banks do not have buyers of last resort and can be stuck to the goods
purchased on behalf of customers, who do not pay for the good itself.
Consequently, Islamic banks can have inventories, which are resold at heavy
discounts for liquidity purposes. All these matters have to be disclosed, otherwise,
the transparency does not exist in Islamic banks.
Supervisors of Islamic banks, Islamic bank shareholders, external credit rating
agencies and Islamic banks counterparties are perceived to be the most important
users in using the information published in existing Islamic banks' annual reports
(mean values of 4.59, 4.55 and 4.45 respectively). This is supported by the median
values of 5.00 for these users. As discussed earlier in Table 9.5, Islamic bank
shareholders were not perceived by Islamic bankers to have the most influence to
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monitor the behaviour of the Islamic banks, even though they are perceived by
Islamic bankers, to be one of the most important users in using the information
published in existing Islamic banks' annual reports. Table 9.25 summarises the mean
values and the median for each user. The least important users are saving
accountholders and unrestricted investment accountholders as perceived by the
Islamic bankers. The findings show that in terms of the mean scores, unrestricted
investment account holders are considered to use less the information published in
Islamic banks' annual reports as compared to restricted investment account holders.
Since unrestricted investment accountholders' funds are typically commingled with
the bank's own funds, in principle they have a greater need for information on the
bank's performance, while restricted investment accountholders are interested in the
performance of their funds. However, by looking at the median values, both have the
same median (4.00). This implies that the small difference in the means is not
significant and both parties are considered to have similar needs for this information.
The Kruskal-Wallis test as shown in Table 9.25 shows that there is only significant
difference with regard to Islamic banks' shareholders and other investors when
compared across countries.
Table 9.25: Important Users in using the Information Published in Islamic
Banks' Annual Reports
Users	 Mean values	 Median	 K-W	 n
1. Depositors-current accounts	 3.69	 4.00	 TN)S	 29
2. Depositors-saving accounts
	
3.55	 4.00	 N/S	 29
3. Investment account holders- 	 3.62	 4.00	 N/S	 29
unrestricted______________ ______________ ____________ _______
4. Investment account holders-
	 3.66	 4.00	 N/S	 29
restricted________________ ________________
5. Islamic banks shareholders	 4.55	 5.00	 0.022	 29
6. Islamic banks counterparties 	 4.45	 5.00	 N/S	 29
7. External credit rating agencies	 4.55	 5.00	 N/S	 29
8. Other investors	 4.07	 4.00	 0.03 0	 28
9. Islamic banks supervisors	 4.59	 5.00	 N/S	 29
* Response rate = 52% with the exception of item 8 where the response rate = 50%
Notes: N/S indicates that the differences are not significant at 10% using Kruskal-WaIlis test;
n = number of responses
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Table 9.26: Views about Islamic Bank Shareholders
Country
	
________________________________ Malaysia 	 Bahrain	 Others
Neutral	 0%	 17%	 11%
Important	 0%	 66%	 16%
Very Important	 100%	 17%	 74%
As shown in Table 9.26, Islamic bankers in Malaysia and other countries perceived
that Islamic bank shareholders are very important users in using the information
published in Islamic banks' aimual reports compared to Islamic bankers in Bahrain.
Table 9.27: Views about Other Investors
________ Countly ________
	
_______________________________ Malaysia	 Bahrain	 Others
Very Unimportant	 0%	 0%	 6%
Unimportant	 0%	 17%	 0%
Neutral	 0%	 33%	 11%
Important	 25%	 50%	 39%
Very Important	 75%	 0%	 44%
Total	 100%	 100%	 100%
With regard to other investors 69, Table 9.27 shows that 100% and 83% of Islamic
bankers from Malaysia and other countries respectively perceived that other investors
are important users; only 50% of Islamic bankers in Bahrain shared the same view.
This implies that there is a significant difference between Islamic bankers in Malaysia
and other countries with Islamic bankers in Bahrain for these two user groups.
Section A (Question 1) in Version 3 asked the respondents (external auditors, external
rating agencies, the representatives from IFSB and AAOIFI) the importance of the
given items to assess the transparency in Islamic banks. In general, the respondents
perceived the type of risks, liquidity and compliance with Shari 'a requirements as the
most important items to assess the transparency in Islamic banks. This is supported by
the highest mean values and the median of 5.00 for all the three items. Table 9.28
presents the descriptive statistics of these items. The Chi-square of the responses for
all these items is also significant at 1% level of significance.
69 Other investors include foreign investors.
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The same items were asked to the supervisors of Islamic banks as discussed in
Chapter 8 (Table 8.11 and 8.12) in order to provide answers to Proposition 6:
Like supervisors of conventional banks, supervisors of Islamic banks require
additional risk information over that which is required by current financial
reporting standards in order to monitor the risk profile and management of the
banks.
Table 9.28: Descriptive Statistics of Items to assess the Transparency in Islamic
Banks
Item	 Mean Median	 SD	 Skewness Chi-square
I. Type of risks (n = 16)	 4.59	 5.00	 0.618	 -1.275	 0.000
2. Severity of risks(n= 16) 	 4.18	 4.00	 0.883	 -0.998	 0.000
3. Risk management (n 16) 	 4.29	 4.00	 0.588	 -0.109	 0.000
4.Breakdown - operating segments (n = 16)	 3.76	 4.00	 0.83 1	 -0.243	 0.000
5. Breakdown - geographical segments 	 3.59	 4.00	 0.795	 0.097	 0.000
(n = 16)	 _____ ________ ______ _________ __________
6. Capital adequacy ratio and banks' own 	 4.35	 4.00	 0.493	 0.677	 0.000
ratio(n 16)	 ______ ________ ______ _________ __________
7. Liquidity (n = 16)	 4.65	 5.00	 0.493	 -0.677	 0.000
8. Maturity matching (n = 16)	 4.35	 4.00	 0.606	 -0.310	 0.000
9. Profitability(n= 16)	 4.18	 4.00	 0.636	 -0.143	 0.000
10. Asset quality (n = 16)
	
4.35	 4.00	 0.702	 -0.634	 0.000
11. Compliance with relevant accounting	 4.29	 4.00	 0.772	 -0.592	 0.000
standards(n = 16)	 ______ _________ _______ __________ ___________
12. Compliance with Shari'a requirements	 4.41	 5.00	 0.870	 -1.629	 0.000
(n = 16)	 ______ _________ _______ _________ ___________
13. Shari'a's view - permissibility of taking 4.29	 4.00	 0.849	 -1.344	 0.000
oncertain risks (n = 16)
	 ______ _________ _______ __________ ____________
F 14. Shari 'a's view - risk mitigation	 4.35	 4.00	 0.702	 -0.634	 0.000
techniques_(n_=_16)	 ______ _________ _______ _________ ___________
Note: Response rate = 57%
The main reason for asking the same questions to different groups of respondents is to
evaluate whether the respondents differ in their opinions or not. The Mann-Whitney
test shows that there is a significant difference in the responses of these two groups
(the supervisors of Islamic banks and other respondents) with respect to severity of
risks, risk management, capital adequacy ratio and bank's ratio and asset quality as
presented in Table 9.29.
This implies that some of this information, in particular asset quality and risk
management, are perceived by the supervisors of Islamic banks as the most important
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to monitor the risk profile of Islamic banks but to other groups, they are not so
important to assess the transparency of Islamic banks.
Table 9.29: Mann-Whitney U Test for Perceptions by Central Banks and Others
(external auditors, external rating agencies, AAOIFI and IFSB) of the following
Risk Information
I_Item	 p values
1.Typeofrisks	 O.I65NS
2. Severity of risks	 0.084
3. Risk management	 0.003
4.Breakdown - operating segments 	 0.118 NS
5. Breakdown - geographical segments	 0.495 NS
6. Capital adequacy ratio and banks' own ratio	 0.017
7. Liquidity	 0.650 NS
8. Maturity matching	 0.185 NS
9. Profitability	 0.3 24 NS
10. Asset quality	 0.016
11. Compliance with relevant accounting standards 0.2 15 NS
12. Compliance with Shari'a requirements	 0.15 1 NS
13. Shari'a's view—permissibility of taking on	 0.945 NS
certainrisks	 _____________________
14. Shari'a's view—risk mitigation techniques	 0.528 NS
Note: N/S indicates that the differences of the responses between the two organisation groups
are not significant at 10% using the Mann-Whitney U test.
9.3 Concluding Remarks
From the analysis above, the findings of the research can be summarised as follows:
Market discipline could facilitate banking supervision in Islamic banks, emphasises
though the need for official supervision in Islamic banks. This provides support to
Proposition 8.
Furthermore, the analysis also supports Propositions 9 and 10. Transparency with
regard to risk reporting is perceived to be more important in Islamic banks than in
conventional banks because of profit sharing investment account holders. In the
countries in which Islamic banks are surveyed, it is perceived that effective disclosure
is important to inform the market participants about the condition of the bank.
With regard to Proposition 11: Base! II could apply to Islamic banks but with
modifications, majority of the respondents perceived that Base! II could be applied to
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Islamic banks but with some adaptations and the IFSB could play an important role in
this context. Therefore, Proposition 11 is supported.
Islamic banks' external credit rating agencies are perceived to help the public to
assess the banks' financial conditions. This again provides support to Proposition
12.
Evidence indicates that Proposition 13 is supported: The level of qualitative risk
information is not adequate in the existing Islamic banks' annual reports to enhance
market discipline. This is based on the perceptions of the respondents on the given
disclosure items, which gives the low mean and median for the qualitative risk
information. In addition, the voluntary disclosures are very minimal and there is still a
need for improved disclosures for risk reporting and segment reporting. The Exposure
Drafts on Risk Management and Capital Adequacy issued by IFSB in March 2005
could be seen as a good initiative for this. Furthermore, as mentioned by one of the
supervisors of Islamic banks in Malaysia, the central bank has issued a new guideline
for the disclosure in Islamic banks to improve the risk reporting, which has effective
date for the year 2004.
Having presented the findings of the research, what follows in Chapter 10 is a
discussion of these findings as well as the conclusions and implications of the current
study and also the areas in which future research appears to be desirable.
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Chapter 10
Conclusions, Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research
10.1 Introduction
This final chapter summarises the main results and conclusion of the thesis. Section
10.2 outlines the research objectives, research questions and methods used in the
study to answer the research questions. The main findings and results of the
propositions testing are reported in Section 10.3. Implications of the survey findings
are summarised in Section 10.4. Section 10.5 addresses the limitations of the study.
Finally, Section 10.6 concludes the thesis with suggestion for further research.
10.2 Summary of the Research Objectives, Research Questions and Methods
This research study deals with the perceptions of several groups of respondents on
transparency in Islamic banks with regard to risks and risk management techniques.
The research objectives, research questions and research methods of the study are
summarised below:-
10.2.1 The Research Objectives
The objectives of the study are as follows:-
. To ascertain the perceptions of Islamic bankers on nature of risks, risk
measurement and risk management approaches of Islamic banks in comparison to
those of conventional banks and with reference to the market environment in
which Islamic banks typically operate.
. To ascertain the information that the supervisors of Islamic banks require most to
monitor the risk profile of Islamic banks, but which is not required by financial
reporting standards (with reference to lAS 32, ED 7 and FAS 1), and also the most
important supervisory tool to monitor the risk profile of Islamic banks.
To examine the implications of transparency with particular reference to market
discipline for Islamic banks and disclosure of risk and risk management.
. To evaluate the adequacy of risk reporting in existing Islamic banks' annual
reports.
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To explore policy implications from the above for the Islamic banks' regulators
(central banks) and standard setters (IFSB and AAOIFI), with reference to Pillar 2
and Pillar 3 of Basel II.
10.2.2 The Research Questions
The thesis aims to answer the following research questions:-
RQ 1 How does the risk perception of Islamic bankers differ from conventional
bankers with respect to the market in which Islamic banks typically operate? Do
Islamic banks use the more technically advanced risk measurement techniques? Apart
from using similar risk mitigation approaches as in conventional banks, do Islamic
banks widely use Shari 'a compliant risk mitigation approaches? Also which risk
mitigation approaches used by conventional banks are not used by Islamic banks?
RQ2 How important for monitoring the risk profile and management of Islamic
banks is the additional risk information which is not required by current financial
reporting standards (with reference to lAS 32, ED 7 and FAS 1) but is provided to
bank supervisors? Which supervisory tool is perceived by bank supervisors to be the
most important to supervise the risk profile and risk management of Islamic banks?
RQ3 What is the perceived role of transparency in Islamic banks from a risk
reporting point of view, with particular reference to Basel II?
RQ4 To what extent are existing public disclosures on qualitative risk informatox
in Islamic banks' annual reports perceived by the supervisors of Islamic banks and
other interested parties (refer to footnotes 5 and 58) to be adequate to provide
sufficient transparency for Islamic banks that can enhance market discipline?
RQ5 What are the implications of the above for the implementation of Base! II, for
example for regulation of risk disclosures (Pillar 3) and for banking supervision
(Pillar 2)?
10.2.3 Research Methods
The study adopted the methodology of questionnaire survey (most of the questions are
close-ended to make the respondents answered them easily) to answer the five
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research questions. Table 10.1 summarises the methods used in this study to answer
each of the research questions.
The responses from several groups of respondents were analysed using descriptive
statistics and tested using non-parametric tests. Thirteen propositions were developed
and tested. The results revealed that ten propositions were supported, one proposition
was not fully supported and two propositions were not supported.
Table 10.1: Research Methods to answer the five Research Questions
Research Question	 Method	 Respondents
RQI	 Questionnaire	 survey, 56 Islamic bankers
interview, follow-up e mails 	 from 28 Islamic banks
RQ2	 Questionnaire	 survey, 26 supervisors of
interview, follow-up e mails
	
	 Islamic banks from 14
countries
RQ3	 Questionnaire	 survey, 56 Islamic bankers, 26
interview, follow-up e mails 	 supervisors of Islamic
banks, 20 external
auditors,	 4	 rating
agencies,	 2
representatives from
IFSB and 2
representatives from
AAOIFI
RQ4	 Questionnaire	 survey, 26 supervisors of
interview, follow-up e mails
	
	 Islamic banks, 20
external auditors, 4
rating agencies, 2
representatives from
	
IFSB	 and	 2
representatives from
_______________ ___________________ AAOIFI
RQ5 Infer from the empirical
findings for RQ1 to RQ 4 and
relate to the theoretical
framework and prior research
on Basel II and market
_________________________ discipline 	 _______________________
10.3 The Main Findings
The survey questionnaire received a high response rate (59%); therefore, the
conclusions below may be considered to be representative of informed opinion in the
countries surveyed (Malaysia, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Sudan, Kuwait, United
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Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, Iran, Bangladesh and Pakistan) -
refer to Table 8.1: Responses to the Survey.
The responses given by the respondents of this survey reflected their views on:
(a) the nature of each risk as currently experienced by Islamic banks;
(b) the risk measurement and management techniques as used in Islamic banks;
(c) the risk information that the supervisors of Islamic banks required to monitor
the risk profile of Islamic banks;
(d) the importance of transparency in Islamic banks; and
(e) the adequacy of risk reporting in the existing Islamic banks' aimual reports
Table 10.2 provides all the propositions used in this study together with the results.
10.3.1 Islamic bankers' opinions about the nature of risks, risk measurement
and risk management techniques in Islamic banks
Islamic banks, like their conventional counterparts, are financial intermediaries
offering services to current account holders and investment account holders on one
side and providing finance to companies, entrepreneurs and the public sector on the
other. Therefore, the findings show that they are exposed to many risks that are
similar to those of conventional banks. Islamic bankers perceived credit risk as the
most important risk in Islamic banks, which is sitniar tc ck kk c&
Risk Disclosure Survey, 2001; Trema Management Consulting, 2002). However, tie
form in which this risk arises is different as compared to conventional banks. For
example, the findings confirm that credit risk is the most important in Salam and
Istisna 'a contracts. This relates to the risk of a counterparty's failure to meet his or its
obligations in terms of making deferred payment and making or taking delivery of an
asset. A failure could relate to a delay or default in payment or in delivery of the
subject matter of Salam or Istisna 'a, entailing a potential loss of income and even
capital for Islamic banks. Due to the above reasons, Salam and Istisna 'a are perceived
to be riskier than Murabaha and Ijarah. It follows that these findings provide
support for proposition 1 - Salam and Istisna 'a are perceived as more risky than
Murabaha and Ijarah.
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Table 10.2: Propositions used in this study and the results
	
Propositions	 Description	 Results
	Proposition	 1	 Salam and Istisna 'a are perceived as more risky than Supported
Murabaha and Ijarah.
	Proposition	 2	 Profit sharing contracts (Musharaka and Mudaraba) are Supported except for
perceived as more risky than mark-up based contracts Salam
(Murabaha, Salam, Istisna 'a and Ijarah).
	Proposition 3
	
Differences in Shari'a interpretation may lead to Not supported
different perceptions of risk by Islamic bankers in
different countries in the study.
	
Proposition 4	 Not many Islamic banks use the more technically Supported
advanced risk measurement approaches.
	
Proposition 5	 Islamic banks use a number of risk mitigation methods Not supported
that are intended to be Shari'a compliant and are
different from methods used by conventional banks.
	
Proposition 6
	
Like supervisors of conventional banks, supervisors of Supported
Islamic banks require additional risk information over
that which is required by current financial reporting
standards in order to monitor the risk profile and
management of the banks.
	
Proposition 7
	
Supervisory bank rating systems (e.g. CAMELS or Supported
similar) are perceived to be the most important
assessment approaches to supervise Islamic banks as
compared to other approaches (e.g. statistically based).
	
Proposition 8
	
Market discipline could facilitate banking supervision in Supported
Islamic banks, similarly to conventional banks.
	
Proposition 9
	
Transparency with regard to risk reporting is perceived Supported
to be more important for unrestricted profit sharing
investment account holders in Islamic banks than for
depositors in conventional banks.
	
Proposition 10
	
In the countries in which Islamic banks are surveyed, it Supported
is perceived that effective disclosure helps market
participants to assess the investment account holders'
performance.
	
Proposition 11
	
Basel II is applicable to Islamic banks with Supported
modifications.
	
Proposition 12
	 External credit ratings of Islamic banks are perceived to Supported
help the public to assess the banks' financial condition.
	
Proposition 13
	
The existing disclosure about the qualitative information Supported
on risks and risk management techniques in Islamic
banks' annual reports in the countries surveyed is not
adequate to provide sufficient transparency that can
enhance market discipline.
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Furthermore, the findings show that the most risky contracts, i.e. those with the
highest mean scores, in Islamic banks are Mudaraba and Mushara/ca contracts, which
are supported by the results of the Chi-square test and Friedman test. Therefore, the
survey findings partially support proposition 2 - Profit sharing assets (Musharalca
and Mudaraba) are perceived as more risky than mark-up based assets (Murabaha,
Istisna 'a and Ijarah), in the exception of Salam. Investments made via Mudaraba and
Musharaka contracts may contribute substantially to Islamic banks' earnings, but they
expose them to significant rate of return risk (mean values = 4.25 and 4.42,
respectively; liquidity risk (mean values = 4.27 and 3.96, respectively); foreign
exchange risk (mean values = 4.38 and 4.29 respectively; and operational risk (mean
values = 4.14 and 4.37, respectively).
In addition, Islamic banking entails special risks that need to be recognised. They are
withdrawal risk (part of liquidity risk) and displaced commercial risk (a form of
market risk). The withdrawal risk arises because the Mudaraba contracts give
investment account holders withdrawal rights that are difficult to honour due to the
lack of cash-equivalents that are Shari 'a compliant. The findings show that all the
respondents agree that these risks are also faced by Islamic banks in the study
(negative coefficients of skewness, mean values are greater than 3 and the mode is 4
for the analysis). This is consistent with the Statement on the Purpose and Calculation
of the Capital Adequacy Ratio for Islamic Banks, which was issued by AAOIFI in
1999.
Even if there are differences in Shari 'a interpretations between Malaysia, Sudan and
the Gulf countries, the perceptions of the nature of risks among them by the Islamic
bankers were not significantly different. All the Islamic bankers in the study in
Malaysia, Bahrain and other countries perceived all the risks in a similar way. This
provides no support for proposition 3 - Differences in Shari 'a interpretation may
lead to different perceptions of risk by Islamic bankers in different countries in the
study.
The above findings confirm that different contracts have different implications for the
importance of each risk. Therefore, the findings suggest that each risk should be
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assessed separately for each financial instrument to facilitate appropriate risk
management. The findings show that Islamic banks are perceived to use less
technically advanced risk measurement techniques of which the most commonly used
are maturity matching, gap analysis and credit ratings. The more technically advanced
risk measurement techniques which include VaR, Simulation techniques, Estimates of
Worst Case and RAROC are perceived not to be used widely by Islamic banks in the
study. The main explanation is that Islamic banks are still new and do not have
sufficient resources and systems in place to employ more technical advanced
techniques. This finding supports proposition 4 - Not many Islamic banks use the
more technically advanced risk measurement approaches.
In addition, the results show that Islamic banks are not fully using the Shari 'a
compliant risk mitigation methods which are different from the ones used by
conventional banks. The reason is because these methods are still subject to several
objections by JIqh scholars, which according to them, (for example parallel Bai'
Salam) may lead to speculation (Usmani, 1996). Therefore, the finding provides no
support to proposition 5 - Islamic banks use a number of risk mitigation methods
that are intended to be Shari 'a compliant and are different from methods used by
conventional banks.
In principle, there is a variety of activities that Islamic banks can carry out in many
ways to provide financing. These ways need to be adapted to be consistent with the
principles on which Islamic banks conduct their business. TneieIoie, tnere is an
urgent need for identification, measurement, management and supervision of such
special risks. This should not be left to the initiative of Islamic banks only; the
supervisory authorities should also undertake a role in this respect by providing
guidelines to enhance transparency with regard to risk reporting in Islamic banks.
10.3.2 Supervisors of Islamic banks' opinions about the information required
most to monitor risk profile of Islamic banks
The findings confirm that supervisors of Islamic banks require additional information
compared to what is required by financial reporting standards in order to supervise
Islamic banks. This is consistent with the findings in conventional literature regarding
the informational advantage of bank supervisors (Berger and Davies, 1998 and I3erger
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et al., 2000). The results from the questionnaire survey show that type of risks, the
risk management, asset quality and compliance with Shari 'a requirements are the
most important risk information required by the supervisors of Islamic banks to
monitor the risk profile of Islamic banks.
Other information required by the supervisors of Islamic banks, which are not
required by current financial reporting standards (lAS and AAOIFI), include rating of
the bank by a rating agency and the implementation of good corporate governance.
This finding provides support to proposition 6 - Like supervisors of conventional
banks, supervisors of Islamic banks require additional risk information over that
which is required by current financial reporting standards in order to monitor the risk
profile and management of the banks (apart from the issue of frequency).
In view of the UK FSA's initiative on Risk Based Approach to Supervision of Banks
(1998), supervisors of Islamic banks tend to share the same view. The FSA's aim is to
ensure that the attention is focused, in the case of each bank, on those areas which can
put depositors' funds at risk, in which they adopt the RATE (for UK and EEA banks)
and SCALE (for non-EEA banks) frameworks (refer to Section 3.2.3 in Chapter 3).
Risk management and type of risks faced by the Islamic banks are perceived to be the
most important information to the supervisors of Islamic banks. Looking at the risks
exposed by Islamic banks as discussed earlier, the supervisors of Islamic banks play
even greater role to assess and evaluate these risks in their supervision.
Looking at Basel II, it is clear that the three Pillars in this accord complement each
other. The supervisory review process (Pillar 2), together with Pillar 3 (market
discipline), complements Pillar I (minimum capital requirements) in achieving a level
of capital commensurate with a bank's overall risk profile.
Pillar 2 suggests that the banks assess their capital adequacy relative to their overall
risk exposures, and that supervisory review and take appropriate actions in response to
those assessments. This is a key component in effective banking supervision.
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Central banks have used a variety of approaches to supervisory review of
conventional banks, including (BCBS, 2001):
• on-site examinations or inspections;
• requirements for policy statements on risk management issues;
• off-site review;
• discussions with bank management;
• commission and review of work done by external auditors (jrovided it is
adequately focused on the necessary capital issues); and
periodic reporting.
Having carried out the review, supervisors should take appropriate action if they are
not satisfied with the results of the bank's own risk assessment and capital allocation
process. Actions may include, but are not limited to:
. increased monitoring of the bank;
requiring improvements in the controls environment and risk management
process of the bank; and/or
. additional capital requirements above the basic minimum.
There is no exception for the supervisors of Islamic banks. They have the same
systems in place in their supervisions; in most cases they however require different
information from that supplied by conventional banks due to Shari 'a requirements.
In order for the supervisors of Islamic banks to perform their supervision effectively,
the findings suggest that they must have an adequate understanding on the wide array
of risks undertaken by Islamic banks and satisfy themselves that Islamic banks have in
place an adequate risk management and reporting process, which according to this
study, is still lacking. Furthermore, the supervisors of Islamic banks require timely
arid reliable information about the financial condition and risk profile of banks, and
they have the system in place to capture the required information to assist their
supervision.
Based on the findings in the study, the supervisors of Islamic banks perceive
supervisory bank rating systems (e.g. CAMELS or similar) to be the most important
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risk assessment approach to supervise Islamic banks. This risk assessment approach
could assist the Islamic bank supervisors in their supervision by providing early
warning signals about the bank's condition and performance. The survey finding
support proposition 7 - Supervisory bank rating systems (e.g. CAMELS or similar)
are perceived to be the most important assessment approaches to supervise Islamic
banks as compared to the statistically based approaches, except in Bahrain, where
they perceived CAMELS to be only important and not very important as they also
used other assessment approaches to supervise Islamic banks with regard to risks.
10.3.3 Transparency and market discipline in Islamic banks
The findings suggest that market discipline could not effectively reduce the need for
official supervision in Islamic banks but the use of market discipline is to supplement
the bank supervision and regulation. This finding provides support to proposition 8:
Market discipline could facilitate banking supervision in Islamic banks, similarly to
conventional banks.
In addition, the supervisors of Islamic banks are perceived to have a strong interest in
facilitating market discipline as 95% of the supervisors of Islamic banks in the study
strongly agree with statement 12: Bank supervisors have a strong interest in
facilitating effective market discipline in Islamic banks.
With regard to monitoring power, the findings show that the supervisors of Jsiarnic
banks are perceived to have the most influence in monitoring the behaviour of Islamic
banks, followed by credit rating agencies and Islamic banks' shareholders. This is
based on Islamic bankers' perceptions. This implies that due to the lack of
transparency and in the absence of market discipline, Islamic banks' shareholders play
a lesser role than the supervisors of Islamic banks in monitoring Islamic banks. This
relates to corporate governance issues. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development 70
 (OECD) defines corporate governance as a set of relationships
between a company's management, its board, shareholders, and other stakeholders.
Corporate governance also provides the structure for companies to set and attain their
objectives and monitor performance. Good corporate governance provides boards and
° See "OECD Principles of Corporate Governance" issued June 21, 1999.
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management with incentives to pursue objectives in the company shareholders'
interest and facilitates effective monitoring and efficient use of resources.
Disclosure may be considered to be the foundation of any system of corporate
governance (Cadbury, 1999). A system of corporate governance needs a good level of
disclosure and adequate information to eliminate (or at least reduce) information
asymmetries between all parties in order to balance the powers of the corporate
stakeholders, making corporate insiders accountable for their actions.
Transparency of risk reporting in Islamic banks is perceived to be more important
than in conventional banks due to the existence of profit sharing arrangements, and in
particular to unrestricted investment account holders. Effective disclosure may help
market participants to assess the bank's performance. Therefore, the findings provide
support to proposition 9 - Transparency with regard to risk reporting is perceived to
be more important in Islamic banks than in conventional banks because of profit
sharing investment account holders.
For Islamic banks, transparency is an important supervisory pillar and has
considerable relevance for enhancing their ethical responsibility and credibility,
thereby contributing to their greater acceptance, and elimination of any
misconceptions of their activities. However, the information made available to the
market must be of the right quality and volume, and it is important to avoid flooding
the market with information that would be hard to interpret or to use in understanding
the bank's actual risk profile.
This is also relevant to the findings of this study. The survey findings support
proposition 10 - In the countries with Islamic banks surveyed, it is perceived that
effective disclosure is important to inform the market participants about the condition
of the bank. As Islamic banks' shareholders play a lesser role in monitoring Islamic
banks, this relates to the current level of disclosure in Islamic banks, which is still not
sufficient for the Islamic banks' shareholders to use to monitor the Islamic banks.
The results of the questionnaire survey and interviews (also follow-up e mails)
indicated a perception that transparency is still lacking in Islamic banks.
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The BCBS has issued standards and principles in risk areas including credit, liquidity
operations, consolidation and capital adequacy. Many of these standards are equally
relevant and applicable to Islamic banks but with some modifications. The results
from the interviews indicated that there are problems in applying this Base! II to
Islamic banks in terms of human resources and costs to be invested in the system.
This problem is faced by conventional banks and is even worse for Islamic banks due
to their relatively small size. Another problem mentioned by Islamic bankers related
to the lack of rating agencies for Islamic banks and the fact there is no historical data
to implement the Accord.
This suggests that there should be modifications to Basel II to suit the Islamic banks'
transactions, which is also supported by the questionnaire findings. Therefore, the
findings provide support for proposition 11 - Basel II could apply to Islamic banks
but with modifications. The results from the questionnaire survey suggest that
majority of the respondents either agree or strongly agree (86%) that IFSB can
facilitate the adoption of Base! II in Islamic banks and there was no significant
difference in their perceptions of this. This implies that IFSB can play an important
role as shown in the findings to adapt Basel II to suit the nature of Islamic banks.
On the other hand, Islamic bank external ratings are perceived to help the public to
assess the banks' financial condition, even though there is still a need for the
supervisors of Islamic banks to perform their effective supervision on Islamic banks.
Hence, the findings support proposition 12 - External credit ratings of Islamic banks
are perceived to help the public to assess the banks' financial conditions.
The rating agencies serve as intermediaries in the disclosure process by collecting,
analysing, and distributing bank information and this could assist bank supervisors in
their supervision. Aside from public information, the agencies often receive bank
proprietary information in this process. Such information becomes embedded in
ratings, which, in turn, are key inputs to credit decisions by other market participants.
In this indirect way, some proprietary information becomes part of the process
through which market discipline is exerted. However, in the case of Islamic banks, the
main limitation is that not all Islamic banks are being rated by the rating agencies, as
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mentioned above, which also leading to the problem in implementing Basel II
proposals.
10.3.4 The level of adequacy of qualitative risk information in existing Islamic
banks' annual reports
The findings show that the level of risk reporting, particularly the qualitative
information in existing annual reports of Islamic banks, was not adequate to provide
sufficient transparency. As discovered in the above findings, corporate governance is
still weak in Islamic banks because the supervisors of Islamic banks were perceived to
have more power in monitoring than Islamic banks' shareholders. Thus, the disclosure
of firms' risk-management positions and strategies is crucial to improve corporate
transparency for market participants and to enhance corporate governance. It can be
concluded that the findings support proposition 13 - The existing disclosure about
the qualitative information on risks and risk management techniques in Islamic banks'
annual reports in the countries surveyed is not adequate to provide sufficient
transparency that can enhance market discipline.
Based on the findings in this study, it is important for the standard setters and the bank
regulators to work together to improve these disclosures. In Malaysia, for example,
there is a new set of guidelines issued by Bank Negara Malaysia known as GP8I
(effective in 2004). This is in addition to GP8 which was issued in 1996 for all
financial institutions in Malaysia. Every Islamic financial institution in Malaysia must
make disclosures in its annual reports based on these guidelines, which it is hoped,
will improve transparency in risk reporting.
It is hoped also that by having adequate disclosure in the annual reports, particularly
risks information, future banking crises could be avoided. This is because research has
shown that one of the causes of the Asian banking crises was the lack of transparency
in the annual reports. However, as mentioned earlier, not all information should be
made available to the public, because some of the information such as the nature and
the amount of investments of the restricted investment account holders should be
made available to restricted investment account holders.
203
Noraini Mohd. Ariffin	 Chapter 10: Conclusions, Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research
10.3.5 Other information
The results from the questionnaire survey revealed that only 46% of the Islamic banks
surveyed provide voluntary disclosure in the annual reports (i.e. 54% do not provide
such information). Segment and risk reporting, which can be part of voluntary
disclosure, were not satisfactory. This again relates to the issue of adequacy in the
existing Islamic banks' annual reports. Voluntary disclosure could provide more
information to the investment account holders. For example, based on the
respondents' answers for the open-ended question in the questionnaire, the voluntary
disclosures include Investments, Murabaha receivables, Ijarah assets, investments in
managed Mudaraba, accounts payable, profit allocations in unrestricted/restricted
investment, liquidity risk analysis/maturity breakdown of assets and liabilities, risk
analysis (profit margin, credit, concentration), concentration of assets and liabilities,
equity, restricted investment accounts and Shari 'a Board's Report.
The supervisors of Islamic banks, Islamic banks' shareholders, external credit rating
agencies and Islamic banks counterparties are perceived to be the most important
users in using the information published in existing Islamic banks' annual reports,
even it as suggested above Islamic banks' shareholders have less influence in
monitoring the behaviour of the Islamic banks as compared to the supervisors of
Islamic banks.
10.4 Implication of Findings
The findings of the present study have an implication for the issue of transparency
with particular reference to risk reporting in Islamic banks. Islamic banks in the study
perceived the importance of all the inherent risks in their operations, and yet the
existing risk reporting in the annual reports is still not adequate.
10.4.1 Policy Implications
The results have some policy implications for AAOIFI, IFSB and the supervisors of
Islamic banks (Central Banks). The AAOIFI, IFSB and Central Banks may find it
useful to assess the level of adequacy of risk reporting in Islamic banks and come up
with the new guidelines for risk reporting. The findings provide evidence for IFSB
and Central Banks to pursue policies that promote transparency with regard to risks
and risk management. The researcher believes that the general findings in this study if
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confirmed by other studies have important implications for setting of risk reporting
standards for Islamic banks.
Efforts are needed at the level of AAOIFJ or JFSB to develop more detailed disclosure
requirements to enhance transparency of risks. The publication of the two exposure
drafts on Risk Management and Capital Adequacy in March 2005 by IFSB could
provide guidelines to Islamic banks.
Central banks and also IFSB would play a greater role in this case to increase risk
disclosure as the growing recognition that the corporate governance of banks has an
important role to play in assisting bank supervisors to perform their tasks, allowing
supervisors to have a working relationship with bank management, rather than an
adversarial one (BCBS, 199971). This will improve a bank's overall management
through a clearer understanding of total risks, risk measurement and management
practices.
The findings also show that Islamic banks are still far behind the current best practice
in terms of risk disclosure (risks and risk management methods) as practised by
leading conventional banks (for example, UBS) in their annual reports. This has
implications, particularly for investment account holders, because as mentioned
earlier, due to the profit sharing arrangements, they require adequate risk information
to monitor their investment. In particular, t\is ena\\es  tiem to aase t\xe po.en\a\
risks and rewards of their investments and to protect their own assets. Islamic bankers
could also find this findings useful n order to improve their cuact ccsk
tecimiques since all the inherent risks are perceived to be very important in this study.
The issuance of ED 7 by IASB could be seen as a good initiative towards the
improvements of risk disclosures in conventional banks. Since Islamic banks have
different characteristics compared to conventional banks, this ED 7 could be subjected
to several modifications before it can be applicable to Islamic banks. For example,
Islamic banks are not exposed to interest rate risk, but will be exposed to other type of
risks, namely rate of return risk. However, the ED 7 could become a very important
BCBS (1999), 'Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Institutions, September 1999.
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guideline to be used in order to improve the risk disclosures in Islamic banks, which
based on the findings in this study, are still inadequate. There are several important
risk disclosure items, in particular the qualitative and quantitative risk information
suggested in ED 7, which could also be tailored to suit the nature of Islamic banks'
operations. The findings in this study confirm that Islamic banks use widely similar
risk measurement and management techniques to those used by conventional banks,
so the disclosure of this information as in ED 7 could make the activities of Islamic
banks more transparent to the users, in particular the investment account holders.
However, many entities would wish to provide the disclosures in paragraphs 32 - 45
of ED 7 (refer to Section 3.2.7) in one place, perhaps as a coherent and complete
statement of risk. While it will be possible to audit all the required disclosures if they
are included in the financial statements, the audit of some of the more narrative and
forward looking disclosures 72 may result in considerable additional expense for
entities, not to mention regulatory constraints on auditing forward looking
information. For example, enormous quantitative data based on information provided
internally to key management could be replaced with a general principle that
management must disclose sufficient information to enable readers to understand the
nature and extent of risks arising from financial instruments. Furthermore, data
provided to management are generally proprietary (such as the policies and processes
for managing risk and capital targets set by the management) and include strategic
business information. Disclosing this information might put entities with a strong risk
management function at a competitive disadvantage to those with a less robust
function and to those that are not required or not permitted to provide such disclosures
such as US GAAP 73 reporting entities.
10.4.2 Theoretical Implications
The thesis has shown the relationship between the transparency of risk reporting and
the effectiveness of market discipline, which is perceived to apply to Islamic banks, as
discussed in the conventional banking literature. This study has filled a gap in the
literature by looking specifically into the case of Islamic banks and this is the first
72 Information provided to key management is generally forward looking. Assumptions and scenarios are generally used to
quantif' certain risks for management, and much of that information is based on future forecasts.
US SEC prohibits the inclusion of forward looking statements in the audited financial statements (Section 27A of the Securities
Act of 1933 and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
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empirical study in the academic literature in the area of risk reporting in Islamic
banks. Previous findings in the conventional literature have shown the link between
lack of transparency in risk reporting and the implications for corporate governance
issues. The findings in this study have confirmed that there is still lack of risk
transparency in Islamic banks' annual reports, which is an obstacle to good corporate
governance. This aspect, namely the alignment of management interests, which often
pursue growth policies through acquisitions, with shareholders' objectives, which
mainly focus on investment returns, once again calls for the active involvement of
supervisory authorities.
Research by bank regulators, particularly BCBS, provides an implication for Islamic
banks. In particular, Basel II, which is issued by BCBS, required some modifications
to suit the nature of Islamic banks' operations. This is not something new. Studies
have confirmed that even in conventional banks, (Sironi, 2003), this Basel II appears
problematic to apply, particularly for smaller banks. Most of Islamic banks are small
in size and there is little historical data and lack of ratings.
Furthermore, due to Shari 'a requirements, Islamic banks are lacking in risk
management techniques to manage their risks. Even, current Shari 'a compliant risk
management techniques are still not widely used due to several objections from fiqh
scholars.
In addition, this study has confirmed that signalling theory (Watts and Zimmerman,
1986, Morris, 1987) originating from developed countries is less applicable in Islamic
banks, of which most are located in developing countries. The reasons suggested by
the study include inadequate transparency about risk conditions in Islamic banks, low
market discipline and poor corporate governance. Effective market discipline depends
on market participants having information about the risks and financial conditions of
banking organisation (Crockett, 2001). This shows that there is a weak information
environment in developing countries where most of the Islamic banks are located.
Even segment reporting is still lacking in Islamic banks.
207
Noraini Mohd. AriffTin
	 Chapter 10: Conclusions, Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research
The results confirm the general criticism made of annual reports for their inadequate
disclosure of risks from the perceptions of the supervisors of Islamic banks, rating
agencies, external auditors, representatives from IFSB and AAOIFI.
10.5 Limitations
There is no perfect study and the current one is no exception. Therefore, this section
will discuss some limitations in the present study, which include:
10.5.1 Social Desirability Bias
This is defined as 'The tendency for respondents to give answer to survey questions
that are consistent with what society believes is right, proper, correct, or acceptable,
creating bias in the results whenever the true answers are suppressed to meet social
norms', (Alreck and Seattle, 1995, p455). For the present study there is possibility of
social desirability bias, since the supervision of Islamic banks are done by the central
banks, and this may introduce a bias into opinions expressed by respondents to the
research questions. Social desirability bias may be reduced but not completely
removed. To minimise the social desirability bias in the present study, the researcher
has made a clear statement within the covering letter of the questionnaire, to the
respondents ensuring them of confidentiality and anonymity. In addition to that, the
sample of the survey was not concentrated on one geographical area, but covered
different geographical areas such as Malaysia, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Sudan,
Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, Iran, Bangladesh and
Pakistan.
10.5.2 Statistical Limitations due to Limited Number of Respondents
The research study focused on the small sample of Islamic bankers and supervisors of
Islamic banks, who have been involved in the risk reporting of Islamic banks,
therefore a higher significance level is used in this study to test the significance of the
data (Stevens, 1996). The possibility of a non-significant result may be due to
insufficient power (small sample size).
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10.6 Further Research Directions
The conclusions drawn from the research study and limitations thereon suggest
opportunities for future research. The following are suggested ideas for further
research:
(I) The current study focused on the risk reporting of Islamic banks, using a
questionnaire survey to obtain the respondents' perceptions on several issues in risk
reporting. More research will be needed from various perspectives in order to form a
whole picture of the interests of the related parties and to determine which party
should take the initiative in order to develop the risk disclosures standards. The study
on how ED 7 and the revised lAS 32 could be adapted by Islamic banks could also
relevant to undertake in the future. Should the Islamic banks take the lead or should
the standard setters offer general guidelines, or should Islamic banks and the standard
setters have a cooperative effort in this?
(2) It is possible to extend the research in investigating in details the disclosure of
each risk and how it is being measured and mitigated. Additional interviews on the
topic discussed, which include a large number of respondents (Islamic bankers and
other interested parties - Islamic bank shareholders and investment accountholders)
about the additional ways to improve the risk disclosures may be desirable and
worthwhile. How much quantitative and qualitative risk information should be
disclosed?
(3) It is also possible to obtain the regulators' point of view on the issues of
transparency and risk disclosures in Islamic banks in terms of their roles to improve
the current situation. An interview with the regulators of Islamic banks would give
additional insights on their roles to improve the transparency of risk condition in
Islamic banks.
Nevertheless, it is hoped that this study has added its useful contribution of the debate
for more transparency in banks, with respect to risk reporting, particularly to Islamic
banks. Transparency of risk reporting has been a pre-requisite to achieve effective
market discipline. Research in this area has made significant contribution to the
development of the policy for Islamic banks. The challenges, complexities and the
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dynamic nature of globalisation will continue to provide a fertile landscape for
research.
Furthermore, the exposure draft of a new IFRS, ED 7: Financial Instruments:
Disclosures issued by IASB to replace lAS 30 and partly the existing lAS 32 can be
seen as a good initiative to improve disclosures about financial instruments in
financial statements.
This initiative is hoped to improve financial reporting by helping users to understand
the significance of financial instruments in financial statements by giving information
about companies' capital and by revealing more clearly risks attached to holding
financial instruments, which has been suggested by this thesis. This ED 7 could be
also applicable to Islamic banks, but after some modifications to suit the specificaties
of Islamic banks.
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APPENDIX 1
Example of Best Disclosure Practice
1.	 UBS Group (Union Bank of Switzerland, Europe's largest bank)
Source: UBS Financial Report 2000
The UBS Group's consolidated financial statements have been prepared in accordance
with International Accounting Standards (lAS). UBS is a global integrated investment
services firm and a leading bank in Switzerland. It provides a broad range of financial
services such as advisory services, underwriting, financing, market making, asset
management, brokerage and retail banking on a global level. It was formed on 29 June
1998 when Swiss Bank Corporation and Union Bank of Switzerland merged. The
consolidated financial statements are sated in Swiss Francs (CHF), the currency of the
country in which UBS is incorporated.
As a global financial services firm, UBS's businesses are affected by the external
environment in the markets in which UBS operates. In particular, the results of UBS's
business in Switzerland, and notably the results of its credit-related activities would be
adversely affected by any deterioration in the state of the Swiss economy because of
the impact this would have on UBS's creditworthiness.
The risks disclosed by UBS can be summarised as follows:
Credit risk
Credit risk represents the loss, which UBS would suffer if a counterparty or issuer
failed to perform its contractual obligations in all forms. It is inherent in traditional
banking products - loans, commitments to lend, and contracts to support
counterparties' obligations to third parties such as letters of credits - and in foreign
exchange and derivatives contracts, such as swaps and options ("traded products").
Positions in tradeable assets such as bonds and equities, including both direct holdings
and synthetic positions through derivatives, also carry credit risk.
The risk is managed primarily based on reviews of the financial status of each specific
counterparty, which are rated on a 14 point rating scale, based on probability of
default. Credit risk is higher when counterparties are concentrated in a single industry
or geographical region.
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a. On-balance sheet assets
As of 31 December 2000, due from banks and loans to customers amounted to CHF
285 billion. 57.9% of the gross loans were with clients domiciled in Switzerland. The
breakdown by region and by type of issuer is found in UBS Financial Statement Notes
(Note 12 and 14 respectively).
b. Off-balance sheet financial instruments
Credit commitments and contingent liabilities
Of the CHF 81 billion in credit commitment and contingent liabilities as at 31
December 2000, 15% related to clients domiciled in Switzerland, 30% Europe
(excluding Switzerland) and 45% North America.
Derivatives
Credit risk represents the current replacement value of all outstanding derivative
contracts with an unrealised gain by taking into consideration legally enforceable
master netting agreements. Positive replacement values amounted to CHF 58 billion
as at 31 December 2000. Based on the location of the ultimate counterparty, 6% of
this credit risk amount related to Switzerland, 45% to Europe (excluding Switzerland)
and 32% to North America. 42% of the positive replacement values are with other
banks.
c. Credit risk mitigation techniques
Credit risk associated with derivative instruments is mitigated by the use of master
netting agreements. Master netting agreements eliminate risk to the extent that only
the net claim is due to be settled in the case of a default of the counterparty. The
impact of master netting agreements on derivative instruments as at 31 December
2000 is to mitigate credit risk on derivative instruments by approximately CHF 80
billion.
Market risks
Include interest rate risk and currency risk.
a.	 Interest rate risk
Interest rate risk is the potential impact of changes in market interest rates on the fair
values of assets and liabilities on the balance sheet and on the annual interest income
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and expense in the income statement. One commonly used method to present the
potential impact of market movements is to show the effect of a one basis point
(0.01%) change in interest rates on the fair value of assets and liabilities, analysed by
time bands within which the Group is committed. This type of presentation, described
as a sensitivity analysis.
b. Currency risk
The Group views itself as a Swiss entity, with the Swiss franc as its reporting
currency. Hedging transactions are used to manage risks in other currencies. The
Group shows the breakdown of assets and liabilities by currencies in its financial
statement notes for the year ended 31 December 2000 and 31 December 1999, which
include Swiss Franc, US Dollar, Euro and other currencies.
Liquidity Risk
This is explained by a statement showing the maturity analysis of assets and
liabilities, which can be broken down into on demand, subject to notice*, due within 3
months, due within 3 and 12 months, due within 1 and 5 years and due after 5 years.
Majority of the assets and liabilities are due within 3 months.
Segment Reporting
In addition to that, UBS presents segment reporting by business group in its financial
reports. UBS is organised into three Business Groups: UBS Switzerland, UBS
Warburg and UBS Asset Management, and the Corporate Center. Total operating
income and expenses, total assets and liabilities and operating profit before tax are
reported for each business segments.
The geographic analysis of total assets is based on customer domicile. Operating
income and capital investment is based on the location of the office in which the
transactions and assets are recorded. The geographical analysis of operating income,
total assets, and capital investment is provided in order to comply with International
Accounting Standards, and does not reflect the way the Group is managed. The
• Deposits without a fixed term, on which notice of withdrawal or termination has not been given. (Such funds may be withdrawn
by the depositor or repaid by the borrower subject to an agreed period of notice).
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analysis is done based on these geographical regions: Switzerland, Rest of Europe,
Americas, Asia/Pacific and Africa/Middle East.
2.	 Barclays PLC
Source: Barclays PLC Annual Report 2000
Barclays PLC is a public limited company registered in England and Wales. It is a
UK-based financial services group engaged primarily in banking, investment banking
and asset management. In terms of assets employed, Barclays is one of the largest
financial services groups in the UK. The company was originally named Barclay &
Co. Ltd. in 1896 and then changed to Barclays Bank Limited in 1917. On 1 January
1985, the company changed its name to Barclays PLC.
The annual report of Barclays PLC showed the bank disclosed the risk management
process in order to achieve superior shareholder value through high quality risk
management techniques and practices.
The aim of Barclays PLC is to achieve superior shareholder value through high
quality risk management techniques and processes. It manages a variety of risks in the
ordinary course of business.
A summary of the risks reported by Barclays is as follows:
Credit risk
Credit risk arises because the Bank's customers, cieti(s oc co\rnttpars may no 'be
willing or able to fulfil their contractual obligations. This type of risk may be divided
into a number of different categories which includes primary, trading and settlement
risks. The report showed the significant concentrations of credit risk by country and
by sector.
The Group uses a grading structure to show the probability of future default by
borrowers. This is used to estimate levels of aimualised credit losses from the overall
lending portfolio.
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a. Analysis of loans and advances to banks and customers
Geographical analyses of the banking business are based on the location of the office
from which the lending are made.
b. Provision for bad and doubtful debts
A specific charge is raised when the Bank considers that the credit-worthiness of a
borrower has undergone deterioration such that the recovery of the whole outstanding
advance is in serious doubt.
Market risk
The risk of loss arising from changes in the level or volatility of market prices, which
can occur in the interest rate, foreign exchange, equity and commodity markets. The
Group uses a daily 'value at risk' (DVAR) measure as the primary mechanism for
controlling market risk. DVAR is an estimate, with a confidence level of 98%, of the
potential loss which might arise if the current positions were to be held unchanged for
one business day. It uses the historical simulation method for calculating DVAR. As
DVAR does not provide a direct indication of the potential size of losses that could
arise in extreme conditions, Barclays Capital uses a number of complementary
techniques for controlling market risk. Weekly firm-wide stress tests, based on both
historical and hypothetical extreme movements of market prices are produced.
Derivatives
The use of derivatives and their sale to customers as risk management products is an
integral part of the Group's trading activities. They are used to manage the Group's
own exposure to fluctuations in interest and exchange rates as part of its asset and
liability management activities. They include swaps, forward rate agreements, futures,
options and combinations of these instruments and primarily affect the Group's net
interest income, dealing profits, commission received and other assets and liabilities.
Treasury asset and liability management
It involves management of liquidity, funding, interest risk and exchange rate risk
arising from non-trading positions through use of both on- and off-balance sheet
instruments. This includes control over asset maturities and the volume and quality of
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liquid assets and short term funds. In hedging, the Group employs interest rate swaps,
currency swaps and other derivatives that are designated as hedges.
Operational risk
Operational risk is inherent in all business activities. It is the potential of financial
loss, and business instability arising from failures in internal controls, operational
processes or the systems that support them.
It is recognised that such risks can never be entirely eliminated and that the cost of
controls in minimising these risks may outweigh the potential benefits.
Compliance risk
This risk arises from a failure or inability to comply with the laws, regulations or
codes applicable to the financial services industry. Non-compliance can lead to fines,
public reprimands, enforced suspension of operations or, in extreme cases, withdrawal
of authorisation to operate.
Legal risk
Legal risk is the risk that the business activities of the Group have unintended or
unexpected legal consequences. The Group manages this risk through effective use of
its internal and external legal advisers.
Tax risk
Tax risk is the risk of loss or increased charges associated with changes in, or errors in
the interpretation of taxation rates or law.
Segment Reporting
The analyses by geographical segment are generally based on the location of the
office recording the transaction. For this Group, the geographical regions are as
follows: UK, Foreign UK-based, Other European Union, United States and Rest of the
World. Total assets, net assets, interest receivable, fees and commission receivable,
dealing profits, other operating income and attributable profit (loss) are disclosed by
geographical segment.
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The analyses by class of business are done for net interest income, non-interest
income, total income, total assets, net assets and profit (loss) on ordinary activities
before tax for 7 types of business. They are Retail Financial Services, Barclaycard,
Corporate Banking, Barclays Capital, Barclays Global Investors, Businesses in
Transition and Other.
3.	 Deutsche Bank
Source: Deutsche Bank Annual Report 2000
Deutsche Bank is a leading European bank in Germany. It operates in the interests of
its quartet of stakeholders: shareholders, customers, staff and society. It was the only
major German bank stock that was able to avoid price losses. The consolidated
financial statements of Deutsche Bank are in accordance with the lAS in force on
balance date.
Deutsche Bank believes that the long-term viability and the continued success of a
global financial institution are critically dependent on a optimal enterprise-wide
management of risks inherent in all of its activities. Excellence in risk management is
centred on the ability to identify, measure, aggregate and manage risks, to attribute
capital and to price risks appropriately.
The risks reported by Deutsche Banks are as follows:
Credit risk
It reflects the potential that customers might not fulfil their contractual payment
obligations to the bank. The Bank discloses credit risk profile by division, by credit
rating category and by region. Credit risk represents the largest single risk and is
comprised of the following types:
Default risk: The failure of customers to meet contractual payment obligations.
Country risk: The inability of customers to fulfil their payment obligations owing to
government measures (for example transfer restrictions) or country-specific economic
factors (for example currency devaluation).
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Settlement risk: The risk that arises if financial obligations are not settled on time or at
all either for the bank or when the bank acts as an intermediary for its clients or other
third parties.
Deutsche Bank established a set of principles to define its appetite for default risk and
to measure and actively manage this risk.
Market risk
Market risk arises from the uncertainty about changes in market prices and rates
(interest rates, equity prices, exchange rates and commodity prices) and the
correlation between them and their levels of volatility. Deutsche Bank uses Value at
Risk (VaR) for group and trading units by risk category to derive a quantitative
measure specifically for market risk under normal conditions. The VaR estimates are
made at a 99% confidence level and for a one day time horizon. It applies a Monte
Carlo simulation process. Weekly stress tests on trading portfolios are also used to
simulate market movements.
Liquidity risk
Liquidity risk refers to the possibility that the bank's payment obligations are not met
fully and punctually when due. It also covers potential losses from being forced to
borrow at excessive interest rates or to invest surplus funds at rates below market. The
management of this risk is to ensure the protection of the bank's solvency and the
ability to support asset portfolios with funding of appropriate term and at a reasonable
cost. Deutsche Bank monitors net cash flows by currency and location as well as
globally.
Operational risk
Operational risk is the potential for incurring losses through unmanageable events,
business disruption, inadequately defined controls or control/system failure in relation
to staff, customer relationships, technology, assets, other third parties/regulators as
well as project and other risks.
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Segment reporting
The Group's reporting of segment information according to lAS relates in its primary
format to the results of the Group Divisions. The information published in the
reporting of segment information by Group Division corresponds to internal reporting
to the Group Board and goes further than the requirements according to lAS.
The analysis by Group/business is as follows: Retail and Private Banking, Corporates
and Real Estate, Global Corporates and Institutions, Asset Management, Global
Technology and Services, Corporate Center and Others. The segment revenue,
provision for losses on loans and advances, operational expenses, balance of other
income/expenses, assets, liabilities and profit before taxes are reported here.
For total assets, total credit extended, liabilities and revenue from ordinary activities,
the geographical analysis were disclosed based on Germany, Europe (excluding
Germany), Asia/Pacific/Africa, North America and South America.
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APPENDIX 2
The Complete Set of Financial Statements for Islamic Banks
Source. Financial Accounting Standard No. 1, 'General Presentation and Disclosure
in the Financial Statements of Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions' (FAS 1),
AA OIFI
Financial Statements	 Disclosure Required
1. A statement of financial position (balance Include the Islamic bank's assets, its
sheet) liabilities, equity of its unrestricted
investment account holders and their
equivalent, and its owners' equity.
2. An income statement Include revenues, expenses, gains and losses,
return (profit or loss) on unrestricted
investment accounts and their equivalent and
net income or net loss.
3. A statement of changes in owners' equity A statement of changes in owner's equity
or a statement of retained earnings	 includes net income, investments by and
distributions to owners.
A statement of retained earnings include net
income (net loss), dividends and transfers to
other owners' equity accounts.
4. A statement of cash flows Differentiate between cash flows from
operations, cash flows from investing
activities and cash flows from financing
activities, which include inflows and
outflows.
5. A statement of changes in restricted Include all the restricted investments,
investment and their equivalents deposits and withdrawals by holders of
restricted investment accounts and their
equivalents.
6. A statement of sources and uses of funds in Include sources and uses of funds in the
the Zakah (Islamic tax) and charity fund	 Zakah and charity.
7. A statement of sources and uses of funds in Include sources and uses of funds during a
the Qard fund	 period and the fund balance as of a given
date.
8. Notes to the financial statements
9. Any statements, reports and other which
assist in providing information required by
users of financial statements as specified in
the Statement of Objectives
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Sample
Islamic banks included in the survey are as follows:
Islamic banks	 Country
1. Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad	 Malaysia
2. Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad	 Malaysia
3. Al Baraka Islamic Bank	 Bahrain
4. ABC Islamic Bank	 Bahrain
5. Bahrain Islamic Bank	 Bahrain
6. Shamil Bank	 Bahrain
7. First Islamic Investment Bank	 Bahrain
8. Bank Muamalat Indonesia 	 Indonesia
9. Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt 	 Egypt
10. Jordan Islamic Bank	 Jordan
11. Islamic International Arab Bank	 Jordan
12. Al Meezan Investment Bank Limited 	 Pakistan
13. Al Baraka Islamic Bank	 Pakistan
13. Qatar International Islamic Bank 	 Qatar
14. Qatar Islamic Bank	 Qatar
15. Islamic Development Bank	 Saudi Arabia
16. Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corp 	 Saudi Arabia
17. Tadamon Islamic Bank	 Sudan
18. Sudanese Islamic Bank	 Sudan
19. Al Shamal Islamic Bank 	 Sudan
20. Animal Resources Bank	 Sudan
21. El Gharb Islamic Bank	 Sudan
22. Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank	 United Arab Emirates
23. Dubai Islamic Bank	 United Arab Emirates
24. Kuwait Finance House	 Kuwait
25. Al Barakah Turkish Finance House 	 Turkey
26. Faisal Islamic Bank of Kibris Ltd 	 Turkey
27. Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd 	 Bangladesh
28. Bank Saderat Iran	 Iran
Central banks included in the survey are as follows:-
1. Bank Negara Malaysia
2. Bahrain Monetary Agency
3. State Bank of Pakistan
4. Bank Indonesia
5. Bank of Sudan
6. Central Bank of Kuwait
7. Qatar Central Bank
8. Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency
Appendices
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9. Bank Markazi Jamhouri Islami Iran
10. Central Bank of Jordan
11. Central Bank of Bangladesh
12. Central Bank of Egypt
13. Central Bank of the UAE
14. Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
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APPENDIX 4
Cover letter and Questionnaires
Cover letter
Date as postmark
Dear Sir/Madam,
I am a postgraduate researcher at the School of Management, University of Surrey, United
Kingdom, currently undertaking a PhD research project on the topic: 'Enhancing the
Transparency of Islamic Banks: Risk Reporting Issues' under the supervision of
Professor Simon Archer and Professor Rifaat Ahmed Abdel Karim.
As part of the research, I have prepared the enclosed questionnaire. It seeks your opinions
about some of the issues associated with 'Enhancing Transparency' within the context of
Islamic Banks. The questionnaire has been designed so that you can complete it easily. In
most cases, you need to tick the appropriate box which describes your opinion. It takes about
30 minutes.
It would be highly appreciated if the questionnaire were completed and returned within one
week of the date of receipt using the self-addressed envelope provided. You can absolutely
sure that all information you provide is strictly confidential and is used for research
purposes only.
Thank you in advance for your help.
Sincerely yours,
Noraini Mohd Ariffmn
n.mohd.ariffinisurrev.ac.uk
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APPENDIX 4A: Version 1
SURVEY ON 'ENHANCING TRANSPARENCY - RISK REPORTING ISSUES' WITHIN THE
CONTEXT OF ISLAMIC BANKS
Section A: General information on risk disclosure in Islamic banks.
QI Risk identification
Below are the inherent risks in Islamic banks. Could you please identify the importance of the
following overall and instrument specific risks to your bank in the tables below (as currently
experienced by your bank). Please tick (I) the appropriate box.
SCALE
Very	 Unimportant	 Neutral	 Important	 Very	 Not Available
Unimportant	 Important
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 NM
Credit or default risk	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 NM
(the risk that counierparty will fail to meet its obligations timely and fully in
accordance with agreed terms)
I.	 Overall risk
2. Ivlurabaha
3. Salain
4. Istisna 'a
5. Ijarah
6. Mudaraba (asset side)	 -
7. Musharaka
8. Diminishing Musharaka
Rate of return risk (the risk arising from changes in the expected	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 NM
rate of return given)
1. Overall risk
2. Murabaha
3. Sa/am
4. Istisna 'a
5. ljarah
6. Mudaraba (asset side)
7. Musharaka
8. Diminishing Musharaka
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SCALE
Very	 Unimportant	 Neutral	 Important	 Very	 Not Available
Unimportant	 Important
1	 2	 3	 4	 - 5	 N/A
Price risk	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 NM
(the risk arising from the changes in market prices)
1. Overall risk
2. Murabaha
3. Salarn
4. Istisna 'a
5. Ijarah
6. Mudaraba (asset side)
7. Musharaka
8. Diminishing Musharaka
Foreign exchange risk	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 NM
(the nsk that the value of the assets and liabilities dominated in foreign
currenciec in which the banks held ss ill change) 	 -
1. Overall risk
2. Murabaha
3. Salam
4. Istisna 'a
5. ljarah
6. Mudaraba (asset side)	 -
7. Musharaka
8. Diminishing Musharaka	 -
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SCALE
Very	 Unimportant	 Neutral	 Important	 Very	 Not Available
Unimportant	 Important
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 N/A
Operational risk	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 N/A
(the risk of losses from inadequate or failed internal processes, people or
system)
1. Overall risk
2. Murabaha
3. Salam
4. Islisna a
5. Ijarah
6. Mudaraba (asset side)
7. Musharaka
8. Diminishing Musharaka
Shari'a non-compliance risk - a category of operational nsk with 	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 N/A
regard to non compliance to Shari a rules
I.	 Overall risk
2. Murabaha
3. Salam
4. lsiisnaa
5. !jarah
6. Mudaraba (asset side)
7. Musharaka
8. Diminishing Musharaka	 -
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Please list below an y other risks that affect your bank.
N/A
Other risks
2.
3.
4.
5.
Q2 Risk measurement
For the risks that you answered above, please indicate whether you have the measurement below in
your Dank.
Risk measurement	 YES/NO
1. Credit ratings of prospective investors
2. Gap analysis
3. Duration analysis
4. Maturity Matching analysis
5. Earnings at Risk
6. Value at Risk
7. Simulation techniques
8. Estimates of Worst Case Scenarios
9. Risk Adjusted Rate of Return on Capital
(RA ROC)
10. Internal Rating System
II. Others_(please_specifi) 	 ___________________________________
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Q3 Risk management and mitigation
Please indicate the risk management and mitigation techniques that you employ to manage risks in your
bank.
_________________________ YES/NO
I. Collateral arrangement
2. Third party enhancements
3. Loan Loss Reserves
4. On Balance Sheet Netting
5. Guarantees
6. Internal ratings
7. Parallel Salam contracts
8. Parallel Islisna 'a contracts
9. Urboun (over-the-counter Islamic
derivatives)
10. Others (please specify)
Q4	 Accounting standards used by your bank comply with:-
YES	 NO
I. International Accounting
Standards
2. AAOIFI Standards
3. Other (please specify)
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Section B: Information on the issue of market discipline 1 in Islamic banks.
Q5	 Does your bank provide any voluntary disclosures 4 in the annual reports?
LI Yes	 LI No
Q6	 If the answer to Q5 is 'YES', please indicate the extent of voluntary disclosures in your
annual reports. Please tick (SI) the appropriate box.
Very High	 High	 Neutral	 Low	 Very Low
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Q7	 Please list down the information that you provide voluntarily in the annual reports.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Market discipline = an environment in which market participants can lake actions to
'discipline' the bank with the effect of improving its management practices (Pillar 3 of Basel II).
2 Voluntary disclosures = additional disclosures made which are not required by mandatory
accounting standards.
241
Noraini Mohd. Ariffin	 Appendices
Q8
	
	
Please rank the importance of these users in using the information published in your annual
reports.
SCALE
Very Unimportant	 Unimportant	 Neutral	 Important	 Very Important
Scale	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
I. Depositors
- Current Accounts
- Saving Accounts	 __________ __________ _______
2. Investment account holders
- Unrestricted Mudaraba
- Restricted Mudaraba	 _________ _________ _______ __________ __________
3. Islamic banks' shareholders 	 __________ __________ _______
4. Islamic banks' counterparties 	 ___________ ___________ ________
5. Credit rating agencies	 __________ __________ _______ ___________ ___________
6. Other investors	 __________ __________ _______ ___________ ___________
7. Islamic banks' supervisors 	 __________ __________ _______ ___________ ___________
8. Others (please specify)
Q9	 Which of the users in Q8 have more power to monitor the behaviour of Islamic banks (exert
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Q1O	 The following statements refer to your perceptions on the issue of market discipline in Islamic
banks. Respond to each statement by ticking ('f) the appropriate box.
Scale	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
1. Transparency 3 is a pre-requisite for achieving market discipline.	 - -	 -
2. Market discipline can work effectively only on the basis of adequate and
accurate information disclosure and transparency.
3. Lack of transparency in financial reporting on risks could lead to
difficulties in assessing the bank's performance.
4. Effective disclosure is essential to ensure that market participants have a
better understanding of the banks' risk profiles.
5. All the inherent risks in Islamic banks (credit, rate of return, price, foreign
exchange, liquidity and operational risks) have been disclosed in the
annual reports.
6. Investment account holders in Islamic banks need more information on all
risks faced by the banks than conventional depositors.
7. Market discipline can effectively reduce the need for official supervision of
Islamic banks.
8. Market discipline reduces the need for supervisory oversight in
maintaining capital in Islamic banks.
9. Effective market discipline can lower the supervision costs by Islamic
banks' supervisors.
10. The most effective way to ensure the Islamic bank adheres to public risk
disclosure requirements as required by accounting standards is to impose
penalties for non-disclosure.
11. Sufficient attention has been given by bank supervisors to ensure public
risk disclosure requirements are proportionate to the nature and scale of the
Islamic bank.
12. Bank supervisors have a strong interest in facilitating effective market
discipline in Islamic banks.
Transparency = public disclosure of reliable and timely information that enables users of that information
to make an accurate assessment of a bank's financial condition and performance, business activities, risk
profile and risk management practices.
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SCALE
Strongly Disagree
	
Disagree	 Neutral	 Agree	 Strongly Agree
1	 2	 3	 4	
_L
13. Bank supervisors have adequate information that enables them to assess
the risks inherent in Islamic banks.
14. Bank supervisors impose Islamic banks rules for public risk disclosure that - - 	 -
improve bank's transparency.
15. A low rate of return on deposits will lead to withdrawal of funds from
Islamic banks.
16. The rate of return on deposits in Islamic banks should be commensurate
with the rate of return of similar financial instrument offered by other
banks (conventional and Islamic).
17. Greater risk disclosure in Islamic banks informs investment account 	 -
holders of the potential risks to which their investments are exposed.
18. Greater risk disclosure in Islamic banks informs investment account
holders of the potential risks to which their investments are exposed.
19. Greater risk disclosure encourages new investments in Islamic banks.
20. The more risk information disclosed in the annual report of Islamic banks, 	 -
the more is market participants able to monitor the banks.
21. It is necessary to have a separate statement in the annual report to highlight
the Islamic banks' risks and risk management techniques.
22. The New Basel Accord is a welcome development for Islamic banks.
23. There is a need to adapt the New Base! Accord to cover the uniqueness of
Islamic banks.
24. Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) can facilitate the adoption of the
New Basel Accord in Islamic banks.
25. Information intermediaries are sufficient in the case of Islamic banks to
reduce informational asymmetries.
26. The Islamic bank credit ratings are based on the ability of the Islamic
banks to access the capital market to raise funds.
27. The external credit ratings affect the ability of Islamic banks to attract 	 -	 -
investment funds for the following year.
28. The release of the Islamic bank credit ratings to the public affects the
market confidence.
29. The release of the credit ratings to the public leads Islamic banks to
disclose less information in the annual reports.
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SCALE
Strongly Disagree
	 Disagree	 Neutral	 Agree	 Strongly Agree
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
30. If the performance of the Islamic bank is good, the bank tends to disclose
more information to the market on its risks and risk management
techniques.
31. The benefits to Islamic banks for signalling more risk information
outweigh the costs incurred.
Section C: Demographic Information About You
I would appreciate if you could complete the following short answers about yourself. All
information will be held in strict confidence and used for research purposes only.
Please tick ('1) the appropriate D.
Qil	 What is your gender?
El Male	 El Female
Q12	 Which of these age ranges do you fall into?
El 25-34	 El	 35-44
El 45-54	 El	 55-64
0 65+
Q13	 What is the highest level of education that you have achieved?
High school diploma	 El	 Bachelor's degree
Master's degree	 El	 PhD
0	 Professional accounting qualifications
Q14
	 What is your job title and department?
Job title
Department
QiS	 How many years have you worked in your organisation?
Write number of years here:
Q16	 Approximately how many years have you been in full-time employment?
Write number of years here:
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Section D: Contact Details
.	 Would you be willing, if necessary, to grant an interview?
Li	 Yes	 No
. If the answer is 'Yes', please provide us with your name, and contact number/address:
Name
Contact Number
Contact Address
E mail Address
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION
Please place this completed questionnaire in the enclosed self-addressed envelope and return to:
Noraini Mohd Ariffin
PhD Researcher
Room 35 MS 02
School of Management
University of Surrey
Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH
UNITED KINGDOM
E mail: n.mohd.ariffin@surrey.ac.uk
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APPENDIX 4B: Version 2
SURVEY ON 'ENHANCING TRANSPARENCY - RISK REPORTING
ISSUES' WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ISLAMIC BANKS
Section A: Information that the bank supervisors require most to monitor risk profile
of Islamic banks.
Qi As the bank supervisors of Islamic banks, how important is the disclosure of each
item of information listed below to your organisation in order for you to monitor the risk
profile of an Islamic bank. Please tick (V) the appropriate box.
SCALE
Very	 Unimportant	 Neutral	 Important	 Very Important
Unimportant
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Scale	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Type of risks faced by the Islamic bank.
2. Severity of various types of risks in different financial
instruments.
3. Risk management system process employed by the Islamic bank.
4. Breakdown of risks based on operating segments.
5. Breakdown of risks based on geographical segments.
6. Calculation of capital adequacy ratio and the bank's capital ratio.
7. Liquidity and funding of the Islamic bank.
8. Maturity matching of the Islamic banks' liabilities.
9. Profitability of the islamic bank.
10. Asset quality by asset category related to credit risk, market risk,
liquidity risk and operational risk.
11. Compliance with relevant accounting standards.
12. Compliance with Shari'a requirement.
13. The Shari'a committee's view on the permissibility of taking on
certain risks (eg. no gharar or maysir).
14. The Shari'a committee's view on risk mitigation methods (eg.
futures transactions and derivative contracts).
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Q2	 Please write down any other non-public information which you feel important in
Q3	 Please rank the importance of these risk assessments' approaches in supervising
Islamic banks.
- SCALE
Very	 Unimportant	 Neutral	 Important	 Very Important
Unimportant
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Scale	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
1. Supervisory bank rating systems
2. Financial ratios
3. Peer group analysis systems
4. Comprehensive bank risk assessment systems
5. Statistical methods
6. Other (please specify here)
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Section B: Information on the issue of market discipline 4 in Islamic banks.
Q4	 The following statements refer to your perceptions on the issue of market discipline in Islamic
banks. Respond to each statement by ticking (I) the appropriate box.
SCALE
Strongly Disagree	 Disagree	 Neutral	 Agree	 Strongly Agree
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Scale	 1	 5
1. Transparency5 is a pre-requisite for achieving market discipline.	 - -	 - -
2. Market discipline can work effectively only on the basis of adequate
and accurate information disclosure and transparency.
3. Lack of transparency in financial reporting on risks could lead to
difficulties in assessing the bank's performance.
4. Effective disclosure is essential to ensure that market participants have 	 - -
a better understanding of the banks' risk profiles.
5. All the inherent risks in Islamic banks (credit, rate of return, price, 	 - -
foreign exchange, liquidity and operational risks) have been disclosed
in the annual reports.
6. Investment account holders in Islamic banks need more information 	 -
on all risks faced by the banks than conventional depositors.
7. Market discipline can effectively reduce the need for official
supervision of Islamic banks.
8. Market discipline reduces the need for supervisory oversight in
maintaining capital in Islamic banks.
9. Effective market discipline can lower the supervision costs by Islamic
banks' supervisors.
10. The most effective way to ensure the Islamic bank adheres to public
risk disclosure requirements as required by accounting standards is to
impose penalties for non-disclosure. 	 - - - - -
11. Sufficient attention has been given by bank supervisors to ensure
public risk disclosure requirements are proportionate to the nature and
scale of the Islamic bank.
Market discipline = an environment in which market participants can take actions to
'discipline' the bank with the effect of improving its management practices (Pillar 3 of Basel H).
Transparency = public disclosure of reliable and timely information that enables users of that
information to make an accurate assessment of a bank's financial condition and performance,
business activities, risk profile and risk management practices.
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SCALE
Strongly Disagree	 Disagree	 Neutral	 Agree	 Strongly Agree
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
12. Bank supervisors have a strong interest in facilitating effective market
discipline in Islamic banks.
13. Bank supervisors have adequate information that enables them to
assess the risks inherent in Islamic banks.
14. Bank supervisors impose Islamic banks rules for public risk disclosure 	 -	 - -
that improve bank's transparency.
15. A low rate of return on deposits will lead to withdrawal of funds from
Islamic banks.
16. The rate of return on deposits in Islamic banks should be 	 -	 - -
commensurate with the rate of return of similar financial instrument
offered by other banks (conventional and Islamic).
17. Greater risk disclosure in Islamic banks informs investment account
holders of the potential risks to which their investments are exposed.
18. Greater risk disclosure in Islamic banks informs investment account
holders of the potential risks to which their investments are exposed.
19. Greater risk disclosure encourages new investments in Islamic banks.	 -
20. The more risk information disclosed in the annual report of Islamic
banks, the more is market participants able to monitor the banks.
21. It is necessary to have a separate statement in the annual report to 	 - - - -
highlight the Islamic banks' risks and risk management techniques.
22. The New Basel Accord is a welcome development for Islamic banks.
23. There is a need to adapt the New Basel Accord to cover the
uniqueness of Islamic banks.
24. Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) can facilitate the adoption of 	 - - - -
the New Basel Accord in Islamic banks.
25. Information intermediaries are sufficient in the case of Islamic banks 	 - - - -
to reduce informational asymmetries.
26. The Islamic bank credit ratings are based on the ability of the Islamic	 - - -
banks to access the capital market to raise funds.
27. The external credit ratings affect the ability of Islamic banks to attract 	 - -
investment funds for the following year.
28. The release of the Islamic bank credit ratings to the public affects the
market confidence.
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SCALE	 1
Strongly Disagree
	 Disagree	 Neutral	 Agree	 J Strongly Agreej
1	 2	 3
29. The release of the credit ratings to the public leads Islamic banks to
disclose less information in the annual reports.
30. If the performance of the Islamic bank is good, the bank tends to
disclose more information to the market on its risks and risk
management techniques.
3 1. The benefits to Islamic banks for signalling more risk information
outweigh the costs incurred.
Section C: Adequacy of public risk disclosures in order to enhance transparency in
Islamic banks.
Q5	 Please rank the adequacy of the following risk disclosures in existing Islamic banks'
annual reports by ticking ('I) the appropriate box.
Scale
Very Inadequate I	 Inadequate	 I	 Don't know	 I	 Adequate	 I Very Adequate
1	 I	 2	 I	 3	 I	 4	 I	 5
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Scale
1. Disclosure of credit risks faced by Islamic banks.
2. Disclosure of qualitative information on market risk faced by
Islamic banks.
3. Disclosure of quantitative information on market risk faced by
Islamic banks.
4. Disclosure of operational risk faced by Islamic banks.
5. Disclosure of liquidity and funding risks faced by Islamic banks.
6. Disclosure of capital adequacy position of Islamic banks.
7. Disclosure of solvency of Islamic banks.
8. Disclosure of profitability of Islamic banks.
9. Disclosure of risk measurement and evaluation for each category of
risk.
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Scale	 12345
10. Disclosure of risk management strategies and practices used by
Islamic banks for each category of risk.
11. Disclosure of significant accounting policies. 	 -
12. Disclosure of corporate governance information.
13. Disclosure of other qualitative risk information on Islamic banks.
section D: Demographic Information About You
I would appreciate if you could complete the following short answers about yourself. All
information will be held in strict confidence and used for research purposes only.
Please tick (I) the appropriate 0.
Q6	 What is your gender?
El Male	 El Female
Q7	 Which of these age ranges do you fall into?
El	 25-34	 El	 35-44
El	 45-54	 El	 55-64
El	 65+
Q8	 What is the highest level of education that you have achieved?
El	 High school diploma	 El	 Bachelor's degree
El	 Master's degree	 El	 PhD
El	 Professional accounting qualifications
Q9	 What is yourjob title and department?
Job title
Department
Q1O How many years have you worked in your organisation?
Write number of years here:
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Qil Approximately how many years have you been in full-time employment?
Write number of years here:
Section D: Contact Details
. Would you be willing, if necessary, to grant an interview?
U Yes	 UNo
. If the answer is 'Yes', please provide us with your name, and contact number/address:
Name
Contact Number
Contact Address
E mail Address
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION
Please place this completed questionnaire in the enclosed self-addressed envelope and return
to:
Noraini Mohd Ariflin
PhD Researcher
Room 35 MS 02
School of Management
University of Surrey
Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7XH
UNITED KINGDOM
E mail: n.mohd.ariffin@surrey.ac.uk
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APPENDIX 4C: Version 3
SURVEY ON 'ENHANCING TRANSPARENCY - RISK REPORTING
ISSUES' WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ISLAMIC BANKS
Section A: General information on Islamic banks' transparency.
Qi In order to assess the transparency 6 of an Islamic bank, how important of each item of
risk information listed below to your organisation. Please tick (I ) the appropriate
box.
SCALE
Very	 Unimportant	 Neutral	 Important	 Very Important
Unimportant
1	 2	 3	 4
Scale	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
1. Type of risks faced by the Islamic bank. 	 -
2. Severity of various types of risks in different financial instruments.
3. Risk management system process employed by the Islamic bank.
4. Breakdown of risks based on operating segments.
5. Breakdown of risks based on geographical segments.
6. Calculation of capital adequacy ratio and the bank's capital ratio.
7. Liquidity and funding of the Islamic bank.
8. Maturity matching of the Islamic banks' liabilities.
9. Profitability of the Islamic bank.
10. Asset quality by asset category related to credit risk, market risk,
liquidity risk and operational risk.
11. Compliance with relevant accounting standards.
12. Compliance with Shari'a requirement.
13. The Shari'a committee's view on the permissibility of taking on
certain risks (eg. no gharar or maysir).
14. The Shari'a committee's view on risk mitigation methods (eg.
futures transactions and derivative contracts).
6 Transparency = public disclosure of reliable and timely information that enables users of that
information to make an accurate assessment of a bank's financial condition and performance,
business activities, risk profile and risk management practices.
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Q2	 What other risk information is important in order to assess the transparency of Islamic
Q3	 Does the current reporting of Islamic banks based on the following items is
satisfactory? Please tick ('1) the appropriate box.
Risk reporting	 Segment reporting7
Yes	 Yes
No	 No
If your answer to Q3 is NO, please give your reasons:
Segment reporting = the breakdown of the items in the financial statements according to
business activities and geographical locations.
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Section B: Information on the issue of market discipline8 in Islamic banks.
Q4	 The following statements refer to your perceptions on the issue of market discipline in Islamic
banks. Respond to each statement by ticking (SI) the appropriate box.
SCALE
Strongly Disagree	 Disagree	 Neutral	 Agree	 Strongly Agree
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Scale	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
1. Transparency9 is a pre-requisite for achieving market discipline.
2. Market discipline can work effectively only on the basis of adequate
and accurate information disclosure and transparency.
3. Lack of transparency in financial reporting on risks could lead to
difficulties in assessing the bank's performance.
4. Effective disclosure is essential to ensure that market participants have
a better understanding of the banks' risk profiles.
5. All the inherent risks in Islamic banks (credit, rate of return, price,
foreign exchange, liquidity and operational risks) have been disclosed
in the annual reports.
6. Investment account holders in Islamic banks need more information
on all risks faced by the banks than conventional depositors.
7. Market discipline can effectively reduce the need for official
supervision of Islamic banks.
8. Market discipline reduces the need for supervisory oversight in
maintaining capital in Islamic banks.
9. Effective market discipline can lower the supervision costs by Islamic
banks' supervisors.
10. The most effective way to ensure the Islamic bank adheres to public
risk disclosure requirements as required by accounting standards is to
impose penalties for non-disclosure. 	 - - - - -
11. Sufficient attention has been given by bank supervisors to ensure
public risk disclosure requirements are proportionate to the nature and
scale of the Islamic bank.
8 Market discipline = an environment in which market participants can take actions to
'discipline' the bank with the effect of improving its management practices (Pillar 3 of Basel II).
Transparency = public disclosure of reliable and timely information that enables users of that
information to make an accurate assessment of a bank's financial condition and performance,
business activities, risk profile and risk management practices.
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SCALE
Strongly Disagree
	 Disagree	 Neutral	 Agree	 Strongly Agree
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
12. Bank supervisors have a strong interest in facilitating effective market
discipline in Islamic banks.
13. Bank supervisors have adequate information that enables them to 	 -	 -
assess the risks inherent in Islamic banks.
14. Bank supervisors impose Islamic banks rules for public risk disclosure 	 -
that improve bank's transparency.
15. A low rate of return on deposits will lead to withdrawal of funds from
Islamic banks.
16. The rate of return on deposits in Islamic banks should be 	 - -
commensurate with the rate of return of similar financial instrument
offered by other banks (conventional and Islamic).
17. Greater risk disclosure in Islamic banks informs investment account 	 - -
holders of the potential risks to which their investments are exposed.
18. Greater risk disclosure in Islamic banks informs investment account 	 - - - -
holders of the potential risks to which their investments are exposed.
19. Greater risk disclosure encourages new investments in Islamic banks. 	 - - -
20. The more risk information disclosed in the annual report of Islamic	 - - -
banks, the more is market participants able to monitor the banks.
21. It is necessary to have a separate statement in the annual report to	 - - -
highlight the Islamic banks' risks and risk management techniques.
22. The New Basel Accord is a welcome development for Islamic banks.	 - -
23. There is a need to adapt the New Basel Accord to cover the 	 - -
uniqueness of Islamic banks.
24. Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) can facilitate the adoption of	 - - -
the New Basel Accord in Islamic banks.
25. Information intermediaries are sufficient in the case of Islamic banks 	 - -
to reduce informational asymmetries.
26. The Islamic bank credit ratings are based on the ability of the Islamic	 - - -
banks to access the capital market to raise funds.
27. The external credit ratings affect the ability of Islamic banks to attract
investment funds for the following year.
28. The release of the Islamic bank credit ratings to the public affects the
market confidence.
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SCALE
Strongly Disagree
	 Disagree	 Neutral	 Agree	 Strongly Agree
1	 2	 3	 4
29. The release of the credit ratings to the public leads Islamic banks to
disclose less information in the annual reports.
30. If the performance of the Islamic bank is good, the bank tends to
disclose more information to the market on its risks and risk
management techniques.
3 1. The benefits to Islamic banks for signalling more risk information
outweigh the costs incurred.
Section C: Adequacy of public risk disclosures in order to enhance transparency in
Islamic banks.
Q5	 Please rank the adequacy of the following risk disclosures in Islamic banks' annual
reports by ticking (I) the appropriate box.
Scale	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
1. Disclosure of credit risks faced by Islamic banks.
2. Disclosure of qualitative information on market risk faced by
Islamic banks.
3. Disclosure of quantitative information on market risk faced by
Islamic banks.
4. Disclosure of operational risk faced by Islamic banks.
5. Disclosure of liquidity and funding risks faced by Islamic
banks.
6. Disclosure of capital adequacy position of Islamic banks.
7. Disclosure of solvency of Islamic banks.
8. Disclosure of profitability of Islamic banks.
9. Disclosure of risk measurement and evaluation for each
category of risk.
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Scale
Very Inadequate	 Inadequate J Don't know	 Adequate	 Very Adequate
1	 2	 1	 3	 4	 5
Scale	 12345
10. Disclosure of risk management strategies and practices used by
Islamic banks for each category of risk.
11. Disclosure of significant accounting policies.
12. Disclosure of corporate governance information.
13. Disclosure of other qualitative risk information on Islamic
banks.
Section D: Demographic Information About You
I would appreciate if you could complete the following short answers about yourself. All
information will be held in strict confidence and used for research purposes only.
Please tick () the appropriate Li.
Q6	 What is your gender?
El Male	 El Female
Q7	 Which of these age ranges do you fall into?
D	 25-34	 El	 35-44
0	 45-54	 El	 55-64
O 65+
Q8	 What is the highest level of education that you have achieved?
o	 High school diploma	 El	 Bachelor's degree
Master's degree	 El	 PhD
0	 Professional accounting qualifications
Q9	 What is your job title and department?
Job title
Department
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Q1O How many years have you worked in your organisation?
Write number of years here:
Qil Approximately how many years have you been in full-time employment?
Write number of years here:
Section D: Contact Details
• Would you be willing, if necessary, to grant an interview?
ci Yes
	
ciNo
• If the answer is 'Yes', please provide us with your name, and contact number/address:
Name
Contact Number
Contact Address
E mail Address
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION
Please place this completed questionnaire in the enclosed self-addressed envelope and return
to:
Noraini Mohd Ariffin
PhD Researcher
Room 35 MS 02
School of Management
University of Surrey
Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7X11
UTITED KINGDOM
E mail: n.mohd.ariffin@surrey.ac.uk
260
Noraini Mohd. Ariffin	 Appendices
APPENDIX 5
Advantages and Disadvantages of Non-Parametric Tests
ADVANTAGES
• If the sample size is very small, threw may be no alternative to using a non-
parametric test unless the nature of the population distribution is known exactly.
• Non-parametric tests typically make fewer assumptions about the data and may be
more relevant to a particular situation. In addition, the hypotheses or propositions
tested by the non-parametric test may be more appropriate for the research
investigation.
• Non-parametric tests are available to analyse data which are inherently in ranks as
well as data whose seemingly numerical scores have the strength of ranks. That is,
the researcher may only be able to say of his or her subjects that one has more or
less of the characteristics than another, without being able to say how much more
or less.
• Non-parametric methods are available to treat data which are simply classificatory
or categorical, i.e. are measured in a nominal scale. No parametric technique
applies to such data.
• There are suitable non-parametric tests for treating samples made up of
observations from several different populations. Parametric tests often cannot
handle such data without requiring unrealistic assumptions or cumbersome
computation.
• Non-parametric tests typically are much easier to learn and to apply than are
parametric tests. In addition, their interpretation often is more direct than the
interpretation of parametric tests.
DISADVANTAGES
• If all the assumptions of a parametric test are met in the data and the research
hypothesis or propositions could be tested with a parametric test, then non-
parametric test is wasteful. The degree of wastefulness is expressed by the power-
efficiency of the non-parametric test.
• Another objection to non-parametric tests is that they are not systematic.
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• Another objection to non-parametric test has to do with convenience. Tables
necessary to implement non-parametric tests are scattered widely and appear in
different formats.
(Sources: Siegel, S. and N.J. Castellan, Jr., (1988), 'Nonparametric Statistics for the
Behavioral Sciences, London: McGraw-Hill, Inc.)
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APPENDIX 6
Assessing Normality
1. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for Normality
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistical test (K-Si) has been used in this study to assess
normality of data distribution. This test is used to examine whether the survey data are
normally distributed. If the significance level from the test is greater than 0.05, then
the data are assumed to be normally distributed. On the other hand, if the significance
level is lower than 0.05, then it is assumed that those data are not normally distributed
(Bryman and Cramer, 1990).
As discussed earlier in Chapter 7, an approximately normal distribution is considered
to be one of the generic assumptions that must be met prior to use of parametric
statistical tests. If the distributions of variables depart from normality, these variables
may need to be transformed before further analysis. When the normal distributions
still deviate dramatically after the transformation, non-parametric test must be
applied. The following sections show summaries the results of the K-Si test.
a) Assessing Normality of Data in Qi, Version 1 using K-Si Test
Table 1: K-Si Test for each type of risks (overall) in Section A (Version 1)
items	 ' K-Si	 Normality
1. Credit risk (n = 29)	 0.000	 NO
2. Rate of return risk (n = 29) 0.025	 NO
3.Pricerisk(n = 28)	 0.153	 YES
4.Foreign exchange risk (n =	 0.039	 NO
28)
5. Liquidity risk ( n = 27) 	 0.082	 YES
6. Operational risk	 0.0 13	 NO
(n = 29)
7. Shari 'a non-compliance	 0.054	 YES
risk (n = 27)
For each type of risk in different financial instrument, the significance level of the K-
Si test is smaller than 0.05. This indicates that the data here are not normally
distributed. This conclusion is also supported by the descriptive statistics results
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where the mean, median and mode are not equal, and there is a negative coefficient of
skewness of the data distribution.
Table 2: K-Si Test of Qi in Version 1
Risks in
	
Risks in	 Risks in Risks in Risks in	 Risks in	 Risks in	 Diminishing
	
Murabaha	 Salam Istisna 'a Ijarah	 Mudaraba	 Musharaka	 Musharaka
K-SI	
.000	 .000	 .000	 .000	 .000	 .000	 .000
With a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the significance levels for each of the dichotomous
groups must be >0.05 to give normality of distribution. It can be seen from Table 2
that the significance score for the risks in each financial instrument is <0.05. This
means that our test does not have normality of distribution.
b) Assessing Normality of Data in Qi0, Version 1, Q4 in Version 2 and 3
The results of the K-Si test show that the significance level is lower than 0.05.
Therefore, from the above results, it can be concluded that the collected data from this
part are not normally distributed. This is supported by the results of mean, mode and
median which are not equal.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of Q1O in Version 1 and Q4 in Version 2 and 3
Statement 1	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 11	 12
K-SI	 0.000 Lo.000 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.002 0.001 0.00 1 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
Statement 13	 14	
1 15	
16	 17	 18	 19	 20	 21	 22	 23	 24
K-Si	 0.001 0.000 jm.002 0.002 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
Statement 25	 26	 27	 28	 29	 30	 31
K-Si	 o.00jj 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.000
c) Assessing Normality of Data in Qi and Q3 Version 2
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Qi in Version 2
TStatement	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 11	 12	 13	 1
I K-SI	 0.000	 0.003	 0.000	 0.013	 0.042	 0.000	 0.001	 0.003	 0.038	 0.000	 0.003	 0.000	 0.034 0.
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of Q3 in Version 2
Statement 1	 2	 3	
J 
4	 5
K-Si	 0.001 0.122 0.004 Lo.008 0.071
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d) Assessing Normality of Data in Q5 in Version 2 and 3
Table 6: Descriptive statistics of Q5 in Version 2 and 3
Statement 1	 2	 3	 4	 I 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 11	 12	 13
K-SI	 0.011 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.001
Variable Transformation for Normality Testing
Generally, variables rarely conform to a classic normal distribution. In fact,
distributions are normally skewed and display varying degree of kurtosis. When the
values of the skewness are extreme, variable transformation is required (Coakes and
Steed, 2001). As discussed earlier, parametric statistical tests are more powerful than
non-parametric tests. However, in order to apply parametric tests to research data,
there are some certain assumptions that need to be met. One of those assumptions is
that the data has to be approximately normally distributed. If the departure from
normality is severe, it is necessary to transform the values of variables in order to
satisfy the distribution requirements for the use of parametric tests.
The above results suggested that the data used in this study are not normally
distributed. Therefore, the logarithmic transformation was applied in this study, in an
attempt to make variables conform to normal distribution. The following tables show
the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistical test.
Table 7: Logarithmic Transformed K-Si of Qi
I Items	 K-SI
1. Credit risk (n = 29)	 0.000
2. Rate of return risk (n = 29)
	
0.006
3.Price risk (n = 28)	 0.050
4.Foreign exchange risk (n
	
0.036
28)
5. Liquidity risk (n = 27) -- 0.03 3
6. Operational risk	 0.023
(n = 29)
7. Shari 'a non-compliance - 0.098
risk (n = 27)
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Table 8: Logarithmic Transformed K-Si of Qi in Version i
Risks in
	
Risks in	 Risks in Risks in Risks in	 Risks in	 Risks in	 Diminishing
	
Murabaha	 Salam Istisna'a Ijarah	 Mudaraba	 Musharaka	 Musharaka
K-SI	
.000	 .000	 .000	 .000	 .000	 .000	 .000
Table 9: Logarithmic Transformed K-Si of Q1O in Version 1 and Q4 in Version
2 and 3
Statement!	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 11	 12
K-SI	 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.002 0.02! 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Statement 13	 14	 15	 16	 17	 18	 19	 20	 21	 22	
J 
23	 24
K-SI	 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 [.000 o.000j
Statement	 25	 26	 27	 28	 29	 30	 3i
K-Si	 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
Table iO: Logarithmic Transformed K-Si of Qi in Version 2
Statement	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 11	 12	 13	 1'
K-SI	 0.000	 0003	 0000	 0.022	 0.021	 0.001	 0.001	 0.004	 0.048	 0.000	 0.004	 0.000	 0.040 0.
Table ii: Logarithmic Transformed K-Si of Q3 in Version 2
Statement	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
K-SI	 0.001 0.153 0.002 0.009 0.037
Table 12: Logarithmic Transformed K-Si of Q5 in Version 2 and 3
Statement 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 11	 12	 13
K-SI	 0.008 0.015 0.001 0.015 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.008 0.001
The above results indicate that even though the variables have been logarithmically
transformed, the distribution of this study's data is still far from normal. Therefore, it
can be concluded that the distribution assumptions of parametric tests have been
seriously violated. Thus, non-parametric tests seem to be appropriate techniques for
this research study. In addition, a small sample size justifies the use of the non-
parametric test in this study.
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APPENDIX 7
Basel Il—Pillar 3: Source: BIS (June 2004)
Part 4: The Third Pillar - Market Discipline
I. General considerations
A. Disclosure requirements
808. The Committee believes that the rationale for Pillar 3 is sufficiently strong to warrant the
introduction of disclosure requirements for banks using the Framework. Supervisors have an array of
measures that they can use to require banks to make such disclosures. Some of these disclosures will be
qualifying criteria for the use of particular methodologies or the recognition of particular instruments
and transactions.
B. Guiding principles
809. The purpose of Pillar 3 - market discipline is to complement the minimum capital requirements
(Pillar 1) and the supervisory review process (Pillar 2). The Committee aims to encourage market
discipline by developing a set of disclosure requirements which will allow market participants to assess
key pieces of information on the scope of application, capital, risk exposures, risk assessment
processes, and hence the capital adequacy of the institution. The Committee believes that such
disclosures have particular relevance under the Framework, where reliance on internal methodologies
gives banks more discretion in assessing capital requirements.
810. In principle, banks' disclosures should be consistent with how senior management and the board
of directors assess and manage the risks of the bank. Under Pillar 1, banks use specified
approaches/methodologies for measuring the various risks they face and the resulting capital
requirements. The Committee believes that providing disclosures that are based on this common
framework is an effective means of informing the market about a bank's exposure to those risks and
provides a consistent and understandable disclosure framework that enhances comparability.
C. Achieving appropriate disclosure
811. The Committee is aware that supervisors have different powers available to them to achieve the
disclosure requirements. Market discipline can contribute to a safe and sound banking environment,
and supervisors require firms to operate in a safe and sound manner. Under safety and soundness
grounds, supervisors could require banks to disclose information. Alternatively, supervisors have the
authority to require banks to provide information in regulatory reports. Some supervisors could make
some or all of the information in these reports publicly available. Further, there are a number of
existing mechanisms by which supervisors may enforce requirements. These vary from country to
country and range from "moral suasion" through dialogue with the bank's management (in order to
change the latter's behaviour), to reprimands or financial penalties. The nature of the exact measures
used will depend on the legal powers of the supervisor and the seriousness of the disclosure deficiency.
However, it is not intended that direct additional capital requirements would be a response to non-
disclosure, except as indicated below.
812. In addition to the general intervention measures outlined above, the Framework also anticipates a
role for specific measures. 'Where disclosure is a qualifying criterion under Pillar 1 to obtain lower risk
weightings and/or to apply specific methodologies, there would be a direct sanction (not being allowed
to apply the lower weighting or the specific methodology).
267
Noraini Mohd. Ariffin 	 Appendices
D. Jnteraction with accounting disclosures
813. The Committee recognises the need for a Pillar 3 disclosure framework that does not conflict with
requirements under accounting standards, which are broader in scope. The Committee has made a
considerable effort to see that the narrower focus of Pillar 3, which is aimed at disclosure of bank
capital adequacy, does not conflict with the broader accounting requirements. Going forward, the
Committee intends to maintain an ongoing relationship with the accounting authorities, given that their
continuing work may have implications for the disclosures required in Pillar 3. The Committee will
consider future modifications to Pillar 3 as necessary in light of its ongoing monitoring of this area and
industry developments.
814. Management should use its discretion in determining the appropriate medium and location of the
disclosure. In situations where the disclosures are made under accounting requirements or are made to
satisfy listing requirements promulgated by securities regulators, banks may rely on them to fulfil the
applicable Pillar 3 expectations. In these situations, banks should explain material differences between
the accounting or other disclosure and the supervisory basis of disclosure. This explanation does not
have to take the form of a line by line reconciliation.
815. For those disclosures that are not mandatory under accounting or other requirements, management
may choose to provide the Pillar 3 information through other means (such as on a publicly accessible
internet website or in public regulatory reports filed with bank supervisors), consistent with
requirements of national supervisory authorities. However, institutions are encouraged to provide all
related information in one location to the degree feasible. In addition, if information is not provided
with the accounting disclosure, institutions should indicate where the additional information can be
found.
816. The recognition of accounting or other mandated disclosure in this manner is also expected to help
clarify the requirements for validation of disclosures. For example, information in the annual financial
statements would generally be audited and additional material published with such statements must be
consistent with the audited statements. In addition, supplementary material (such as Management's
Discussion and Analysis) that is published to satisfy other disclosure regimes (e.g. listing requirements
promulgated by securities regulators) is generally subject to sufficient scrutiny (e.g. internal control
assessments, etc.) to satisfy the validation issue. If material is not published under a validation regime,
for instance in a stand alone report or as a section on a website, then management should ensure that
appropriate verification of the information takes place, in accordance with the general disclosure
principle set out below. Accordingly, Pillar 3 disclosures will not be required to be audited by an
external auditor, unless otherwise required by accounting standards setters, securities regulators or
other authorities.
E. Materiality
817. A bank should decide which disclosures are relevant for it based on the materiality concept.
Information would be regarded as material if its omission or misstatement could change or influence
the assessment or decision of a user relying on that in formation for the purpose of making economic
decisions. This definition is consistent with International Accounting Standards and with many national
accounting frameworks. The Committee recognises the need for a qualitative judgement of whether, in
light of the particular circumstances, a user of financial information would consider the item to be
material (user test). The Committee is not setting specific thresholds for disclosure as these can be open
to manipulation and are difficult to determine, and it believes that the user test is a useful benchmark
for achieving sufficient disclosure.
F. Frequency
818. The disclosures set out in Pillar 3 should be made on a semi-annual basis, subject to the following
exceptions. Qualitative disclosures that provide a general summary of a bank's risk management
objectives and policies, reporting system and definitions may be published on an annual basis. In
recognition of the increased risk sensitivity of the Framework and the general trend towards more
frequent reporting in capital markets, large internationally active banks and other significant banks (and
their significant bank subsidiaries) must disclose their Tier 1 and total capital adequacy ratios, and their
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113
components, on a quarterly basis. Furthermore, if information on risk exposure or other items is
prone to rapid change, then banks should also disclose information on a quarterly basis. In all cases,
banks should publish material information as soon as practicable and not later than deadlines set by like
114
requirements in national laws.
G. Proprietary and confidential information
819. Proprietary information encompasses information (for example on products or systems), that if
shared with competitors would render a bank's investment in these products/systems less valuable, and
hence would undermine its competitive position. Information about customers is often confidential, in
that it is provided under the terms of a legal agreement or counterparty relationship. This has an impact
on what banks should reveal in terms of information about their customer base, as well as details on
their internal arrangements, for instance methodologies used, parameter estimates, data etc. The
Committee believes that the requirements set out below strike an appropriate balance between the need
for meaningful disclosure and the protection of proprietary and confidential information. In exceptional
cases, disclosure of certain items of information required by Pillar 3 may prejudice seriously the
position of the bank by making public information that is either proprietary or confidential in nature. In
such cases, a bank need not disclose those specific items, but must disclose more general information
about the subject matter of the requirement, together with the fact that, and the reason why, the specific
items of information have not been disclosed. This limited exemption is not intended to conflict with
the disclosure requirements under the accounting standards.
115
H. The disclosure requirements
820. The following sections set out in tabular form the disclosure requirements under Pillar 3.
Additional definitions and explanations are provided in a series of footnotes.
A. General disclosure principle
821. Banks should have a formal disclosure policy approved by the board of directors that addresses
the bank's approach for determining what disclosures it will make and the internal controls over the
disclosure process. In addition, banks should implement a process for assessing the appropriateness of
their disclosures, including validation and frequency of them.
B. Scope of application
822. Pillar 3 applies at the top consolidated level of the banking group to which the Framework applies
(as indicated above in Part 1: Scope of Application). Disclosures related to individual banks within the
groups would not generally be required to fulfil the disclosure requirements set out below. An
exception to this arises in the disclosure of Total and Tier I Capital Ratios by the top consolidated
entity where an analysis of significant bank subsidiaries within the group is appropriate, in order to
recognise the need for these subsidiaries to comply with the Framework and other applicable
limitations on the transfer of funds or capital within the group.
Table I
Scope of application
(a) The name of the top corporate entity in the group to which the Framework
Qualitative	 applies.
Disclosures
An outline of differences in the basis of consolidation for accounting and
116
regulatory purposes, with a brief description of the entities 	 within the group
117	 118
(a) that are fully consolidated; 	 (b) that are pro-rata consolidated; 	 (c) that
119
are given a deduction treatment; 	 and (d) from which surplus capital is
recognised plus (e) that are neither consolidated nor deducted (e.g. where the
investment is risk-weighted).
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(c) Any restrictions, or other major impediments, on transfer of funds or regulatory
- capital within the group.
120Quantitative	 Cd) I The aggregate amount of surplus capital	 of insurance subsidiaries (whether
deducted or subjected to an alternative method ) included in the capital of theDisclosures	 I	 121
Iconsolidated group.
( \	 122
e, The aggregate amount of capital deficiencies 	 in all subsidiaries not included
in the consolidation i.e. that are deducted and the name(s) of such subsidiaries.
(1) The aggregate amounts (e.g. current book value) of the firm's total interests in
insurance entities, which are risk-weighted rather than deducted from capital
124
or subjected to an alternate group-wide method,	 as well as their name, their
country of incorporation or residence, the proportion of ownership interest and,
if different, the proportion of voting power in these entities. In addition, indicate
the quantitative impact on regulatory capital of using this method versus using
the deduction or alternate group-wide method.
C. Capital
Table 2
Capital structure
Qualitative	 I (a) I Summary information on the terms and conditions of the main features of allI capital instruments, especially in the case of innovative, complex or hybridDisclosures	 j	 jcaPital instruments.	 -
Quantitative	 (b) The amount of Tier 1 capital, with separate disclosure of
Disclosures
• paid-up share capital/common stock;
reserves;
minority interests in the equity of subsidiaries;
125
innovative instruments;
other capital instruments;
126
• surplus capital from insurance companies;
• regulatory calculation differences deducted from Tier 1 capital; 
127
and
• other amounts deducted from Tier I capital, including goodwill and
investments.
(c) The total amount of Tier 2 and Tier 3 capital.
128(d) Other deductions from capital.
(e) Total eligible capital.
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Table 3
Capital Adequacy
Qualitative	 (a) A summary discussion of the banks approach to assessing the adequacy of its
disclosures	 capital to support current and future activities.
Quantitative	 (b) Capital requirements for credit risk:
disclosures
• Portfolios subject to standardised or simplified standardised approach,
disclosed separately for each portfolio;
• Portfolios subject to the IRB approaches, disclosed separately for each
portfolio under the foundation IRB approach and for each portfolio under
the advanced IRB approach:
• Corporate (including SL not subject to supervisory slotting criteria),
sovereign and bank;
Residential mortgage;
129
• Qualifying revolving retail;	 and
• Other retail;
• Securitisation exposures.
(c) Capital requirements for equity exposures in the IRB approach:
Equity portfolios subject to the market-based approaches;
• Equity portfolios subject to simple risk weight method; and
• Equities in the banking book under the internal models approach (for banks
using IMA for banking book equity exposures).
• Equity portfolios subject to PD/LGD approaches.
130(d) Capita! requirements for market risk
Standardised approach;
• Internal models approach Trading book.
(e)I Capital requirements for operational risk:
Basic indicator approach;
• Standardised approach;
• Advanced measurement approach (AMA).
131(0 Total and Tier 1	 capital ratio:
• For the top consolidated group; and
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• For significant bank subsidiaries (stand alone or sub-consolidated depending
on how the Framework is applied).
D. Risk exposure and assessment
823. The risks to which banks are exposed and the techniques that banks use to identify, measure,
monitor and control those risks are important factors market participants consider in their assessment of
an institution. In this section, several key banking risks are considered: credit risk, market risk, interest
rate risk and equity risk in the banking book and operational risk. Also included in this section are
disclosures relating to credit risk mitigation and asset securitisation, both of which alter the risk profile
of the institution. Where applicable, separate disclosures are set out for banks using different
approaches to the assessment of regulatory capital.
1. General qualitative disclosure requirement
824. For each separate risk area (e.g. credit, market, operational, banking book interest rate risk, equity)
banks must describe their risk management objectives and policies, including: •
strategies and processes;
the structure and organisation of the relevant risk management function;
the scope and nature of risk reporting and/or measurement systems;
policies for hedging and/or mitigating risk and strategies and processes for monitoring the continuing
effectiveness of hedges/mitigants.
2. Credit risk
825. General disclosures of credit risk provide market participants with a range of information about
overall credit exposure and need not necessarily be based on information prepared for regulatory
purposes. Disclosures on the capital assessment techniques give information on the specific nature of
the exposures, the means of capital assessment and data to assess the reliability of the information
disclosed.
132
Table 4
Credit risk: general disclosures for all banks
The general qualitative disclosure requirement (paragraph 824) with respect to
credit risk, including:
Definitions of past due and impaired (for accounting purposes);
Description of approaches followed for specific and general allowances and
Qualitative	 statistical methods
Disclosures	
. Discussion of the bank's credit risk management policy; and
• For banks that have partly, but not fully adopted either the foundation IRB or
the advanced IRB approach, a description of the nature of exposures within
each portfolio that are subject to the 1) standardised, 2) foundation IRB,
and 3) advanced IRB approaches and of management's plans and timing
for migrating exposures to full implementation of the applicable approach.
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Quantitative
Disclosures
133	 134
Total gross credit risk exposures, 	 plus average gross exposure 	 over the
135	 136
period broken down by major types of credit exposure.
137
Geographic distribution of exposures, broken down in significant areas by
major types of credit exposure.
Industry or counterparty type distribution of exposures, broken down by major types of credit
(d) exposure.
(e) Residual contractual maturity breakdown of the whole portfolio, broken down by major types
of credit exposure.
(I) By major industry or counterparty type:
139
Amount of impaired loans and if available, past due loans, provided separately;
Specific and general allowances; and
Charges for specific allowances and charge-offs during the period.
(g) Amount of impaired loans and, if available, past due loans provided separately broken down by
significant geographic areas including, if practical, the amounts of specific and general
140
allowances related to each geographical area.
(h) Reconciliation of changes in the allowances for loan impairment. i4 i
(i) For each portfolio, the amount of exposures (for IRB banks, drawn plus EAD on undrawn)
subject to the I) standardised, 2) foundation IRB, and 3) advanced IRB approaches.
Table 5
Credit risk: disclosures for portfolios subject to the standardised approach and supervisory risk
142
weights in the IRB approaches
Qualitative
Disclosures
For portfolios under the standardised approach:
• Names of ECAIs and ECA5 used, plus reasons for any changes;*
• Types of exposure for which each agency is used;
• A description of the process used to transfer public issue ratings onto
comparable assets in the banking book; and
• The alignment of the alphanumerical scale of each agency used with risk
143
buckets.
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(b)	 For exposure amounts after risk mitigation subject to the standardised
approach, amount of a bank's outstandings (rated and unrated) in each
risk bucket as well as those that are deducted; and
Quantitative
Disclosures	 • For exposures subject to the supervisory risk weights in IRB (HVCRE, any
SL products subject to supervisory slotting criteria and equities under the
simple risk weight method) the aggregate amount of a bank's
outstandings in each risk bucket.
Credit risk: disclosures for portfolios subject to IRB approaches
826. An important part of the Framework is the introduction of an IRB approach for the assessment of
regulatory capital for credit risk. To varying degrees, banks will have discretion to use internal inputs
in their regulatory capital calculations. In this sub-section, the IRB approach is used as the basis for a
set of disclosures intended to provide market participants with information about asset quality. In
addition, these disclosures are important to allow market participants to assess the resulting capital in
light of the exposures. There are two categories of quantitative disclosures: those focussing on an
analysis of risk exposure and assessment (i.e. the inputs) and those focussing on the actual outcomes
(as the basis for providing an indication of the likely reliability of the disclosed information). These are
supplemented by a qualitative disclosure regime which provides background information on the
assumptions underlying the IRB framework, the use of the IRB system as part of a risk management
framework and the means for validating the results of the IRB system. The disclosure regime is
intended to enable market participants to assess the credit risk exposure of IRB banks and the overall
application and suitability of the IRB framework, without revealing proprietary information or
duplicating the role of the supervisor in validating the detail of the IRB framework in place.
Table 6
Credit risk: disclosures for portfolios subject to IRB approaches
Qualitative	 (a) Supervisor's acceptance of approach! supervisory approved transition
disclosures *
Explanation and review of the:
• Structure of internal rating systems and relation between internal and
external ratings;
• use of internal estimates other than for IRB capital purposes;
• process for managing and recognising credit risk mitigation; and
• Control mechanisms for the rating system including discussion of
independence, accountability, and rating systems review.
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Description of the internal ratings process, provided separately for five distinct portfolios:
• Corporate (including SMEs, specialised lending and purchased corporate receivables), sovereign
and bank;
144
• Equities;
• Residential mortgages;
'45
• Qualifying revolving retail; 	 and
• Other retail.
The description should include, for each portfolio:
The types of exposure included in the portfolio;
• The definitions, methods and data for estimation and validation of PD, and (for portfolios
subject to the IRB advanced approach) LGD and/or EAD, including assumptions employed
146
in the derivation of these variables; 	 and
• Description of deviations as permitted under paragraph 456 and footnote 82 from the
reference definition of default where determined to be material, including the broad segments
147
of the portfolio(s) affected by such deviations.
Quantitative	 (d) For each portfolio (as defined above) except retail, present the following
disclosures: risk	 information across a sufficient number of PD grades (including default) to
assessment*	 allow for a meaningful differentiation of credit risk:
Total exposures (for corporate, sovereign and bank, outstanding loans and
149
EAD on undrawn commitments; for equities, outstanding amount);
• For banks on the IRB advanced apcc', pe-'&ig'tieà average LGD
(percentage); and
Exposure weighted-average risk-weight.
For banks on the IRB advanced approach, amount of undrawn commitments
l50
and exposure-weighted average EAD for each portfolio;
'Si
For each retail portfolio (as defined above), either:
• Disclosures as outlined above on a pool basis (i.e. same as for non-retail
portfolios); or
• Analysis of exposures on a pooi basis (outstanding loans and EAD on
commitments) against a sufficient number of EL grades to allow for a
meaningful differentiation of credit risk.
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Quantitative	 (e) Actual losses (e.g. charge-offs and specific provisions) in the preceding
disclosures:	 period for each portfolio (as defined above) and how this differs from past
historical results* experience. A discussion of the factors that impacted on the loss experience
in the preceding period - for example, has the bank experienced higher than
average default rates, or higher than average LGDs and EADs.
152
Banks' estimates against actual outcomes over a longer period. 	 At a minimum, this
should include information on estimates of losses against actual losses in each
portfolio (as defined above) over a period sufficient to allow for a meaningful
153
assessment of the performance of the internal rating processes for each portfolio.
Where appropriate, banks should further decompose this to provide analysis of PD
and, for banks on the advanced JRB approach, LGD and EAD outcomes against
154
estimates provided in the quantitative risk assessment disclosures above.
Table 7
Credit risk mitigation: disclosures for standardised and IRB approaches 
i55,i56
Qualitative
Disclosures *
The general qualitative disclosure requirement (paragraph 824) with respect to
credit risk mitigation including:
• policies and processes for, and an indication of the extent to which the bank
makes use of, on- and off-balance sheet netting;
• policies and processes for collateral valuation and management;
• a description of the main types of collateral taken by the bank;
• the main types of guarantor/credit derivative counterparty and their
creditworthiness; and
• information about (market or credit) risk concentrations within the mitigation
taken.
Quantitative	 (b)	 For each separately disclosed credit risk portfolio under the standardised
Disclosures *	 and/or foundation IRD approach, the total exposure (after, where applicable,
on- or off- balance sheet netting) that is covered by:
eligible financial collateral; and
other eligible IRB collateral;
157
after the application of haircuts.
For each separately disclosed portfolio under the standardised and/or IRB approach, the total
exposure (after, where applicable, on- or off-balance sheet netting) that is covered by
guarantees/credit derivatives.
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Table 8
Securitisation: disclosure for standardised and IRB approaches
Qualitative	 (a) The general qualitative disclosure requirement (paragraph 824) with respect to
disclosures*	 securitisation (including synthetics), including a discussion of:
• the bank's objectives in relation to securitisation activity, including the
extent to which these activities transfer credit risk of the underlying
securitised exposures away from the bank to other entities;
158
• the roles played by the bank in the securitisation process 	 and an indication
of the extent of the bank's involvement in each of them; and
• the regulatory capital approaches (e.g. RBA, IAA and SFA) that the bank
follows for its securitisation activities.
(b) Summary of the banks accounting policies for securitisation activities,
including:
• whether the transactions are treated as sales or financings;
• recognition of gain on sale;
• key assumptions for valuing retained interests, including any significant
changes since the last reporting period and the impact of such changes;
and
• treatment of synthetic securitisations if this is not covered by other
accounting policies (e.g. on derivatives).
(c) Names of ECAIs used for securitisations and the types of securitisation
exposure for which each agency is used.
Quantitative	 (d) The total outstanding exposures securitised by the bank and subject to the
disclosures*	 securitisation framework (broken down into traditionallsynthetic), by exposure
159,160,161
type.
(e) For exposures securitised by the bank and subject to the securitisation
framework:
amount of impaired/past due assets securitised; and
162
• losses recognised by the bank during the current period broken down by
exposure type.
163(1) Aggregate amount of securitisation exposures retained or purchased broken
down by exposure type.
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(g) Aggregate amount of securitisation exposures retained or purchased and the associated IRB
capital charges for these exposures broken down into a meaningful number of risk weight bands.
Exposures that have been deducted entirely from Tier 1 capital, credit enhancing I/Os deducted
from Total Capital, and other exposures deducted from total capital should be disclosed
separately by type of underlying asset.
(h) For securitisations subject to the early amortisation treatment, the following items by underlying
asset type for securitised facilities:
the aggregate drawn exposures attributed to the seller's and investors' interests;
• the aggregate IRB capital charges incurred by the bank against its retained (i.e. the seller's)
shares of the drawn balances and undrawn lines; and
• the aggregate IRB capital charges incurred by the bank against the investor's shares of drawn
balances and undrawn lines.
(i) Banks using the standardised approach are also subject to disclosures (g) and (h), but should use
the capital charges for the standardised approach.
(j) Summary of current year's securitisation activity, including the amount of exposures securitised
(by exposure type), and recognised gain or loss on sale by asset type.
3. Market risk
Table 9
164
Market risk: disclosures for banks using the standardised approach
Qualitative	 (a) The general qualitative disclosure requirement (paragraph 824) for market
disclosures	 risk including the portfolios covered by the standardised approach.
Quantitative	 (b) The capital requirements for:
disclosures
• interest rate risk;
• equity position risk;
• foreign exchange risk; and
• commodity risk.
Table 10
Market risk: disclosures for banks using the internal models approach (IMA) for trading
portfolios
Qualitative	 (a) The general qualitative disclosure requirement (paragraph 824) for market
disclosures	 risk including the portfolios covered by the IMA.
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For each portfolio covered by the IMA:
the characteristics of the models used;
a description of stress testing applied to the portfolio; and
• a description of the approach used for backtesting/validating the
accuracy and consistency of the internal models and modelling
processes.
The scope of acceptance by the supervisor.
Quantitative	 (d) For trading portfolios under the IMA:
disclosures
The high, mean and low VaR values over the reporting period and
period-end; and
• A comparison of VaR estimates with actual gains/losses experienced
by the bank, with analysis of important "outliers" in backtest results.
4. Operational risk
Table 11
Operational risk
Qualitative
disclosures
(a) In addition to the general qualitative disclosure requirement (paragraph 824), the
approach(es) for operational risk capital assessment for which the bank
qualifies.
(b) Description of the AMA, if used by the bank, including a discussion of relevant
internal and external factors considered in the bank's measurement approach. In
the case of partial use, the scope and coverage of the different approaches used.
(c) *	 For banks using the AMA, a description of the use of insurance for the purpose of
mitigating operational risk.
5. Equities
Table 12
Equities: disclosures for banking book positions
Qualitative	 (a) The general qualitative disclosure requirement (paragraph 824) with respect to
Disclosures	 equity risk, including:
• differentiation between holdings on which capital gains are expected and
those taken under other objectives including for relationship and
strategic reasons; and
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• discussion of important policies covering the valuation and accounting of
equity holdings in the banking book. This includes the accounting
techniques and valuation methodologies used, including key
assumptions and practices affecting valuation as well as significant
changes in these practices.
Quantitative	 (b) Value disclosed in the balance sheet of investments, as well as the fair value of
Disclosures*
	
	 those investments; for quoted securities, a comparison to publicly quoted share
values where the share price is materially different from fair value.
(c) The types and nature of investments, including the amount that can be
classified as:
Publicly traded; and
Privately held.
(d) The cumulative realised gains (losses) arising from sales and liquidations in
the reporting period.
(e)
165
Total unrealised gains (losses)
166
Total latent revaluation gains (losses)
any amounts of the above included in Tier 1 and/or Tier 2 capital.
(f) Capital requirements broken down by appropriate equity groupings, consistent
with the bank's methodology, as well as the aggregate amounts and the type of
equity investments subject to any supervisory transition or grandfathering
provisions regarding regulatory capital requirements.
6. Interest rate risk in the banking book
Table 13
Interest rate risk in the banking book (IRRBB)
Qualitative	 (a) The general qualitative disclosure requirement (paragraph 824), including the
disclosures
	
	 nature of IRRBB and key assumptions, including assumptions regarding loan
prepayments and behaviour of non-maturity deposits, and frequency of IRRBB
measurement.
(b) The increase (decline) in earnings or economic value (or relevant measure used
Quantitative	 by management) for upward and downward rate shocks according to
disclosures	 management's method for measuring IRRBB, broken down by currency (as
relevant).
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Endnotes:
113
i14 
These components include Tier 1 capital, total capital and total required capital.
For some small banks with stable risk profiles, annual reporting may be acceptable. Where a bank
publishes information on only an annual basis, it should state clearly why this is appropriate.
In this section of this Framework, disclosures marked with an asterisk are conditions for use of a
particular approach or methodology for the calculation of regulatory capital.
Entity = securities, insurance and other financial subsidiaries, commercial subsidiaries, significant
minority equity investments in insurance, financial and commercial entities.
117 
Following the listing of significant subsidiaries in consolidated accounting, e.g. lAS 27.
118 
Following the listing of subsidiaries in consolidated accounting, e.g. lAS 31.
i i9
May be provided as an extension (extension of entities only if they are significant for the
consolidating bank) to the listing of significant subsidiaries in consolidated accounting, e.g. LAS 27 and
32.
i 20
Surplus capital in unconsolidated regulated subsidiaries is the difference between the amount of the
investment in those entities and their regulatory capital requirements.
See paragraphs 30 and 33.
i22
A capital deficiency is the amount by which actual capital is less than the regulatory capital
requirement. Any deficiencies which have been deducted on a group level in addition to the investment
in such subsidiaries are not to be included in the aggregate capital deficiency.
124 
See paragraph 31.
i25 
See paragraph 30.
Innovative instruments are covered under the Committee's press release, Instruments eligible for
inclusion in Tier I capital (27 October 1998).
127 
See paragraph 33.
Representing 50% of the difference (when expected losses as calculated within the IRB approach
exceed total provisions) to be deducted from Tier I capital.
Including 50% of the difference (when expected losses as calculated within the IRB approach
exceed total provisions) to be deducted from Tier 2 capital.
Banks should distinguish between the separate non-mortgage retail portfolios used for the Pillar 1
capital calculation (i.e. qualifying revolving retail exposures and other retail exposures) unless these
portfolios are insignificant in size (relative to overall credit exposures) and the risk profile of each
portfolio is sufficiently similar such that separate disclosure would not help users' understanding of the
risk profile of the banks' retail business.
130
Capital requirements are to be disclosed only for the approaches used.
i3i
Including proportion of innovative capital instruments.
i 32
Table 4 does not include equities.
i33
That is, afler accounting offsets in accordance with the applicable accounting regime and without
taking into account the effects of credit risk mitigation techniques, e.g. collateral and netting.
i34
Where the period end position is representative of the risk positions of the bank during the period,
average gross exposures need not be disclosed.
i 35
Where average amounts are disclosed in accordance with an accounting standard or other
requirement which specifies the calculation method to be used, that method should be followed.
Otherwise, the average exposures should be calculated using the most frequent interval that an entity's
systems generate for management, regulatory or other reasons, provided that the resulting averages are
representative of the bank's operations. The basis used for calculating averages need be stated only if
not on a daily average basis.
i 36
This breakdown could be that applied under accounting rules, and might, for instance, be (a) loans,
commitments and other non-derivative off balance sheet exposures, (b) debt securities, and (c) OTC
derivative.
137
Geographical areas may comprise individual countries, groups of countries or regions within
countries. Banks might choose to define the geographical areas based on the way the bank's portfolio is
geographically managed. The criteria used to allocate the loans to geographical areas should be
specified.
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138
This may already be covered by accounting standards, in which case banks may wish to use the
same maturity groupings used in accounting.
i40 
Banks are encouraged also to provide an analysis of the ageing of past-due loans.
The portion of general allowance that is not allocated to a geographical area should be disclosed
separately.
The reconciliation shows separately specific and general allowances; the information comprises: a
description of the type of allowance; the opening balance of the allowance; charge-offs taken against
the allowance during the period; amounts set aside (or reversed) for estimated probable loan losses
during the period, any other adjustments (e.g. exchange rate differences, business combinations,
acquisitions and disposals of subsidiaries), including transfers between allowances; and the closing of
the allowance. Charge-offs and recoveries that have been recorded directly to the income statement
should be disclosed separately.
2 
A de minim is exception would apply where ratings are used for less than 1% of the total loan
portfolio.
143	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .
This information need not be disclosed if the bank complies with a standard mappmg which is
published by the relevant supervisor
144
Equities need only be disclosed here as a separate portfolio where the bank uses the PD/LGD
approach for equities held in the banking book.
145
In both the qualitative disclosures and quantitative disclosures that follow, banks should distinguish
between the qualifying revolving retail exposures and other retail exposures unless these portfolios are
insignificant in size (relative to overall credit exposures) and the risk profile of each portfolio is
sufficiently similar such that separate disclosure would not help users' understanding of the risk profile
of the banks' retail business.
146
This disclosure does not require a detailed description of the model in full - it should provide the
reader with a broad overview of the model approach, describing definitions of the variables, and
methods for estimating and validating those variables set out in the quantitative risk disclosures below.
This should be done for each of the five portfolios. Banks should draw out any significant differences
in approach to estimating these variables within each portfolio.
147
This is to provide the reader with context for the quantitative disclosures that follow. Banks need
only describe main areas where there has been material divergence from the reference definition of
default such that it would affect the readers' ability to compare and understand the disclosure of
exposures by PD grade.
The PD, LGD and EAD disclosures below should reflect the effects of collateral, netting and
guarantees/credit derivatives, where recognised under Part 2. Disclosure of each PD grade should
include the exposure weighted-average PD for each grade. Where banks are aggregating PD grades for
the purposes of disclosure, this should be a representative breakdown of the distribution of PD grades
used in the IRB approach.
149
Outstanding loans and EAD on undrawn commitments can be presented on a combined basis for
these disclosures.
i 50
Banks need only provide one estimate of EAD for each portfolio. However, where banks believe it
is helpful, in order to give a more meaningful assessment of risk, they may also disclose EAD estimates
across a number of EAD categories, against the undrawn exposures to which these relate.
Banks would normally be expected to follow the disclosures provided for the non-retail portfolios.
However, banks may choose to adopt EL grades as the basis of disclosure where they believe this can
provide the reader with a meaningful differentiation of credit risk. Where banks are aggregating
internal grades (either PD/LGD or EL) for the purposes of disclosure, this should be a representative
breakdown of the distribution of those grades used in the IRB approach.
i52
These disclosures are a way of further informing the reader about the reliability of the information
provided in the "quantitative disclosures: risk assessment" over the long run. The disclosures are
requirements from year-end 2009; In the meantime, early adoption would be encouraged. The phased
implementation is to allow banks sufficient time to build up a longer run of data that will make these
disclosures meaningful.
The Committee will not be prescriptive about the period used for this assessment. Upon
implementation, it might be expected that banks would provide these disclosures for as long run of data
as possible - for example, if banks have 10 years of data, they might choose to disclose the average
default rates for each PD grade over that 10-year period. Annual amounts need not be disclosed.
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154
Banks should provide this further decomposition where it will allow users greater insight mto the
reliability of the estimates provided in the 'quantitative disclosures: risk assessment'. In particular,
banks should provide this information where there are material differences between the PD, LGD or
EAD estimates given by banks compared to actual outcomes over the long run. Banks should also
provide explanations for such differences.
At a minimum, banks must give the disclosures below in relation to credit risk mitigation that has
been recognised for the purposes of reducing capital requirements under this Framework. Where
relevant, banks are encouraged to give further information about mitigants that have not been
recognised for that purpose.
Credit derivatives that are treated, for the purposes of this Framework, as part of synthetic
securitisation structures should be excluded from the credit risk mitigation disclosures and included
within those relating to securitisation.
157
If the comprehensive approach is applied, where applicable, the total exposure covered by collateral
afler haircuts should be reduced further to remove any positive adjustments that were applied to the
exposure, as permitted under Part 2.
158
For example: originator, investor, servicer, provider of credit enhancement, sponsor of asset backed
commercial paper facility, liquidity provider, swap provider.
i 59
For example, credit cards, home equity, auto, etc.
160
Securitisation transactions in which the originating bank does not retain any securitisation exposure
should be shown separately but need only be reported for the year of inception.
161
Where relevant, banks are encouraged to differentiate between exposures resulting from activities in
which they act only as sponsors, and exposures that result from all other bank securitisation activities
that are subject to the securitisation framework.
162
For example, charge-offs/allowances (if the assets remain on the bank's balance sheet) or write-
downs of I/O strips and other residual interests.
163
Securitisation exposures, as noted in Part 2, Section IV, include, but are not restricted to, securities,
liquidity facilities, other commitments and credit enhancements such as 110 strips, cash collateral
accounts and other subordinated assets.
164
The standardised approach here refers to the "standardised measurement method" as defined in the
Market Risk Amendment.
165 
Unrealised gains (losses) recognised in the balance sheet but not through the profit and loss
account.
166
Unrealised gains (losses) not recognised either in the balance sheet or through the profit and loss
account.
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